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After Chancellor Angela Merkel opened Germany’s borders in 2015 in the ‘Great Summer of 
Migration’, many cities were left utilising ad-hoc policy interventions and housing 
infrastructure that was unprepared for the level of incoming asylum-seekers. Berlin in 
particular experienced a significant collapse of its policy governance around asylum housing 
and integration benefits, leading the city government to an unprecedented direct policy 
partnership with consulting firm McKinsey & Co. Leverkusen, which had an existing model 
of refugee housing policy since 2002, utilised the institutional framework of its eponymous 
Leverkusen Model to expand its features and adapt the city’s response accordingly.   
  
Housing, however, is a contentious subject around German cities because housing shortages 
have affected German cities for the past two to three decades since cities across the country 
sold off their municipal housing companies to private owners in order to compensate for 
budgetary shortfalls amid economic pullback. Housing thus became a focal point not just for 
refugee integration, but as a policy over which cities must regain some control.  
  
This thesis contributes to a growing field of study on refugee housing, urban integration, and 
policy governance, centred on the refugee experience by being one of the first, if not the first 
comparative research of refugee housing policy utilising multi-level governance as a 
framework, as well as the first to study the Leverkusen Model in depth. It does so 
conceptually and empirically by exploring complexities around policy governance and 
implementation, as well as subjective experiences of housing and integration processes for 
refugees. Conceptually, this thesis draws from Multi-Level Governance and Integration 
theory literature and engages with concepts of collaborative governance, public-private 
partnerships, policy implementation, policy learning, interculturalism, civil society 
engagement and housing as an object of theorising. Empirically, this thesis provides a 
detailed account of refugee housing and integration policies in Berlin and Leverkusen, 
supported by in-depth interviews with government employees, NGO workers, and Syrian 
refugees. This culminates in the creation of an original theoretical framework for refugee 
housing policy, the first of its kind.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction   
1.1 Background  
  In the summer of 2015, Chancellor Angela Merkel and Germany made a decision that 
would have been inconceivable for the country 20 years prior: the Dublin Regulation (see 
European Union, 2013) was suspended, and Germany welcomed in refugees from across 
Europe who would have otherwise been legally obligated to lodge an application for asylum 
in their countries of first entry in the European Union (EU), which for many was Greece and 
Italy. Instead, these refugees were not only allowed to submit an application for asylum 
within Germany, but they found eager and enthusiastic German citizens waiting for them to 
arrive and help them begin new lives in Germany.   
  Germany received 60% of all applications for asylum in the EU in 2016, and 5 times 
the number of applications of any other European neighbourhood country in the peak years 
of 2015 and 2016 (Eurostat, 2017).  
  However, the suddenness of Merkel’s decision left many local authorities struggling 
to develop immediate spaces for refugees to be sheltered while their applications could be 
processed. Furthermore, refugees could not be expected to live in the temporary shelters and 
refugee-specific accommodations forever while they sought jobs and education within the 
country; the influx of refugees made Germany acknowledge and face a national housing 
shortage across its major and smaller cities, and cities have responded with a variety of 
means to either facilitate refugee access to the housing market while developing more general 
housing structures, or severely restrict them.  
  Thus, we1 seek to understand and juxtapose the policy responses between two cities 
comparable in terms of their governance structures through the following research questions:  
 
1 ‘We’ is often preferred to ‘I’ in certain places throughout this thesis, as appropriate, to recognise that this 





1. What were the main mechanisms, instruments and types of housing adopted in the 
two cities for the governance of refugee housing policy?   
2. How do the two cities’ differing responses to refugee housing policies affect refugee 
integration prospects in the respective cities?  
3. How can refugee housing policy governance be structured to best facilitate refugee 
integration?  
  
  This thesis will explore the local reactions to the refugee influx in two German cities, 
Leverkusen and Berlin, and will analyse how the two cities crafted their governance over the 
aspects of policies covering refugee housing, including the construction and location of 
refugee-specific accommodation, as well as the policies enacted towards integrating refugees 
into German society. We define ‘refugee’, for the purpose of residence in Germany, as any 
asylum-seeker holding any protected status (full asylum, subsidiary, humanitarian) from the 
German government. 
The two cities were chosen for three main reasons: first, Leverkusen is recognised as 
a model of ‘best practice’ within policy discussions (see Deutscher Bundestag, 2014), which, 
if true, should provide a benchmark against which to analyse a more idealised MLG 
structure; second, Berlin received a high number of refugees for a comparably small city size 
(~5% of all refugees in Germany are placed in Berlin), making it a reasonably centralised 
‘hub’; and third, their overall multi-level governance (MLG) structures are similar enough to 
compare their policy implementation practices and draw illustrative policy lessons.   
Our core argument surrounding these research questions follows on from and 
synthesises interculturalist theory (see chapter 3.2.6) and collaborative governance (see 





i.e., my supervisors and numerous interview partners. Without their input helping to shape this thesis, it would 
not contain the substance and structure that it does now. My usage of ‘we’ reflects that while the research itself 
came from my own ideas and curiosities, much like the implementation of policies for refugees, there is a 
necessity for input, feedback, and impact that shapes the result, as well as including the reader in the research 
journey.  
intervention and access for refugees granted by the government when in a governance 
partnership with refugee-facing organisations. However, because Germany’s housing market 
is largely informal, a government’s ability to promote direct contact between Germans and 
refugees is also integral in ensuring refugees can access the housing market. Furthermore, we 
also argue that a state or city’s ability to engage in policy learning mediated through the input 
and knowledge of both refugees and refugee-facing organisations while engaging within the 
scope of collaborative governance, i.e. having both directly invested into the policy 
implementation process, will yield better results for refugee housing situations. Subsequently, 
integration will also be a boon to local governance as more refugees would be able to enter 
into work or education faster through their facilitated entry into private housing. 
‘Governance’ and ‘integration’ will be explored as theoretical concepts and practical 
implementation in the following chapters, both within the German context and outside of it.   
Overall scholarship on analysis of housing policies and its effect on refugee 
integration has been largely absent from academia, as there is more focus solely on housing 
as an object or indicator of integration rather than as something that can be delivered through 
policy to facilitate integration (see Ager & Strang, 2008; Czischke & Huisman, 2018; 
Hamann & El-Kayed, 2018; et al.), or on the issue of refugee and migrant houselessness and 
homelessness in Europe (European Observatory on Homelessness, 2016; see Pleace, 2011), 
or on the importance of ‘place and space’ and locality of cultural placement in integration 
without delving too deeply into local policy or administration (Platts-Fowler & Robinson, 
2015; Phillips & Robinson, 2015; et al.). This thesis fills a research gap that is likely to 




from global warming, with major cities expected to bear the brunt of this population influx 
(Hoegh-Guldberg, et al., 2018)2. We take a unique approach towards analysing housing for 
refugees and how housing policies are coupled with refugee inflows. We do this by utilising a 
multi-methods approach of speaking both with those who craft and implement housing 
policy, and those whom the policy impacts. First, rather than solely focusing on the 
governing/policymaking level, as much policy analysis does, this study focuses on the 
recipients of policymaking to determine whether policy successes, from the governance 
perspective, could or should be considered as much. This gives us a ‘thicker’ and more 
holistic understanding of policy and its effects, rather than keeping policy analysis and 
studies of integration separate. Second, we analyse these policies through policy governance, 
specifically looking at the factors within the multi-level governance (MLG) framework and 
how the structure of governance affects policy output. Furthermore, we utilise various strands 
of theories surrounding migrant integration to analyse how governance of refugee housing 
can affect integration prospects for refugees for better or worse, and how refugee 
predicaments are inevitably shaped by the state. This culminates in the development of a 
theoretical policy framework that combines the lessons learned from our two case studies and 
the theoretical literature to determine an ideal model for how refugee housing policies can be 
enacted in  
cities.  
Housing was chosen as a primary vector for refugee integration because it exists as 
both an object to be controlled/implemented/monitored by the state (either through 
accommodation facilities or subsidised private housing) and as something that refugees can 
‘obtain’ as a first act of agency within a new country (see King, 2009; Adam, et al., 2019). It 
exists at the centre of one’s immersion in society, either serving as a ‘home’, where one feels 
 




that they belong and are accepted as part and parcel of the neighbourhood in which they live, 
or as a ‘notable exception’ that keeps them on the fringes of society without allowing for a 
sense of inclusion (see HACT, 2004; Salvi del Pero, et al., 2016; European Foundation for 
Democracy, 2018). On a more basic level it is also something that one cannot live well 
without. When it is provided but isolated away from others (and not by choice), it can act as a 
further barrier to societal entry by restricting a refugee’s ability to obtain social connections 
(Vey, 2018).   
Housing is thus unlike two other common staples of integration, work and language 
acquisition, in that it comprises both a physical and metaphysical space that can either serve 
to include or exclude refugees from beginning or engaging in integration practices. While 
both work and language acquisition are undoubtedly important features of a refugee’s 
integration pathway, housing maintains a centrality in integration as a method of societal 
access and (permanent) settlement into a ‘home’.   
MLG was chosen as a framework of analysis because it allows for discovery of why 
and how governance structures elicit certain policy outcomes under specific conditions by 
revealing the mechanisms of policy governance and implementation (George, 2004; Homsy, 
et al., 2019). Type-II MLG contains facets within it, such as different partnership styles of 
governance between government and non-government organisations, be they corporations, 
non-profits, or something else, that can illuminate how and why policies operate as they do 
(see Kjær, 2004, and Piattoni, 2010). The discovery of these different policy outcomes 
between two cities with structural governance similarities can help us explain why these 
differences occurred and what factors contributed to those differences. Our two city case 
studies have their own respective chapters where governance structures and issues within 




This study is one of the first, if not the first, comparative refugee housing study of 
German cities to utilise MLG as an organising framework by which to understand how a 
city’s governance structure affects policy outcomes for both government and refugees, and 
reveals the specific connections between strongly and actively promoted refugee entrance 
into private housing by government and the important facets of integration. This study is also 
the first (at least in English) to analyse the Leverkusen Model as one of ‘best practice’ of both 
refugee housing policy and policy governance (see Deutscher Bundestag, 2014) and draw 
lessons from its relative success around refugee housing and integration while demonstrating 
that other cities, including Berlin, have begun (or are already) enacting facets of the Model 
that have been central to its function since its beginning in 2002 (see Flüchtlingsrat NRW, 
2017).   
This is significant for three reasons: first, because German cities’ variegated 
approaches to refugee integration allow us to determine which policies functioned best under 
similar contexts with the strain of the sudden refugee influx; second, because governing 
structures across German cities are generally similar, we can more easily determine why 
some policy responses failed while others succeeded by comparing cases; third, because 
establishing policy frameworks now from the lessons learned since 2014 can allow for cities 
both within Germany and across Europe to adjust adequately both if and when there is 
another sudden refugee influx in the future. As Europe and its cities continue to develop new 
methods and strategies of integration for increasing future refugee migration, analysis of best 
practice models can provide cities across Europe, regardless of state, with policy ideas to 
graft onto their own governance structures.  
Our ideal MLG-based theoretical framework of refugee housing and integration 
policy delivery will come from the lessons learned from the two case studies. An MLG 




literature and could help to focus the utilisation of MLG in policy studies, as well as 
understanding how governance structures can affect refugee integration prospects.  
The next sections will discuss the rationale for our theoretical selection, as well as 
theoretical contributions and the methods used in this thesis.  
  
1.2 Theoretical Contributions  
1.2.1 Multi-Level Governance  
  Currently, MLG is utilised for policy analysis in a variety of methods and frames due 
to the continuous grafting of components onto MLG as a body of work since its inception 
(see Stephenson, 2013). MLG, as an analytical framework, has been used to understand the 
structural components of various policies and styles of governance, from European 
integration policy, to energy policy, to migration policy and beyond (see Marks, 1996; 
Ohlhorst, 2015; Scholten, et al., 2015). Part of its appeal is in its flexibility in both tracking 
the interactions of relevant actors throughout government levels (Homsy, et al., 2019) and 
setting up a frame in which to analyse the nitty-gritty of issues within the broader governance 
structure that contribute to how and why policies succeed or fail, or fall somewhere in 
between. It is this reason why MLG is an analytical component of this thesis.  
Generally, however, there is disagreement within academia over whether MLG 
constitutes a school of theory, meaning it could postulate predictive outcomes based on its 
use in analysis (Bache & Flinders, 2004a) or that it is too broad and piecemeal to contribute 
meaningful analyses to academia (Peters & Pierre, 2004). As explored further in chapter 4, 
these two sides of the argument could be brought to reconciliation by what Ongaro (2015) 
calls a ‘systematic approach’, where MLG as an analytical frame is utilised in addition to a 





  For our purposes, the main internal logic of Leverkusen’s and Berlin’s governance 
styles is that of type-II multi-level governance, where specific domains are structured to 
cover refugee affairs and where external actors are brought into the fold, through contracting 
of services or through partnership governance where two entities share competence of service 
delivery while coordinating with each other and other actors. We argue that while multi-level 
governance serves to describe how the structures of Leverkusen’s and Berlin’s refugee affairs 
systems function, MLG tends to lack a functional specificity3 to explain why there are  
  
different outcomes or similar in the field of refugee integration services when it comes to 
service delivery from different or similar MLG structures, and it requires a subsidiary 
narrowing frame to discern the ‘why’ and ‘how’ of differing outcomes. This is because the 
broad-based MLG literature exists as more of a framework than a theory of how governance 
at different levels should operate. There is no widely accepted ‘ideal model’ of type-II MLG 
to which one can compare a single structure, and this is largely due to how the concept of 
MLG developed and changed over the past three decades.  
  Our approach to tackling the debate on MLG adds to a wide range of literature on the 
merits and deficiencies of MLG’s explanatory/theoretical prowess and efforts to create 
models through which MLG can have a functionally specific capability to explain policy and 
policy outcomes (Stephenson, 2013; Homsy, et al., 2019; etc.). Instead of seeking to argue 
whether or not MLG constitutes a framework or a theory, we will develop a theoretical 
framework for MLG functionality within the realm of refugee integration service delivery.  
 
3 ‘Functional specificity’ and ‘functional specialisation’ are terms used within the field of neuroscience to 
postulate that certain regions of the brain only carry out a single, focal task. In the case of MLG, I argue that 
MLG is unable to act as a predictive theory for policy because it lacks the tools a theory would typically utilise,  
i.e. a set of values, norms, or assumptions that could indicate future behaviour of a governance structure beyond 
that of democracy and federalism. In that sense, MLG has expanded beyond what Marks & Hooghe (2001) first 
presented, as a method to understand European policymaking, into a concept that describes many forms of 




 In doing so we hope to combine the logics of the various strains of theories covering 
integration, particularly those developed by Ager and Strang (2008) and Zapata-Barrero  
(2017), et al., with the efforts by MLG scholars such as Homsy, et al. (2019), Hooghe and 
Marks (2003), Stephenson (2013), Emilsson, et al. (2015), to conceive of a strong theoretical 
framework covering MLG governance that is able to facilitate the delivery of refugee 
integration services and capture the outlying, intangible, immeasurable variables that affect 
integration (Ager & Strang, 2008). We will seek to move beyond explanatory models of 
governance and posit a theoretical framework that crosses the typical policy 
analysis/integration theory boundaries. We seek to capture the centrality and effect housing, 
as a physical and community space, has on other commonly measured facets of refugee 
integration, as well as how policy and governance of refugee housing policy can intervene in 
or interfere with refugee integration, and postulate a theoretical framework that can elicit 
better policy and integration outcomes for cities and refugees, respectively.  
  Through the empirical work of this thesis, as well as the background provided by the 
MLG and integration theory literature, we hope to adequately account for the work of 
individuals, both in and outside of positions of power, internal (government) actors, and 
external (civil society) actors within the structure of a given city’s laws. This expanded 
theoretical framework will have the ability to bring together integration and governance 
theories using comparative research and public policy analysis to bridge the gap in the 
existing policy, governance, and integration literatures.  
  The impact of such a theoretical model/framework would have bearing on all states 
and governing entities that deal with refugees and so-called ‘hard to integrate’ migrant 
populations. Additionally, the theoretical framework proposed here would impact the 
theoretical study of integration and MLG as separate strands of literature while contributing 




implementation and subsequent integration pathways, such as party politics and city 
budgetary concerns. Such an approach would galvanise the disparate strands of literature in 
both avenues and attempt to cover a broad enough base to be applicable across differing 
governance structures.  
  One admitted difficulty with creating a model of governance to cover refugee 
integration services is that many countries and cities do integration services differently, and 
models of governance may differ from city to city within the same country, as seen in this 
thesis. Some countries’ central governments outsource service delivery at the local level to 
private providers, such as the United Kingdom, leaving little purview for municipalities to 
oversee integration besides in more peripheral ways. Others, such as Germany, are devolved 
polities in which the regional governments have a major financial and policy-making stake, 
leading to varying outcomes across cities and states. Outcomes are often endemic to political 
willingness at both the city and state level regardless of central government support; for 
instance, when Berlin’s Lageso (Landesamt für Gesundheit und Soziales, State Office for 
Health and Social Affairs) sought to burden-share refugee numbers with ensconcing 
neighbour Brandenburg, the surrounding state refused to take any more refugees than their 
allotted quota (Sebastian Muschter interview, 2018).   
  However, the intention of the proposed new theoretical framework (chapter 7) is not 
to overwrite a city/state’s governance structure, but rather demonstrate aspects where a 
government can engage in policy learning and adaptation in order to improve refugee 
housing and integration prospects and utilise its ideas within the city’s unique governance 
context. This holds relevance for cities across Europe in both federal and centralised states, 
especially where there is a lack of clarity at the national (and supranational) level for the 




than their national governments and more willing to act in lieu of national (or EU) directives 
(see  
Buonanno, 2017).   
    
1.2.2 Theories of Integration  
  Theories of integration cover a wide conceptual ground and hold viewpoints from, 
generally, three levels and directions: the individual/actor level looks towards the 
mesosocietal and government levels for ‘guidance’ on integration necessities, such as cultural 
idiosyncrasies and understanding how society is ordered/formulated through government 
action; the meso-societal level looks towards both the individual and government levels, both 
for guidance in cultural norms and acceptance within the acceptable ‘societal bubble’ in 
which it exists and whether the new individuals are acculturated enough to enter the 
mesosocietal level; and the government level looks downward at both, presenting norms 
through enforced laws and governance styles that dictate what concepts are held to be 
important within the state, i.e. equality, religious freedom, etc.   
  From within these three general levels we will look at various strands of integration 
theory that concerns how these levels interact (if they do) and what implications there are for 
refugee integration. These theories will be explored in chapter 3.  
With regard to existing integration theory literature, we will take one variable 
generally accepted as a key ingredient in a migrant’s integration, housing, and seek to 
measure its impact upon a refugee’s immersion into society. We make the argument that 
housing comprises one of the most, if not the most important aspect of integration, and can 
strongly determine a refugee’s ‘integration course’ (see HACT, 2004; Ager & Strang, 2008; 




refugees recall the different types of housing and accommodation they experienced, what the 
conditions were, and how it affected them.   
  In this way we will exemplify an actor-theory gap in which housing and housing 
types lend the actors, i.e. the refugees, the agency with which to better take control of their 
integration prospects. One argument is that housing acts as a springboard into other facets of 
integration while remaining a constant, i.e. a refugee may move from education to work but 
his or her housing situation will remain relatively consistent for longer durations of time. 
With that in mind, it is necessary to understand that housing is both a physical and mental 
space, encompassing both a structure in which one lives along with the surrounding 
neighbourhood, and a place in which a person can feel secure and relaxed without the stress 
of an evanescent housing situation, i.e. living in a hotel or hostel short-term, a mass 
accommodation with relatively little privacy and lower standards of sanitation, or in a shelter 
of any type.   
  Much of the integration theory literature considers housing to be a ‘tangible’, 
‘measurable’ variable that is a marker of integration without defining whether housing 
constitutes solely a physical object a government can measure as indicating greater 
integration or something that, once obtained, can lead to greater integration (Ager and Strang, 
2008; see Adam, et al., 2019). However, the same literature is more concerned with the 
conceptual and metaphysical methods of adaptation by migrants and refugees towards their 
new country of residence rather than ascribing weight towards the tangible aspects, such as 
housing, language acquisition, education, and so forth (Berry, 2004; Zapata-Barrero, 2017; 
Goodman, 2010; et al.). Within the various frameworks proposed of how a migrant finds his 
or her way through the new intricacies they face are socio-psychological theories of 
integration, theories on continuing transnational identities, the fight between ‘civic 




etc., all of which depends on an increasingly metaphysical, broad-stroke understanding of 
integration.  
Part of the argument is that these grander, broad theories of integration have difficulty 
accounting for individual differences and tangible accomplishments by new arrivals in their 
new country of residence. They ignore an actor-focused ontology in order to paint with a 
broad brush, when in fact the individual actor and how they interact with the governing and 
societal structures is the most important facet of integration. There are two foci in a 
theoretical ‘road to integration’: the starting line, i.e. where the refugee is mentally on the 
first day when he or she arrives, and the ‘finish line’, i.e. where one would consider 
themselves ‘integrated’ into their new home. The space between the two points is filled with 
continual interactions with governance and societal structures, and will be expounded upon 
further on in the thesis.  
  With regard to the previously mentioned model development, housing will be taken 
as the central facet attributed to the framework as it can be overseen by a governing entity 
and the refugee has a method of agency in deciding where he or she chooses to live in the 
two case studies of Leverkusen and Berlin. Thus, it becomes a quintessential variable in 
determining how best to ascertain a multi-level governance structure that functions for both 
the governance structure and refugees. It will act to bridge the divide between the bodies of 
integration theories and MLG, as housing can accommodate the more metatheoretical aspects 
of integration while being tangible and measurable.   
  Finally, integration as a catch-all term will be explored and narrowed within the 
purview of the refugee experience, as refugees experience a different subjective reality than 
traditional legal migrants, and thus should not be classified with the same expectations as 





1.3 Methods  
Our two cities, Leverkusen and Berlin, were selected because of the latter’s higher 
plurality of refugee reception as a percentage of population relative to Germany as a whole 
and the former’s policy model referred to as one of best practice, while both share a similar 
governance structure, allowing for an illustration and comparison of their governance 
structures. Their operating policy managers and administrators contain comparable 
directionality of contact, with lines of access to the relevant recipients of policy output 
(refugees) and modes of communication and transparency between governance partners (both 
cities operate within Type I and Type II MLG with third-party partnerships).  
Two rounds of fieldwork were conducted within Germany for a total of two months, 
with one month spent in both Berlin and Leverkusen. There were 44 total semi-structured 
interviews, divided between 26 in Berlin and 18 in Leverkusen. The disparity between the 
numbers is accounted for by the lower population in Leverkusen, as well as the smaller 
number of civil service and NGO actors involved in integration service delivery, as per the 
function of the Leverkusen Model. In Berlin, 13 interviews were conducted with recognised 
Syrian refugees, 8 with non-profit/NGO/social workers, and 5 with current and former civil 
service workers and policymakers. Syrian refugees were chosen specifically because of the 
rights allocation differentiation within Germany’s 2016 Integrationsgesetz, which allowed 
refugees from countries with high acceptance rates to receive immediate integration benefits 
rather than waiting until after an asylum decision has been reached. Anonymised 
interviewees from Berlin are given 2-letter identifiers. In Leverkusen, 7 interviews were 
carried out with recognised Syrian refugees, 7 with non-profit/NGO/social workers, and 4 
with civil service workers. Anonymised interviewees from Leverkusen are given 3-letter 




my interview partners either spoke English as a second or third language with a high degree 
of fluency (and those who did wished to practice speaking English), or they spoke German.  
The interviews conducted in German were translated by me into English for transcription. 
Ethical clearance for interviews with a vulnerable population was granted by the University 
of York ELMPS Ethics Committee 27 July 2018. 
  Initial interviews were obtained through phone calls, e-mails, or social media queries. 
Almost all were face-to-face, though one interviewee had to respond via written questions 
through e-mail due to issues of availability, while another was conducted via phone, as the 
interview partner lived in a different city. Subsequent interviews were obtained via chain 
referrals or ‘snowballing’, where one subject would recommend one of his or her contacts for 
a further interview. Snowballing mostly benefited the numbers of interviews with Syrian 
refugees I had, as refugees often maintained active networks of contact with other Syrians, as 
well as friends and volunteers they met throughout their journeys.   
Several events about Syrian life in Germany were attended with interview partners, as 
well as several sprachcafes. Most interviews took place in public spaces, such as in cafes, the 
interviewees’ workspaces or libraries, though some Syrian interview partners invited me into 
their places of residence or homes, as it was more comfortable for them to sit in a place that 
was familiar, as well as maintaining a home-worn custom of inviting guests into one’s home 
to serve both food and tea even during the interview allowed for greater comfort in 
interviewing (Harris & Roberts, 2003). I found that speaking to interview partners in the 
places in which they lived elicited stronger and more salient observations and recollections 
about the process of obtaining a private space than when speaking with interview partners in 
public spaces. Conducting interviews in their residences also clarified the emotions they held 
that they associated with the place itself and what it symbolised; for those interview partners 




greater pride about the process of obtaining the space and their situation in Germany in 
general, while interview partners who were either in government accommodations or coming 
to the end of a lease period (see chapter on Berlin) expressed greater anxiety, not just over 
housing, but over residency status, obtaining work, education, etc.  
  All interviews were recorded with the permissions of the interview partners except for 
several where the participant requested no recording be made. In lieu of a recording, 
meticulous notes were taken both during and after the interviews, and then typed up for 
storage. Anonymity was granted automatically for all refugee participants, and for those 
nonrefugee interview partners who requested not to be identified in the write-up of this study. 
Several follow-up messages were sent (with the participants’ permission) to refugee 
participants to ‘check in’ and see if their situations had improved in the time since the 
interview. All notes taken during interviews and interview transcripts were typed up and 
stored in NVivo, and those who requested their data be deleted once this thesis is complete 
have been assured the record of their interview will be erased.  
  The purpose of these interviews was to understand how refugee housing and 
integration policy operated on three levels: that of the refugee, that of the NGO/civil society 
effort to help refugees understand German society, and that of the government. Identifying 
individual perspectives that were couched within the respective cities’ policies allowed for 
eliciting areas of best practice and greater understanding of both the perceptions of how the 
respective cities were coping with the current situation as well as how the people in the cities 
interacted with the policies and believed there could be improvements (Devine, 2002). A 
secondary purpose was to understand how policies can be considered either successful or one 
of ‘best practice’, and determine if and how a policy that works in one city can be 
successfully learned/transferred to another (see chapter 8.3.1). As previously discussed, the 




so it was important to capture these differences in order to understand what sort of policy 
worked best for both the government and the refugees (Vromen, 2010).   
This study does not claim to be representative of issues facing refugees with regard to 
their housing situations; rather, the interviews provide the colour to the sketches provided by 
the other data. There were issues of access surrounding both refugee and government 
participants. One of the limitations of the data I collected was the relative dearth of female 
Syrian interviewees. This is due to several factors: first, my initial Syrian contact in Berlin 
knew mostly men, and thus I spoke to mostly Syrian men with the exception of two women. 
Second, being a male interviewer makes my access that much more difficult given cultural 
complexities around language and broaching conversation about interviews, as well as the 
perception of differences regarding backgrounds that may make interview partners wary to 
interview with someone about their possibly traumatic experiences for research rather than 
for something that may be perceived as more pragmatically useful, such as a study on refugee 
health or direct discussions with policymakers (Frazier, 2020).  
  Issues of selection bias are inherent in chain referrals given it is more likely that an 
interviewee will refer someone in a similar situation to themselves (available and willing to 
be reached via phone or computer, likely to be social, or willing to talk about their situation) 
(Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981). An example of this is how one of my interview partners in 
Berlin reached out to a refugee who was still living in the mass accommodations several 
years after his arrival. He refused an interview because he believed (according to my 
interview partner) that his perspective was not worthwhile since he was still living in the 
mass accommodation and unable to support himself or become more fully versed in German 
while living in Germany. Alternatively, those who had more ‘controlled’ lives, i.e. those who 
were working, in education, or generally active contributed to this thesis, exemplifying a gap 




unfortunately cannot cover those who have fallen through the gaps in the system, or those 
who faced similar obstacles to my interview partners and met rejection or difficulty where 
my interview partners succeeded.   
  Additionally, there were issues of access to public figures and politicians given both 
my status as an overseas PhD researcher and their reluctance to agree to interview for this 
specific research. In Berlin, this was encapsulated in the lack of response by many members 
of parliament (save for the one interviewed), as well as being told that their schedules could 
not accommodate an interview despite contacting them well in advance of fieldwork. In 
Leverkusen, this was prevalent in political party representatives telling me first that there was 
no one available to interview in English, and then that there was no one available to interview 
at all when presented with the option of interviewing in German. Possible reasons for this 
could be due to my lack of ‘insider knowledge’ of the party, i.e. having an insider contact 
who could facilitate an interview, as well as my relatively ‘unimportant’ status as a PhD 
researcher, or the topic of the research as politically sensitive (Frazier, 2020). Additionally, 
given my German speaking abilities are more conversational than fluent, there may have 
been general reluctance on the part of party officials to communicate with someone with a 
comprehension deficit.  
  To close this data deficit, I have examined research conducted by other academics 
who have worked on similar/related topics to support this thesis, though this research can 
only be used as a supplement rather than a replacement for interview data given the novelty 
of the approaches and research practice in this thesis that are less typical in conventional 
housing or refugee research.   
This thesis is divided between knowledge derivations from literature and experiences 
derived from interviews with recognised refugees in Germany, volunteers/NGO workers, and 




utilised mainly as a foundational bedrock for both theory and background knowledge that 
informed how the research questions were posed, and what types of questions were asked 
during the interviews with the various interview partners. All literature contributions are 
weighed critically and are juxtaposed with conflicting ideas from other relevant literature, 
where applicable.  
A portion of this literature informs the study of path dependence and process tracing 
of the two cities in question, their respective histories of migration, and how they positioned 
themselves towards refugees when Germany accepted many more asylum seekers than the 
rest of Europe combined. This leans more heavily towards Berlin because there is a longer 
history of immigration to Berlin when compared to Leverkusen, as well as more conflicting 
politics given its nature as a formerly divided city during the Cold War. Because Berlin’s 
migration policy history is more varied than Leverkusen’s given the duration of the 
Leverkusen Model, its process tracing narrative will be filled with more ‘twists and turns’ in 
order to delineate how the city came to develop the refugee housing policy implemented at 
the time of data gathering (Collier, 2011).   
Much of the literature concerns the various theories of integration and multi-level 
governance that will be expanded upon in chapters 3 and 4. This literature contains the 
important variables and aspects of both integration and multi-level governance that the thesis 
seeks to study and analyse; within the scope of the interviews, the variables and facets of 
integration/governance that were found to be more active/important in the study of refugee 
housing policy governance were isolated and studied, and are used to structure the integration 
framework that will be created in chapter 7.   
Analysis of government documents and publications, such as from the city of Berlin, 
Leverkusen, Germany, and the EU also supplement the thesis as primary sources of data and 




in law, etc. Documents from government partners, such as Caritas in Leverkusen, are also 
used as resources. Most of these documents were published online, though several were 
obtained in person during the interviews and are noted as such throughout the course of the 
thesis when they are cited. Official documents from both government and non-government 
sources ensure there are factually anchored causal moments from which we can derive 
important signposts, especially when studying both path dependency and process tracing 
(Blatter & Haverland, 2014).  
  Above all else, this thesis relies on the subjective inputs of its interview partners, 
especially the refugee partners, and thus may inadvertently showcase individual psychologies 
and traumas rather than discussions of how policy worked for them (Bishop, 2015). A refrain 
heard from several of the interview partners was that they were doing their best to move on 
with their lives and establish a sense of normalcy while trying to leave behind or let the past 
distress they suffered fade into distant memory. For all refugee respondents, the interviews 
took place two years or more after they had arrived in Germany; in this time they had secured 
a living space, learned German, taken up education or work, began paying taxes, etc. 
Inevitably interviews, for some, prompted memories of traumas they suffered and kept in the 
back of their minds since they occurred. I followed ethics guidelines in ensuring that any 
information the interview partners wished to be kept out of the record would be. Any 
moments when the interview partners wished for the interview recording to be paused due to 
difficult emotions weren’t noted as data either.  
  While the difficult personal emotions behind the struggles of integration are mitigated 
in the presentation of the thesis through their quotes, it is not completely directed in favour of 
only commentating on policy or housing because questions of housing and integration are 
intimately tied into the refugees’ lived experiences, and to ignore that reality ignores the 




necessity for asylum exists to protect those who cannot find protection in their homelands, 
and integration serves to provide a semblance of protection and comfort through learned 
familiarity, even if efforts for integration and adjustment into a new, foreign country are not 
clearly formulated by the receiving country (Hugman, et al., 2011). While refugees engage in 
these integration programmes implemented by the host government, they remain tied to the 
incidents that drove them to flee and the experiences that demonstrated to them their 
homelands were no longer safe (Al-Ali, 2001). These experiences can surface at any time and 
in any setting, day or night, awake or asleep, and not all are able to bury their pasts and move 
forward.  
  Thus, maintaining an awareness of the ever-present mental trauma that corresponds 
with war refugees is integral in any study concerning policy over refugees and asylum, it 
should be a cornerstone of every policy concerning integration and this was a key 
consideration over the course of the interviews (Bishop, 2015).   
  The information obtained through the interviews was mainly narrowed through a 
series of questions surrounding first arrival, placement in refugee accommodations and 
subsequent moves to other accommodations, how they were able to find their first private 
residence (if they had), interactions with government for their accommodations, interactions 
with volunteers and NGO workers in helping them find accommodations, and how 
differences in their accommodations affected other factors of integration, such as education, 
German comprehension, etc. These questions were used as jump-off points for subsequent 
discussion and questions. Differences between how refugees perceived housing and 
integration and how NGOs/government officials perceived them are noted, as these 
differences are important in explaining the discrepancy between how a governance structure 
perceives policy implementation and how those on the receiving end perceive policy 




  Though this thesis is not generalisable on the broader refugee population in Germany, 
answers to the  questions fit within an expected spectrum of relative ‘success and failure’ of 
one’s ability to find a place to live and the struggles therein. This is to be expected, on the 
one hand, because, as previously stated, all refugees interviewed had been living in Germany 
for some time and were generally considered to be ‘on the right track’, i.e. knowledgeable in 
the language, enrolled in education, working a job, etc., and referrals came through those 
who were, themselves, working through the nuances of German social structures.   
On the other hand, a second reason the responses fit within a general spectrum of 
success and failure, rather than existing in an extreme outside perspective (i.e. enduring 
longterm homelessness, drug abuse, etc.) is that the refugees interviewed generally had 
educated/experienced backgrounds even if their education/work was cut short by the Syrian 
civil war. This demonstrates a slight selection bias in the interview partners for this thesis: 
before they were forced from their homes, interview partners had been engineers, musicians, 
nurses, management consultants, software engineers, geologists, opera singers, etc. There 
was, generally, a high level of education among interview partners, so they would likely be 
able to understand and adapt to changing circumstances. However, all interview partners had 
problems transferring their credentials to Germany as their qualifications were impossible to 
verify given the shambolic situation in Syria, so they all began, generally, at the same level 
when they arrived in Germany.     
   The next section will provide a chapter overview for the rest of the thesis.  
  
1.4 Chapter overview  
Chapter 2  
This chapter will give a brief history of Germany’s migration and integration policies 




1960s/1970s to the present. It will describe how we understand Germany’s conceptualisation 
of migration and integration in general, and how it has applied to refugees today. It will also 
cover in brief Germany’s housing laws and the current shortage that affects not just refugees, 
but the general population.   
Chapter 3  
The aim of this chapter is to review and critique the relevant literature on integration 
theory that predominates in the international and academic arenas and delineate the 
differences between them and how they are applied currently. Key themes of integration 
theories will be drawn out and understood through the lens of application, i.e. how concepts 
within the theories can be applied by stakeholders in integration service delivery to refugees, 
offering a critique of more generalised and ‘meta-unspecific’ notions of integration.   
Housing will be identified as a singular variable of interest as to how it can help or 
hinder the previously discussed concepts of integration, with different understandings of  
‘housing’ presented within the literature about housing and its importance as a social object. 
The instrumental theme surrounding housing as a variable of integration is that it serves a key 
purpose in either hindering or facilitating integration depending on the form it takes.   
Chapter 4  
This chapter will analyse the literature and academic debates surrounding multi-level 
governance as both a framework and a theory by which a government can maintain policy 
delivery systems within its borders. It will summarise the key points from the debate around 
the theoretical contributions of MLG and will delineate the important factors that determine 
what makes MLG a useful method of analysis.  
We will critique the disparate notions of framing MLG as an applicable predictive 




facets that comprise type II governance and how these can lead to differences in policy 
outcomes between two systems that use type II governance, even if the governing structures 
are relatively similar. These differences will be carried forward into the development of our 
theoretical framework on refugee housing policy in chapter 6.  
Chapter 5  
This chapter will revolve around the case study of Leverkusen and the empirical data 
garnered from the fieldwork conducted there. It will map out the Leverkusen Model and 
utilise relevant stakeholder interviews surrounding both the formulation and implementation 
of the Leverkusen Model as well as document analysis as provided by civil servants and 
government partners to both analyse and critique the Model’s ability to fulfil its objectives,  
i.e. helping refugees both find a place to live outside of the mass accommodations and 
provide integration support.   
The central argument of this chapter will be that Leverkusen is able to elicit better 
integration outcomes because of the governance structure of the Leverkusen Model and the 
active participation and cooperation between the government and the relevant NGO 
stakeholders it entails. This will be supported by the interviews conducted in the city with 
government officials as well as NGO workers and refugees.   
  The chapter will also contain a brief history of migration to Leverkusen, coinciding 
with the development of the Leverkusen Model and its progress since its implementation in 
2002. The successful structural governance and integration elements of the empirical work 
will be brought forward into the development of the theoretical framework that will be 




Chapter 6  
The second empirical case, Berlin, will be introduced and analysed in this chapter. In 
it, Berlin’s response to the refugee influx from 2014 will be analysed from the perspective of 
its integration service delivery governance, taking into account the viewpoints from the  
NGOs and civil society organisations that shouldered much of the burden for refugee care. 
How Berlin organises its housing governance and how its policy surrounding housing has 
evolved from 2014 to today will be covered.   
The central argument is that Berlin’s decentralised organising standards surrounding 
oversight of its refugee housing regulations created a chaotic and iniquitous system in which 
outcomes for refugees vary strongly depending on their housing experiences. Further, this 
system is exacerbated by the general housing shortage in Berlin (and across Germany), as 
well as perceptions of racism and preference for German tenants over refugee ones within the 
strained housing market.   
Berlin’s general governance structure will be mapped out and analysed in order to 
understand where it succeeded and where it failed, and how Berlin’s new initiatives are 
‘closing the gap of governance and implementation’ in terms of making housing and 
integration initiatives more accessible for refugees. The notion of Berlin having ‘unique’ 
problems from other German cities will be put to task given the city’s continuing move 
towards more inclusive housing and integration programmes, similar to those enacted in 
Leverkusen and elsewhere.  
Chapter 7  
This chapter will synthesise the key features of housing policy observed in the 
previous two empirical chapters and discuss why and how they were successes/failures. This 
discussion will be essential to pull out the variables that will help to build our theoretical 




discussed about integration and multi-level governance, and will inform us as to what 
variables within the two realms of integration and MLG can create a successful 
implementation of policy.   
This will be preceded by a short discussion as to what constitutes policy success or 
failure, as the definitions over the two terms often change or are used loosely depending on 
how they or the policies that are studied are framed.   
Our theoretical model will be visualised along with the typical stages of processing 
refugee experiences when undergoing an asylum procedure. Governance and integration 
objectives for both the government and the governance partners will be established in order 
to clarify how these objectives fit into the model, and how the model can be utilised to fulfil 
the objectives for both the government and governance partners. Because the model will be 
based on the examples of best practice from the two empirical case studies and the 
background knowledge from the respective literature, we will discuss why these examples of 
best practice were chosen in order to strengthen the model and what they imply for the 
model’s possible use in the future.  
Chapter 8  
This chapter will reflect on the application of the study and the theoretical framework 
on cities both within Germany and throughout Europe. Can other cities utilise the theoretical 
framework for refugee housing policy governance in a similar way, or are there restrictions in 
how governance can be employed at the local level? This question will segue into a broader 
discussion on how asylum and refugee integration laws are governed between the local and 
the national levels, and whether policies constructed at the national level reflect on how 
policies are made and implemented at the local level.  
This chapter will also discuss the role of the EU and how it affects refugee 




able to transfer policy ideas and communicate policy successes to each other. This will lead 
to a discussion of where the priority of asylum and refugee integration ultimately rests, and 
whether cities should have a greater say in the national considerations of how a country crafts 
its asylum and integration policies.  
There will also be a brief discussion about the future of asylum and integration 
policies, surrounding such topics as climate migration, burden sharing, sustainable housing 
allotments, etc., as it is important to look to the future of what policymakers and social 
scientists believe will occur in the realm of forced migration.  
Chapter 9  
This will be the concluding chapter, wrapping up the main points from the thesis and 
summarising how the empirical cases and the development of the theoretical framework 
answered the research questions. There will also be a list of policy recommendations based 
on the findings from this study intended to be applicable to cities with saturated housing 
sectors while hosting refugees. These recommendations will be broad-based and divided 
between short-term and long-term, i.e. that which can be implemented immediately and that 
which will take more time to fully implement.  
Finally, this chapter will briefly discuss future avenues of research that stem from the 













Chapter 2:  Ticket to Ride (or More Recently, Remain): 
Historical context of German migration  
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter will provide a general overview of Germany’s history with migration and 
integration in order to provide a greater context of understanding of the surprise and extreme 
recency of Germany’s transition into a willing country of immigration and integration. We 
will start with an overview of the first large non-ethnically German migration wave post-
World War II in the Gastarbeiter, i.e. workers (from southern Europe and Turkey, primarily) 
imported into the country to fill gaps in the workforce in order to help the country’s industry 
grow.   
We will then move into the modern era of Germany’s migration history in the latter 
part of the 1990s/early-2000s, where liberalisation reforms entailed easements on both 
citizenship and integration benefits allotted towards enabling migrants to facilitate life in 
Germany. From there, we will look at the contemporary era and how the refugee movements 
of 2014/2015 changed how Germany defines integration, as well as the burdens and 
restrictions placed upon refugees.  
Finally, we will provide an overview of the general housing situation across  
Germany, which provides us with the understanding of the general housing problems for both 
refugees and the population at large, and what led to the difficult adjustments our two city 
case studies had to make in order to acclimatise to the refugee influx.  




2.2 Gastarbeiter  
Germany’s first experience4 with large non-ethnically German populations was 
through its ‘guest worker’ (Gastarbeiter) programme that ran from 1955 to 1973. Rapid 
growth in the German economy necessitated the import of workers from other countries to 
facilitate jobs where Germany lacked qualified citizenry, though as the title suggests, the 
German government expected these workers to be only temporary residents who would 
eventually return to their homelands. However, by the end of the guest worker programme in 
1973, there were 4 million migrants living in Germany (both workers and their families), 
leading to the government creating incentives to encourage even longer-term Gastarbeiter to 
return home, such as paying all fees of return in excess (Brubaker, 1992: 171-173).   
As one would expect, government efforts at ‘integration’ between German citizens 
and the migrant populations were negligible, with cities often acting at the forefront of 
attempting integration, even if half-heartedly, because of the general expectation on the part 
of the German government that the guest workers would leave and the efforts at integration 
may be ‘wasted’ (see Hackett, 2018: 44-45). After a study conducted by Heinz Kühn, the first 
appointed commissioner presiding over the question of migrant integration, he demanded that 
an integration policy or initiative be conducted by the German government to ensure that 
those guest workers who would reside in Germany over the long term will not be treated as 
second-class citizens and have the opportunity to acquire citizenship rights; instead, the 
German government promoted a voluntary return programme, though the numbers of guest 
workers returning to their native countries was well below the government’s desired figure 
(Borkert & Bosswick, 2007).   
 
4 Before the Gastarbeiter, Germany had a mass inward migration experience with the Aussiedler, ethnic 
Germans outside of Germany, which consisted of around 12 million Germans after World War II. They were 
accorded automatic citizenship under German Basic Law, but still had relative difficulties integrating back into 




Germany then had a large demographic of Turkish, Italian, and Greek (among other 
nationalities) migrants who had resided within the country for a number of years, raised 
children within the country, but who could not apply for citizenship for themselves or their 
children given the jus sanguinis nature of Germany’s citizenship laws before 1992 (Brubaker, 
1992). The sentiment of ‘Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland’ remained a steadfast 
policy within the government despite growing consensus, especially after German 
reunification, that immigration numbers were increasing to the country.  
  
2.3 Migration reforms and the National Integration Plan  
With the formal creation of the European Union5 after the end of the Cold War, 
elements of migration policy were removed from the national level and moved up to the 
supranational level, notably the application to asylum with the signing of the Dublin 
Regulation. It falls in line with Germany’s overall migration strategy in the 1990s, which was 
to restrict ‘illegal’ or burdensome migration, i.e. asylum seekers, and attempt to attract 
qualified professional migrants6 (Prümm & Alscher, 2007: 74). To this end, Helmut Kohl’s 
government introduced migration reforms early in the 1990s that allowed for long-term 
migrants residing in Germany, notably members of the Turkish Gastarbeiter who did not 
have citizenship rights under the newly-created European Union, to apply for German 
citizenship if they had lived in the country for 15 years, though with an application deadline 
of 1995 (Borkert & Bosswick, 2007); ironically, the same government implemented in the 
 
5 Here we refer to the formal implementation of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which is recognised as the formal 
beginning of the European Union and its supranationalisation of several policy areas.  
6 Included within this restrictive immigration strategy were the Spätaussiedler, or Aussiedler who sought to 
migrate into Germany after 1992 due to the fall of the Iron Curtain. Quotas on applications and requirements 
that the Spätaussiedler apply from their country of residence curtailed numbers, as did a new imposition in 
1996: Spätaussiedler would be dispersed at the German local level in a similar way to asylum-seekers, 





Basic Law the concept of ‘safe third country’ for asylum seekers in order to restrict their 
ability to submit an application for asylum within Germany if they had passed through a 
country the German government deemed to be ‘safe’ (Prümm & Alscher, 2007; 76).  
The election of the centre-left coalition of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the 
Greens in 1998 changed the nature of Germany’s immigration status. The new government 
shifted towards a more inclusive society, allowing for dual nationality of citizens up until the 
age of 23 (the limit would be removed in 2014) and a more open labour market with the 
Hartz reforms, allowing for an expansion of welfare coverage and a more ‘adaptive’ labour 
market that would respond to the needs of lower-income and immigrant areas with targeted 
education and training, as predominantly Turkish areas in Germany faced persistent 
negligence and higher unemployment partly due to the aforementioned restrictions (Geddes 
& Scholten, 2016: 141; 154).   
A new immigration law, the Zuwanderungsgesetz, came into effect in 2005 and 
further expanded the criteria and rights of immigration, as well as creating the Bundesamt für 
Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF) and integration courses for legal immigrants who chose 
to remain in Germany long-term. Despite initial objections towards the SPD’s stance on 
liberalising the immigration and citizenship laws, the centre-right CDU continued the trend of 
broadening the country’s migration and integration structuring after the 2005 federal 
elections in which Angela Merkel became Chancellor of the country. The general agreement 
between the two parties in maintaining the societal shift in favour of increased migration was 
likely because the facets of the immigration law and shift towards integration expanded on 
existing structures of German society rather than adding or upending existing ones, making 
the reforms far more palatable (Geddes & Scholten, 2016: 155).  
This culminated in the 2006 forum on integration as assembled under Angela 




comprised national support structures around language, education, and employment, and 
equal opportunities and access to societal benefits (with housing being an exception that fell 
under ‘equal access to benefits’ at the state and city levels, rather than at the federal level; see 
Die Bundesregierung Der Deutschland, 2007, and Leise, 2007) as a guiding framework for 
the federal states to follow in crafting their own specialised integration laws. Notably, 
integration courses were offered that “provide knowledge of topics such as rights and 
obligations, democracy, government structure, the history of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, regulations, time, religious and cultural/regional diversity, view of mankind and 
coexistence in Germany” (Die Bundesregierung der Deutschland, 2007: 37). Much is left to 
the federal states, which are able to tailor their own practices of integration towards 
regionspecific needs.   
At the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st, Germany also saw a move 
from its more corporatist-welfare system to a more liberal or neoliberal one in what was 
called the ‘New Steering Model’ (similar in ideology to New Public Management), where an 
effort to induce marketisation and private enterprise involvement of government arms and 
functions gained traction and became the norm of governance (Kuhlmann, 2009: 234). For 
German social services, the eligibility of citizens and residents for social welfare benefits was 
pared back and limited and portions of what was formally federal responsibility were 
devolved to the local level, such as coverage of assisted housing, and vice versa (see 
BuschGeertsema, 2004). Within the circumstance of a recession, social housing and social 
services saw dramatic reductions and restrictions on eligibility in order to recoup budgetary 
deficits and slow expenditures (Kholodilin, 2017: 282; and see below section on German 
housing). Many cities that had their own ‘municipal companies’ for a variety of services had 




though these short-term savings often have not equated to long-term budget surpluses and 
became financial burdens (Kuhlmann, 2009).  
This introduced an expansion of the ‘state-ordered’ NGO aid services through large 
government-funded charity organisations such as Caritas and Diakonie, which de facto took 
on many responsibilities towards the impoverished that the government would traditionally 
otherwise maintain; given the disparities between the enduring former Gastarbeiter 
population and the native German population, these organisations also took on important 
roles within integration as a by-product of the federal government’s pullback (Borkert &  
Bosswick, 2007: 14; Busch-Geertsema, 2004).  
As a result of the reforms within social services and additional responsibilities placed 
on localities, disparities emerged between certain states in the creation and implementation of 
integration laws and practices (see Schmidtke, 2014), though these were largely created 
during a trough in widespread migration/refugee movements between 2000 and 2014. These 
state-level government structures were tested under the weight of the 2014-2016 refugee 
influx to varying degrees of responses, ranging from the capable to the deterrent (see Hamann 
& El-Kayed, 2018).  
  
2.4 The 2014 refugee influx and the Integrationsgesetz  
Europe saw an unprecedented movement of refugees into the continent due to a 
combination of the ongoing civil wars in Syria and Yemen, ISIL’s (Islamic State of Iraq and 
the Levant) presence throughout the Levant and its persecution of residents who refused to 
join their cause, an insurgent Taliban in Afghanistan, continued government oppression in 
Eritrea, etc. Between 2014 and 2016, approximately 3,024,000 people applied for asylum 
throughout Europe, with more than 60% of those applications made in Germany alone 




bordering measures implemented in the Dublin Regulation and allow refugees to submit an 
application for asylum in Germany even if they had passed through a ‘safe third country’, a 
stunning turn on the changes in German asylum policy some 20 years earlier.   
The suddenness of the decision left cities and states adapting on the fly to cope with 
the dispersal of refugees throughout the country, using whatever resources were available and 
relying on the aid of civil society volunteers and organisations for the delivery of the bulwark 
of integration policy and practice, which will be covered in more detail in this thesis in the 
chapter on Berlin. Legal changes were also implemented at the federal level: the 2015 
Asylverfahrensbeschleunigungsgesetz (Asylum Procedures Acceleration Act) opened 
integration courses to all recognised refugees and those given tolerated status from Iran, Iraq, 
Syria, and Eritrea (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2015).  
The 2016 Integrationsgesetz (Integration Law) focused on shoring up resources for 
integration courses as well as facilitating entry into the labour market, but also enacted a 
nationality barrier for immediate access to integration courses: those from nationalities with a 
‘good remaining probability’, i.e. nationalities whose refugee acceptance rate is over 50% are 
able to access integration benefits immediately upon arrival rather than having to wait for 
their asylum applications to be approved and status to be assigned (Rietig, 2016). 
Additionally, the law expanded the list of ‘safe countries of origin’ for refugee applicants 
which included states on the periphery of the European Union, such as Albania, Serbia, 
Bosnia, Montenegro, et al., as well as states in Africa, such as Ghana and Senegal 
(Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz, 2016). Asylum applicants from 
those countries would, in all likelihood, have their applications denied outright and would be 
deported back to their country of origin.  




Königsteiner Schlüssel, which is normally used to determine federal funding for universities. 
The formula lends 1/3 weight to total population of a given state (rather than population 
density) and 2/3s weight to total tax revenues, leading to a city-state such as Berlin receiving 
5% of the total admitted refugee population while sitting on a comparatively small landmass 
to Germany’s other cities, even while it is both the most populated overall and most densely 
populated city in the country (Katz, et al., 2016). For a city facing an ongoing housing 
availability crisis, this extra population influx presented a problem: where could they live, 
both in the short- and long-term?  
  
2.5 Housing in Germany: A self-made time bomb  
  Germany’s housing market emerged from the ashes of World War II with two key 
tenets: first, that the German housing market is predominantly rented rather than owned, 
where approximately half of all Germans are property renters rather than owner-occupiers 
(Kuhn & Grabka, 2018); second, that cities typically have strong rental protection laws to 
ensure that costs are sustainable for tenants, leading to Germans spending a lower amount of 
their income on rent when compared to many other OECD countries (Kholodilin, 2017;  
OECD, 2017).   
  The conservative government of the 1980s encouraged the expansion of the 
financialisation of the housing market by loosening restrictions against commercial banking 
and mortgages (Wijburg & Aalbers, 2017) while taxation reform removed construction and 
maintenance incentives for municipal housing companies, leading to many of them selling 
off or privatising their existing housing stocks (Martin, et al., 2018: 58). Adding to this was 
the strain of German reunification: in an attempt to stem and prevent migration from the 
former East Germany to West Germany, the Kohl government issued tax and real estate 
subsidies to encourage development of buildings, both commercial and housing, in former 




West Germany were pressured by high demand and low supply while housing markets in 
former East  
Germany had high supply but lower demand and very low occupancy (Holm, et al., 2015).  
 Further exacerbating public housing development was a formidable recession in the latter 
half of the 1990s, pushing cities across Germany to confront budget deficits by further 
enervating public housing stocks and selling off municipal housing company assets to private 
ownership, either corporate or individual (Aalbers & Holm, 2008). Across Germany, social 
housing stock fell from approximately 3 million affordable housing units in 1990 to 
approximately 1.25 million by 2017 (Manthei, 2018). Berlin was not exempt from this trend, 
with its council housing stock numbering just 95,723 out of a total 1.66 million leasehold 
properties in 2021, a decline of 2.2% from 2020 (Investitionsbank Berlin, 2021). Social 
housing policies, instead of targeting the broader population, became narrowed to 
marginalised and special-needs groups as a method by which to justify narrowing the scope 
of policy and saving on public expenditure (Aalbers & Holm, 2008).   
With the Föderalismusreform-Begleitgesetz (federal reforms) of 2006, the federal 
states gained more control over spending and development of social housing. Now, rather 
than the federal government funding the proliferation of social housing directly, the states 
have access to a designated government funding item in the budget, last set at a little over a 
billion euro in the 2015 Asylverfahrensbeschleuningungsgesetz (Asylum Procedure  
Acceleration Act). This is at odds with the 2001 Gesetz zur Reform des Wohnungsbaurechts 
(Act to reform the Residence Building Law), which designated the federal government 
provide €230 million euro yearly to each of the 16 states for social housing (Kholodilin,  
2017). The difference in total federal investments between the two laws is staggering:  
measured at 2018 inflationary rates, money from the Residence Building Law totalled €4.721 




What this amounted to, especially in cities such as Berlin but in both large and 
medium-sized cities across Germany, was a housing shock when refugees were dispersed 
throughout Germany. For years, many German cities had seen general population growth and 
rising rental prices while housing construction lagged behind and occupancy rates were at 
near-full saturation (Investitionsbank Berlin, 2019). For cities already experiencing a housing 
crunch, an infusion of a new population of thousands further exacerbated an issue that had 
been developing over the previous two decades and came to a head after 2015. For 
cities/towns facing economic decline and dwindling populations, this population infusion 
came as both a burden and an unexpected opportunity, the former because of the sudden 
necessity to house and care for people who likely did not speak the native language, and the 
latter because this new population presented a possibility for these declining cities to 
experience new growth while they sought to balance the possible backlash of the local 
populace with the needs of the refugees, though these neglected smaller cities and towns had 
little to offer refugees beyond shelter (Bock, 2018; Schiffauer, et al., 2017).  
With this context, we can better understand the difficulties faced by both refugees and 
governments, and why there was a constant array of uncertainty from both sides. The next 
chapter will take an in-depth look at various theories surrounding integration and housing, 
which will lead into a discussion of multi-level governance before utilising these two 


















    
Chapter 3:  The Long, Winding and Differently Directional 
Road of Integration and Housing Theories  
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter will review the primary and secondary literature for two bodies of theory 
utilised for analysis in this thesis, integration theory and housing. These two theories will 
inform the empirical and analytical sections of this thesis by providing a fundamental 
understanding of integration and a theoretical conceptualisation of how housing can impact 
the process of integration. Because housing is not a cohesive body of theory and comes under 
contention as to whether or not housing can be theorised, the primary objective of this 
chapter’s section on housing will be to input a theory of housing as it pertains to the structural 
facets of integration.   
Integration and housing theory will inform how we will answer the research questions 
in four ways: first, by providing a concrete understanding of the variables important within 
refugee integration; second, by developing a conceptualisation of what comprises ‘housing’, 
as the term itself is applied to a wide variety of accommodation for refugees (first reception 
centres, hangar halls, apartments, container accommodation, etc.); third, by combining the 




governance (MLG) as a policymaking framework to analyse refugee housing 
implementations in Leverkusen and Berlin7; and fourth, by juxtaposing the essential elements 
of integration and housing against the policies that are implemented in Leverkusen and Berlin 
while also combining the individualistic elements derived from participant interviews as a 
critique of both applications of the two theories and the policies themselves.  
  
We will look at ‘integration’ as a core concept and derive the various theories, 
concepts and uses within. Migrant integration theory covers a broad swath of approaches and 
schools, from more positivist-based methods that quantify measurements of integration to 
that which is attainable, i.e. education levels, residence, etc., to more conceptual and 
interpretivist methods that, rather than seeking to directly and tangibly measure ‘integration’ 
as a hard and fast variable, instead exists within an intersectionary subfield of sociology, 
psychology, and politics as a normative field of study.   
Even within the EU where member states are subject to EU law8, ‘integration’ holds 
different meanings and measurements across most member states (Bertossi & Duyvendak, 
2012). There currently exists no standard ‘definition’ of integration generally accepted by 
academics, international/local organisations, governments, etc. given how contentious the 
subject is9.   
 
7 Framework will be developed in Chapter 7.  
8 Though the EU has no direct jurisprudence over the implementation of member state programmes of 
integration, the component parts of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) acts to ensure a minimum 
of reception standards and conditions across member states. However, some member states, notably the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark, have opt-out clauses for portions of the CEAS. While the EU’s purview over 
wholesale integration is limited, the EU does have the potential to impact aspects of integration, such as 
education and employment rights.  
9 Over the course of my interviews with NGO employees who work directly with refugees, many expressed 
disdain at the term ‘integration’ as it precipitated the notion that refugees existed somewhere outside of society 
and that society must ‘pull them in’ so that they can live closer to how Germans live. Some directly equated the 
term with ‘assimilation’, which to them elicited a concept of overriding and erasing the refugees’ native culture 




This chapter will also delineate the analytical strengths and weaknesses of the various 
groups of literature and critique the overall ideas presented with arguments from the other 
groups, as well as inputting my own analysis and critique for the respective schools of 
thought. The framework by Ager and Strang (2008) was one attempt to reconcile the various 
disagreements between the groups, and it will serve as both an example of how the overall  
  
concept of integration can be reified and how the framework needs ‘touching up’ in light of 
the consequences of the refugee movements into Europe in the latter half of the 2010s.  
Housing, as an indicator of migrant integration theory, will be explored on its own 
through the current work on its establishment as both a tangible and theoretical object. 
Whether ‘housing’ can be considered a theory or a body of theoretical work is a subject of 
some debate (see Kemeny, 1992, and Ruonavaara, 2018), which will be covered in the 
section. There is currently a relative dearth on the socio-theoretical conception of housing 
outside its traditional marker of economic health and wealth, though the literature 
surrounding it is growing (see King, 2009). It is worth isolating its own theoretical section 
because it serves an important role in the general mechanics of integration, and without an 
aggregated description of the theoretical and tangible role of housing in refugee integration, 
this thesis would be enervated in its arguments.  
Because integration is generally studied on a wider, more normative scale rather than 
through one tangible facet of integration, this chapter will elucidate the importance of 
housing, both as a physical space in which a refugee may or may not have privacy and 
agency to control, as well as a space in which one can access local community. Given the 
 
refugees are able to acclimate to life in Germany, they do not feel as if their cultural identities are being eroded 
by what can be perceived as a ‘German cultural bubble’. This, to the NGO workers with whom I interviewed, 
undermines the goodwill extolled by the German government to that of demanding that the refugees become 
good German workers rather than Syrian-Germans without respecting the fact that they had little choice in 




importance of the local level in refugee integration (Bendel, et al., 2019), this chapter will 
conceptualise housing as a gateway to community and immersion in the local level, and make 
it a determining variable for the other facets of integration.  
Finally, this chapter will capture and demonstrate the gap in literature pertaining to 
how housing affects refugee integration experiences. Though there has been extensive study 
around general integration policies, practices, and theories, deep dives into how types of 
housing policies, practices, and theories affect integration outcomes are lacking. There are 
notable studies that touch on housing situations for refugees (section 3.3) that reflect on 
interactions with government and civil society, as well on how housing types and policy 
structures surrounding housing choice affect refugee self-perception of delegated rights 
within a country, but the greater link to integration prospects and ‘moving forward’ for 
refugees, as it were, has not been well constructed. From uncovering this gap, we can directly 
move into the empirical chapters to analyse how housing situations and policies for refugees 
have affected their integration experience, both at a personal level and how they perceive the 
state/local government’s ‘attitude’ towards their efforts, i.e. if the relevant government 
policies seems to impede more than facilitate ameliorating the issues refugees face.  
Because of the width and breadth of integration literature, we will focus on the 
‘bigger names’ in integration theories, namely acculturation, transnationalism, civic 
integrationism, and interculturalism while analysing and discussing the variations within, and 
how they apply to policies enacted by both Germany and other EU member states. Doing so 
ensures that we can extract key variables from the theories with which we will apply in our 
analysis of the empirical chapters. This analysis will inform the development of the 
theoretical framework in chapter 7.  
The next section will begin by giving the lay of the land in integration literature, 




concerning integration. We will then cover state/society-refugee interactions, both formally 
and informally, and then we will tackle some of the frameworks developed to cover 
integration, ranging from those created by academics to those created by governments and 
draw comparisons between their applicability in a contemporary setting. Here we will 
differentiate between the theoretical bodies of work covering integration and briefly examine 
how several states envision their integration policies, and how they compare to the 
integration literature and theory. Finally, housing will be discussed and analysed as a 
theoretical object by which the main variables discussed within these models of integration 
can be attained or facilitated.  
  
3.2 Theories of Migrant Integration  
3.2.1 Introduction  
  Before all else, it must be noted that while the following theories of integration 
pertain mainly to regular migrants, they are also applicable to asylum-seekers/refugees and 
have been applied to studies covering asylum-seekers/refugees (see examples below). 
Though there are obvious differences between wilful migrants and asylum-seekers/refugees 
on the consequences of their arrival to a new country, similar mechanics of integration are 
shared between the two situations: language acquisition (whether it is implied cultural idioms 
or a completely separate language), work/education acquisition, and housing acquisition, et  
al.  
  Integration theories in the following subsections are ordered by integration theories 
and perspectives at the individual level, integration theories from government and societal 
levels, and current theoretical and state models of integration. These variations allow us to 
reflect on the research questions by first developing a general conceptualisation of how 




individual and societal experience and interaction (Council of the European Union, 2004), 
and how those individual experiences interact with theoretical models and those employed by 
governments. Because we are focused on housing and integration outcomes for individuals 
and how they interact with policy governance, prioritising how refugees experience 
integration qualitatively rather than attempting to glean successful outcomes through 
quantitative measurements places individual perceptions, decision, and actions at the 
forefront of our study.  
  
3.2.2 Theories on Individual and Group Integration- ‘Acculturation’  
An individual’s perception of how integration occurs can greatly affect their potential 
integration outcome (Bourhis, et al., 1997). Though not explicitly relating to refugees, Berry 
(2005) proposed an ‘acculturation and ethnic relations’ model to determine “how can peoples 
of different cultural backgrounds encounter each other, seek avenues of mutual 
understanding, negotiate and compromise on their initial positions, and achieve some degree 
of harmonious engagement? (Berry, 2005: 698)”. He distinguishes an important facet about 
acculturation, and one that largely applies to the process of integration: a process of 
interaction and participation with the dominant (or other) culture relies entirely upon the 
decision of the individual to do so within the respective cultural contexts between the 
individual and the other society [emphasis mine](Ibid: 702), which touches on the theory of 
interculturalism discussed below.  
The understanding (or lack thereof) of discrete cultural differences in interactions 
affects the outcome of the interactions and the eventual acculturation strategy of the 
individuals in question. Murphy (1977) found the cultural contexts or perceived relative 
openness of a society also contributes to whether or not individuals from ‘different cultures’ 
are able to acclimate to a new culture; if there is a section of the receiving culture that 




settled into the new culture, acculturation can be facilitated (Murphy, 1977: 678-679; see 
transnationalism below). This does not, however, mean that the migrant group is actively 
accepted by the dominant society, which can lead to strife and active discrimination; that 
requires more intimate and detailed intercultural dynamics (see Lebedeva and Tatarko, 2004).  
Berry (2005) posits four acculturation strategies employed by individuals:  
assimilation, separation, integration, and marginalisation. Figure 1 demonstrates the 
differences therein. Briefly, assimilation is when one does not care to maintain one’s original 
cultural identity and instead seeks to integrate fully with the new society; separation is when 
an individual wishes to maintain their cultural identity and avoids purposeful interaction with 
society; marginalisation is when an individual does not care to maintain their cultural 
background but also does not engage with the society around them (for any number of 
reasons); and integration is when one cares about maintaining one’s cultural heritage as well 




Figure 1- Berry's (2006: 705) Acculturation Model 




The development of the acculturation strategies is based on 3 underlying concepts: 
“cultural maintenance, contact and participation, and the power to decide on how 
acculturation will take place. (Ibid: 706)” Berry, et al. (2006) demonstrated the applicability 
of both the strategies and the underlying concepts in their wide-ranging study on immigrant 
youth acculturation prospects, while Koos & Seibel (2019) confirmed the necessity of 
governments to facilitate contact and interactions between society and refugees to best help 
refugees ease into a new life. This ties into findings from Bourhis, et al. (1997), where “state 
integration policies can have a decisive impact on the acculturation orientation of both 
immigrants and members of the host society. (Ibid: 369)”   
In the same vein as Berry, Bourhis et al. (1997: 371) propose acculturation strategies 
that a state can take in its integration policies: pluralism ideology, civic ideology, assimilation 
ideology, and ethnist ideology, and identified that the disparity between a state’s integration 
policy and the out-group’s acculturation strategy (and how they would like to perceive 
themselves within the new society) affects how the group is able to integrate. As with Berry’s 
(2006) individual acculturation strategies, this list is a continuum from one ideological end to 
the other rather than being mutually exclusive with siloed implementations.   
Phillimore (2011) studied the acculturative strategies of refugees in the UK with a 
focus on refugees utilising the health services. Many of the study participants experienced 
various problems interacting with the National Health Service and were unable to find or 
understand guidance, which increased their stress; thus, they sought relative separation by 
turning to either underground medical practices or physicians not approved to practice in the 
UK (but who may have had medical licenses from their home countries) (Phillimore, 2011: 
18-20). Further, recalling Bourhis, et al. (1997), the study found that the ‘race blind’ policies 
within the health service hindered refugees’ access to it, demonstrating a hybrid 




refugees to penetrate de facto cultural boundaries that would be considered otherwise 
mundane for average citizens (Allport, 1954).  
One possible issue with proposing such a standard framework of acculturation onto 
all migrants is the essential notion of choice: some migrants choose to leave their native 
culture and live elsewhere, while refugees do not. As in the case of the empirical work 
conducted for this thesis, several refugees expressed a yearning to return to their homes in  
Syria, or at least a desire to return to the lives they had because of the difficulties they faced 
adapting to Germany. Others were more than happy to envision settling into German life 
given the support and care provided by German society, as they felt that they owed the 
country for giving them the opportunity to begin anew (KD Interview, 2018). Though outside 
the scope of the work done by this thesis, further study into the methods of acculturation 
employed by refugees compared to those employed by wilful migrants is warranted.  
The desire to return to a life with less stress is to be expected when one is forcibly 
displaced from one’s home; however, the demands placed upon them by the German 
government can be more than those placed on migrants (EU nationals or other voluntary 
migrants) who chose to move to Germany (Söhn, 2013), given the difficultly of adapting to a 
new cultural zeitgeist, a largely unfamiliar language, and the possibility that the individual 
may be dealing with the psychological trauma of having to flee his or her home under duress 
(see Allen, et al., 2006).  
  
3.2.3 Theories on Individual and Group Integration- ‘Transnationalism’  
The concept of transnationalism may be a coping method for this stress (Phillimore, 
2011). Transnationalism, as a general frame of study, has expectedly grown in parallel to the 
explosive expansion of global interconnectedness of the past few decades. One can easily 




internet connection or a mobile signal, or engage actively in diasporic connections through 
social media. Along with this has come a diversification of consumer options, where it is now 
possible to find in any number of online retail items that one might commonly find in one’s 
home country. Thus, ensuring one has access to facets of one’s home takes little effort.  
Vertovec (2009) classifies transnationalism as more a ‘messy’ process than a 
straightforward one, and differentiates six general takes on the concept: social morphology, 
which focuses on diasporic groups and the networks they maintain; types of consciousness, 
which focuses on the dual identities that members of a diaspora may adopt, i.e. that of their 
current home and that of their diasporic roots; mode of cultural reproduction, which focuses 
on how one’s culture is spread, consumed, and understood, i.e. through media, entertainment, 
etc.; avenue of capital, focusing on the expansion of trans-national corporations and business, 
as well as the cross-border avenues of work where workers abroad send money home; site of 
political engagement, which concerns both the work of international organisations and the 
political advocacy of local diasporas towards the home country; and (re)construction of 
‘place’ or locality, which concerns people’s relationships towards the country in question, in 
such a way that they might find areas inhabited by people from their native culture rather 
than ‘nationals’ (Ibid: 4-12).  
The concept of ‘transnationalism’, however, runs into several questions about its 
applicability of analysis because of the broadness of the term, i.e. whether it studies at the 
micro- or macro-level, whether it applies only to people or to corporate entities, what makes 
something transnational and not, for instance, multicultural, and so forth (Ibid: 15-20). For 
instance, Bendel, et al. (2019) utilise the term to understand networks formed by 
municipalities within the realm of refugee policy. Erdal and Oeppen (2013) apply the term 
for the efforts individuals make to both integrate into a new society while maintaining ties 




similar in that they are both forms of adaptation to social processes (Ibid: 875). Not only that, 
but the two processes need not conflict and transnationalism can facilitate integration, in 
some cases (Ibid: 874).   
For our purposes, we can simplify the term ‘transnationalism’ to be any act that serves 
to connect a refugee with his or her home or culture, whether it is finding familiar food or 
watching familiar TV/films, keeping contact with those in the home country, or engaging 
actively with a local diaspora, among others (see Ehrkamp, 2005 for examples of 
transnational actions large and small).  
In the case of understanding integration processes for refugees, all the varying 
meanings Vertovec (2009) proposes hold relevance: each implies a connection of some sort 
to one’s distant homeland, whether it is more passive (such as watching familiar TV or news) 
or active, such as sending money to friends/relatives or partaking in organisations specifically 
tailored to one’s ethnic background. Or, in the case of many Syrian refugees in Germany, 
connecting with the local Syrian diaspora as an aid to more comfortable immersion into 
German culture.  
Before the refugee movements of 2014-2015, Germany experienced the growth of a 
Turkish diaspora during the mid- to later-20th century, as the country imported guest workers 
to help boost the country’s growing economy10. Sert (2012) studied the transnational 
activities of Turks (and Turkish-Germans) and found that their transnational activities 
generally facilitated the individuals’ integration efforts into German society, and that 
transnationalism and integration are co-supportive. However, those were wilful migrants; for 
refugees, lives ‘back home’ only exist in memory and may be sources of trauma (Al-Ali, 
2001). For those refugees with family and friends still in their home country, transnationalism 
may entail a  
 




‘balancing act’ of living psychologically in one place and physically in another (Erdal & 
Oeppen, 2013: 877).   
Thus we can differentiate a strong integration distinction between migrants of 
necessity, i.e. refugees and those who have little choice in where they will eventually reside 
and must rely on their new residence to aid them in returning their lives to a state of 
homeostasis, and migrants of choice, i.e. those who have no fear of returning to their home 
countries.  
 
This correlates with Al-Ali’s (2001) study of Bosnian refugees spread throughout 
Europe after the Dayton Accords, where the refugees had established small diasporas in their 
new countries of residence while also seeking to integrate vis a vis job and language training. 
They still had a connection to their homes in the wake of the reconstruction effort and the 
political precarity; however, a majority were reluctant to return within 5 years after the 
Dayton Accords were signed because they had established lives within the new countries, and 
because of the complex political and ethnic situation that unfolded in the region (Ibid: 97-98).  
  
3.2.4 State and Societal Theories and Integration Conceptualisations  
The state was the main actor that has been traditionally been involved in policy 
delivery in this policy area, but in more recent times new actors have emerged in the delivery 
process, such as local and regional level organisations, civil society organisations, private 
sector actors (Caponio & Jones-Correa, 2018). This section explores the literature on the 




integration practices that then continues with discussions of civic integrationism, followed by 
a discussion of general German integration policies, and finally moves into interculturalism.11  
State responses to integration governance vary widely by country, depending on their 
history with migration management and the respective countries’ approaches to social 
welfare and education. The rights/privileges afforded refugees by states to aid in integration 
affect the life outcomes of those refugees’ children and their ability to contribute to the state, 
should they remain in it (Söhn, 2013). In addition to that, integration policies for migrants 
and refugees can vary from city to city within a given state, oftentimes providing for 
variegated integration outcomes by region (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 
2019). Material conditions often vary from state to state and city to city, resulting in different 
introductions to the new host state (ECRE, 2016). How a state (and city) government  
postures itself towards refugees and migrants can strongly determine the course of integration 
and how well the migrant can situate themselves within the new host country (Nuissl, 
Domann, and Engel, 2019; Bendel, et al., 2019; Jørgensen, 2012; OECD, 2018; Braun & 
Dwenger, 2017; Czischke and Huisman, 2018; et al.).  
The EU does not have direct jurisprudence over the issue of integration as a whole, 
but does oversee aspects such as non-discrimination in work and accessibility of education12.  
 
11 Interculturalism was chosen as the primary mode of integration analysis rather than multiculturalism because 
of Germany’s migration history in the 20th century as it regards the Gastarbeiter (as discussed in Chapter 2). 
The Gastarbeiter, and notably the Turkish migrants who settled in Germany, became a ‘parallel society’ that 
had noted difficulties integrating into the ‘mainstream’ of German society, especially with the formerly jus 
sanguinis model of German citizenship serving to exclude millions of Turks (Brubaker, 1992). Thus for 
Germany, the general ‘side-by-side’ model of multiculturalism (Meer & Modood, 2012) was unfavourable as a 
method of acculturation. Instead, the German federal government utilises civic integrationism (see Joppke, 
2007), while local levels, depending on policy and practice, may seek more inclusive and interactive models of 
integration. 
12 In 2016, as a reaction to the refugee crisis and continued efforts to reallocate refugees throughout member 
states and maintain a standard of integration, the EU enacted The Action Plan on the Integration of Third 
Country Nationals. The Action Plan was an attempt by the EU to centralize and coordinate decision-making on 
the crisis within its purview as a supranational entity, given “whilst the competence on integration lies primarily 
with the Member States, the EU may establish measures to provide incentives and support for Member States in 
promoting integration of third country nationals residing legally in their territories and has an important role in  
supporting, stimulating and coordinating Member States' actions and policies in this area. (European 




Some EU member states, such as Hungary, have been outwardly hostile to refugees, 
adopting restrictive and harsh practices intended to curtail refugee interest in settling in those 
states (Zaun, 2018). The obvious implication is that integration for these refugees is unlikely 
to happen in these states, though the more likely outcome is that they attempt to claim asylum 
in another EU member state. According to the EU’s Dublin Regulation, refugees must make 
an application for asylum in their port of first entry; applications made in a secondary 
member state are likely to be rejected (Robila, 2018: 9). The refugees unfortunate enough to 
experience such an outcome can end up living ‘informally’, i.e. in tenuous camps (such as 
Calais), on the streets, or in homeless shelters without the opportunity to begin the process of 
integration if they do not wish to be deported back to their homeland (see Davies, Isakjee, 
and Dhesi, 2017).  
  
   
3.2.5 Civic Integrationism  
In the case of the EU member states that typically receive migrants, each member 
state defines and conducts their integration frameworks differently (see Geddes and Scholten, 
2013 for overview). Joppke (2007) argues that these national models and frameworks are 
actually converging as a result of the fallout from the September 11 terrorist attacks, from 
one of multiculturalism and general plurality to one that leans towards assimilation (but does 
not entirely become assimilation; see Joppke, 2017), to contain the same selective variables 
termed to be ‘civic integration’, a framework pioneered by the Netherlands and gradually 
adopted by other EU member states: education on and tests of civic knowledge, enforced 
language courses, and encouragement to enter the workforce. The onus of integration moves 
towards the individual, rather than being a ‘two-way’ process (Council of the European 




integration, Goodman (2010) argues, promotes the values that a state would want to see in 
future citizens (and expects of its citizens already).  
Joppke identifies the shared notion of ‘obligation’ for migrants across the realm of 
civic integration policies (Joppke, 2007: 14). These obligations can be exported, as in the 
case of the Netherlands having tests outside their borders on both language and culture before 
migrants enter the country legally (Ibid: 5). External testing of qualifications before entry is 
not exclusive to the Netherlands.  
That the state’s integration requirements impose a checkpoint system that allow 
migrants to access further benefits only if they attain certain levels seems to contravene the 
ideal of a pluralistic, multicultural society, these policies can coexist with multiculturalist 
policies set at the city or municipal level (Joppke, 2017:1164). This system acts as a sieve, 
allocating the opportunity to move only to those with the resources and time, though this 
differentiates the ideals of the state and the local: where the state government coordinates 
‘bordering’ aspects, i.e. access and those associated with citizenship and/or ‘contributing to 
society’ (such as through paying taxes), the local level is tasked with ensuring that the 
individual has access to housing, social welfare provisions, job aid, etc., that which would 
serve inclusivity.  
In the 21st century Germany has walked the line between being a pluralistic, open 
society and one that has stricter civic integrationist mechanisms. Dual citizenship was not 
fully legal until 2014, even as the country unveiled its National Integration Plan in 2007 
(Heckmann, 2016). The Plan instituted standards for integration mainly through language and 
civics courses, along with measuring employment levels, among other things (Die 
Bundesregierung Der Deutschland, 2007). Much was left to the federal states, leading to 
disparities between integration outcomes and demonstrating the civic integrationist-pluralistic 




For instance, Schmidtke (2014) cites North-Rhein Westphalia (NRW) as being a 
leader in formulating its own Teilhabe-und Integrationsgesetz (Participation and Integration 
Law), notable in allowing refugees to test their expertise in fields in which they were 
qualified in their home countries, even if they were unable to bring their documentation with 
them (Ministerium des Innern des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2012). Investing in 
education and qualification certification for refugees has been found to expedite or ameliorate 
their integration prospects (Bach, et al., 2017), and though it was restrictive before the 
refugee influx, the German federal government studied how to liberalise its highly regulated 
qualifications system to ease the difficulties already-qualified refugees had in re-joining their 
fields of expertise (Maroufi, 2017), demonstrating the ability of the non-federal level to lead 
in integration policy innovation13.  
  
With the increase in refugee flows in 2015, Germany adopted the Integrationsgesetz 
in 2016, which standardised vocational training programmes and integration courses with the 
mandate of a 3-year residence permit for those undertaking vocational training, with an 
additional 2-year residence permit for those taken on by their places of work (Rietig, 2016: 
14). There is still much leeway given to the states and municipalities for implementation of 
integration practices.   
It is not uncommon that national and local integration policies differ in both their 
conceptualisation and supporting political ideology, and has come to be expected in the 
current era of migration and integration (OECD, 2018; Bendel, et al., 2019; Zapata-Barrero 
and Cantle, 2018). The disparity between the national and the local in this regard provokes 
 




further questions about the state’s priorities in integration policy: whether it is to deter 
general migrants or promote future citizenry, or something else.  
Goodman and Wright (2015: 1887) argue that national civic integration measures are 
more of a ‘symbolic’ measure than a functional one, acting to satisfy the demands of the 
more conservative political voices in society that would otherwise impose strict integration 
requirements on all migrants. In the case of refugees and asylum seekers, civic integration 
clashes with the duties imparted by the rights and obligations for the state surrounding 
refugee status: the state (in this case, Germany) has the obligation to support the refugees, 
first with a place to live and substantive benefits with which to support themselves, then with 
education and eventual access to the job market, whereas overall integration requirements for 
other migrants would work in the opposite direction, i.e. they must know/have the 
language/job first, then comes access to benefits. These factors, along with various 
programmes enacted by the EU and cross-border city networks, shift the ‘door to entry’ to the 
local level  
(Schmidtke, 2014).  
 
However, Goodman and Wright (2015: 1898-1899) found that countries whose 
integration policies scored highly on the civic integration scale (CIVIX) did not have an 
immediate effect on the political integration of immigrants into the mainstream, and that it 
was likely tertiary factors (social aspects outside the scope of civic integration policies) that 
contributed to immigrants ‘feeling’ more integrated rather than learning and being tested on 
language and culture. This corroborates Ersbøll and Gravesen’s (2010) study of Danish 
legislation and integration practices and how immigrants responded to the requirements 
placed on them, with “[t]he frequent changes to the legislation cause great insecurity and a 




respondents integrate was “their family, friends, and work” rather than the requirements 
placed on them by the state (Ibid: 41).  
This points to the difficulty in attempting to legislate ‘integration’, where the term and 
practice itself is still too vague and varied between states and locales to determine what can 
make effective integration practices, especially one that can be measured statistically  
(Phillimore, 2012: 535-541).  
  
3.2.6 Interculturalism  
The rise of ‘measurable’ integration factors has contributed, conversely, to the rise of 
interculturalism as a method by which to conduct integration. The term is used to connote a 
mixture of cultures rather than keeping them distinct (Taylor, 2012: 417). The term itself has 
been applied to disparate meanings, such as a new word by which to describe a world where 
the word ‘culture’ is no longer applicable to describe discrete aspects of one region/ethnic 
group to differentiate from another (Abdallah-Pretceille, 2006); a method of ‘discursive 
moral contract’ of immigrant integration primarily developed in Quebec, Canada as a way of 
deviating from Canada’s use of multiculturalism, which was perceived by the Québécois as a 
method by which to remove the ‘Québécois heritage’ within greater Canadian society, i.e. the 
French language (Gagnon and Iacovino, 2006); and a term used to diagnose and treat the 
inherent anxiety present in a societal majority when a visibly ‘different’ sizeable minority 
comes to occupy a (reasonably sized) part of the living space (Bouchárd, 2011).  
All three uses of the word share (more or less) the same underlying concept:  
promoting inclusivity and acceptance of differences.  
Interculturalism need not conflict with the requirements of civic integration, but the 
theory behind interculturalism believes that encouraging interaction and discourse between 




(Zapata-Barrero, 2015). The basic assumption behind interculturalism is that integration is 
more than simply checking boxes of tangible accomplishments such as language, education, a 
job, etc., but the interpersonal connections developed in the course of acclimating to a new 
surrounding. The aspects of interpersonal connections also redefines the notion of ‘diversity’ 
away from multiculturalism’s assumed silos of ethnicity, nationality, etc., to individual 
preferences and practices (Ibid: 5).   
While some might argue that interculturalism is a synonym of multiculturalism 
(though multiculturalism, in its various uses, tends to take on many meanings not originally 
ascribed to it; see Bhabha, 1998), interculturalism is differentiated from multiculturalism in 
its belief that there must be interactions between different groups in order to promote a more 
cohesive culture, rather than the general living side-by-side nature of multiculturalism (Meer 
and Modood, 2012). In that sense, multiculturalism exists as a method by which to ensure a 
minority group can live alongside a majority, while interculturalism acts as a way to bridge 
the divide.  
Interculturalism has seen practical implementations without being called as much 
through the extensive work done by civil society actors in conjunction with the various levels 
of government. Within Germany, countless civil society organisations sprang up to help 
refugees in the wake of the 2014-2015 migration movements and existing organisations 
increased their efforts to both draft volunteers and extend partnerships with municipalities 
and states. For example, in 2011, Caritas, one of Germany’s largest nonprofits, partnered 
with the German Red Cross, the Refugee Council of Cologne, and the city of Cologne to 
develop a Relocation Coordination Centre, which both helped refugees transition into the 
private rental market and provided them access to social workers; they increased their efforts 
in 2015 and directly partnered with the Municipal Housing Company to facilitate refugees 




However, in the German case, civil society and non-profit organisations have been the 
entities promoting interculturalism rather than the federal government, and sometimes the 
state/municipal government. Contacts with civil society, typically supported through NGOs 
both large and small, can facilitate integration practices (Doomernik & Ardon, 2018: 96), 
though this is dependent upon local policy and how local policies surrounding refugees may 
clash with national policies, as alluded to above. There are various programmes sponsored by 
civil society organisations and governments aimed at promoting contact and inclusion 
between refugees and citizens; some relate to sport, such as initiatives around football 
(Dukic, et al., 2017), while others surround socialising while learning the German language, 
and still others comprise a mentoring role to help refugees understand the complexities and 
distinctions of their new homes (Aumüller, et al., 2015). Furthermore, positive contact with 
volunteers and civil society in general alleviates the anxiety that refugees may feel about the 
burdens they face when entering a new society, i.e. figuring out living arrangements, 
education, work, paying bills, etc., and acts as a type of informal therapy (Han-Broich, 2015:  
45-46).   
Volunteers and civil society organisations also provide practical integration support, 
such as through language courses and ‘sprachcafes’ (language cafes often coordinated by 
civil society organisations), helping directly with ‘integration points’ offered in some German 
states, and through other coordination efforts with municipalities (Bogumil, et al., 2017). In 
many cases, volunteers and civil society organisations also take on integration tasks that 
would normally be the domain of the state: ensuring communication with job centres, 
attending health appointments, registering for school places, etc.; while this has enabled the 
creation of contacts networks between citizens and refugees, it is also indicative of the state’s 
failure to provide those basic services at levels adequate for a basic level of need (Hamann &  




From this, we can conclude that integration has components at varying levels that 
must be utilised in order to effectively promote integration: the federal government must 
create accessible services for refugees that do not impress a burden on them as recipients (i.e. 
imparting a cost for language courses, or creating bureaucratic hurdles when applying for 
services) while mandating a standard across states/municipalities to ensure equal access for 
all refugees; the states/municipalities must engage with advocacy organisations and work 
with communities to ensure area-specific issues, such as school, health, and housing access, 
are addressed; local volunteer programmes should be mobilised to encourage contact between 
refugees and citizens; cultures should be exchanged and celebrated between refugees and 
citizens; and refugees themselves should be consulted about their needs while adjusting to a 
wholly new society. The next section will discuss some attempts, both academic and 
policyoriented, to address these strands of thought and compress them into models and 
practices, with the primary focus on the integration model developed by Ager and Strang 
(2008).  
  
3.2.7 Makes and Models- Ager and Strang  
Ager and Strang (2008) attempted to coalesce these varying strands of integrationist 
theory and literature into a functional framework on which to possibly base government 
policy directed at facilitating integration. As seen below in Figure 2, they utilise the tangible 
means presented through civic integration (employment, education, language, as well as the 
inherent basis of citizenship, according to Goodman (2010)), the social connections present 
in transnationalism and interculturalism, and the overall psychological aspects of 






Figure 2- Ager and Strang's (2008) integration framework 
  
The model maintains, much as the EU does, that integration is a two-way process in 
which individual and society must move towards each other in order to ameliorate any 
tensions one side may have about the other (Ager & Strang, 2010). The model is not without 
its criticism from its authors, who state “[g]iven the wide variation in income and 
employment, in housing status, in educational experience and outcome, and in health access 
and status across the settled population of any nation, what constitutes ‘successful 
integration’ across those domains? (Ager & Strang, 2008: 173)” Though they seek to rectify 
this sentiment with the ‘rights and citizenship’ domain of the model, attaining refugee status 
can ascribe the rights of a citizen (save the right to vote) to the recognised refugee in the case 
of Germany, where refugees gain access to the social system upon recognition of their status.  
The model also runs into the issue of most countries conducting their integration 
methods and practices differently than others, and even then cities have different practices as 
well. Where employment and education may be the main focus of one state or city, language 




connections. For example, France’s notion of integration stems from its establishment of an 
assimilationist republic, where all people are equal under French law (see Brubaker, 1992, for 
a detailed history about France’s development of citizenship). This ‘colour-blind’ notion of 
integration tends to ignore the difficulties faced by migrants attempting to integrate within 
French culture because their statuses/backgrounds are not taken into account when it comes 
to government interventions (Streiff-Fenart & Segatti, 2012; Simon & Beaujeu, 2018)14.  
Comparatively, the Swedish government frames its definition of integration through 
the goals of its integration policies, i.e. “equal rights, obligations and opportunities for all, 
regardless of ethnic or cultural background. (Government Offices of Sweden, 2009)”15. The  
state even goes so far as to assign cities/towns of residence to refugees (not necessarily in 
mass accommodation centres), though this can lead to refugees taking more time to enter the 
labour market due to being placed in areas outside of large cities because of high population 
density and unavailability of places for accommodation (Bevelander & Dahlstedt, 2013).   
The strength of Ager & Strang’s model is that it can be generalised into integration 
provisions that the state can measure: housing, education, employment, etc. while accounting 
for the metaphysical aspects that cannot be enforced or measured. A potential weakness, 
however, is the lack of structure surrounding the implementation or utilisation of government 
 
14 Brubaker (2014) asserts assimilationism (defined differently from aforementioned definitions of assimilation) 
has made a return into French discourse on integration. Mainly helped along by Jean-Marie Le Pen’s argument 
that the country should only accommodate that which is ‘French’ and neglect that which falls outside the realm 
of what is considered to be ‘truly French’, the politics of refugees and integration has been suffused with the 
notion that mixture with a culture that eschews French ‘values’ sullies the French cultural monolith. Given the 
surprisingly high turnout for the National Front at the previous French presidential election, Brubaker’s 
argument may hold water.  
15 Referring back to the various frameworks surrounding migrant integration, this type of definition can be 
construed as pseudo-assimilationist/multiculturalist given that, while the definition doesn’t demand a social 
contract to the state a la France, the state will still seek to provide the tools and means by which a migrant can 
become more ‘Swedish’ through language education and civics classes. Both Sweden’s left- and right-aligned 
parties regard inclusion and inclusiveness of immigrants and refugees within Swedish society to be a 
fundamental understanding of Swedish identity, along with the provision of welfare and residence allotted to 
each (Jensen, 2016). The exception is the Sweden Democrats, the country’s far-right nationalist party that has 
openly stated the country should restrict immigration and that integration policies should end (Sweden 




resources. Research into more ‘hands-off’ attempts at integration programmes revealed that 
utilising primarily volunteer-based organisations to steer integration services for refugees led 
to extreme uncertainty for refugees and high levels of turnover for the volunteers (Phillimore, 
2012).  
In that vein, Ager & Strang found “both refugees and non-refugees suggested that an 
important factor in making them feel ‘at home’ in an area was the friendliness of the people 
they encountered on a daily basis” (Ager & Strang, 2008: 180). This idea was exemplified 
with the Startblok programme enacted in Amsterdam, where refugees were given the 
opportunity to live side-by-side with native Dutch, which helped in their acculturation to 
Dutch society (Czischke & Huisman, 2018). By allowing refugees the opportunity to be 
surrounded by people who had the desire to be around them, the social bridges and bonds 
portion of Ager & Strang’s model could be fulfilled through a pragmatic approach, i.e. 
providing diverse and integrated housing opportunities to the refugees.  
Social connections, according to Ager & Strang, act as the ‘connective tissue’ with 
which to forge greater links with tangible objects such as education, language, housing, and 
others (Ager & Strang, 2008: 177). How a government can facilitate the development of 
social connections is a wide-ranging discussion; there currently exist many programmes set at 
the local level across Germany that seek to create social connections between native Germans 
and newly-arrived refugees (see Flüchtlingsrat NRW, 2015).  
Taking the literature into account, we can define refugee16 integration as an ongoing, 
dynamic process between a state/society and a refugee, by which a refugee is able to 
acclimate his or herself into a new society through the interaction with processes and 
programmes employed by both the state and civil society.  
 
16 Here we refer to those who have received positive asylum decisions from the government and have been 




How does a refugee/migrant engage with that first connection? Does it come with the 
tangible policy objects provided by the state, or does the connection come before? With that 
in mind, we can focus on housing as a singular aspect that exists in both the tangible realm of 
integration policy and that which can aid in the intangible realm, i.e. creation of social 
connections, promote dialogue between refugees/migrants and society, and ease 
group/outgroup relations by encouraging daily contact.  
  
3.3 Housing (Theories) as a Pathway Through Integration  
3.3.1 Introduction  
In this section we will review housing as both a theoretical object and as a pivotal part 
of integration and integration theory. Because housing comprises the sum of many different 
fields of study, our review of housing literature focuses on housing as a social problem 
around which it is possible to develop theory (Ruonavaara, 2018), and as a pivotal aspect of 
refugee integration that is (and should be) considered at the forefront of policies surrounding 
refugee integration. We start with a discussion about the limited theories concerning housing 
as a social problem, transitioning into aspects of ‘power’ in housing with examples around 
refugees and their access to housing. Then we move into a policy-oriented discussion 
surrounding housing and its relation to the theoretical aspects discussed, at both the local and 
federal level, and coalesce our theoretical and practical discussions into important variables 
concerning refugees and housing, and how it can affect integration.  
  
3.3.2 Can there be theories on or around housing?  
Housing as a material component is widely regarded as an integral part of integration 




2010; Bordignon & Moriconi, 2017; et al.), though there is not a singular socio-theoretical 
framework about housing onto which one can chart an integration course, or understand how 
housing and accommodation affects a refugee’s integration prospects (see King, 2009).   
Ruonavaara (2018) delineates between a theory of housing and a theory about 
housing. The former indicates that it is possible to create a theory of housing that 
encompasses housing in all academic fields, while the latter follows from what Kemeny 
(1992) believes, that it is not possible or desirable to create a theory around housing separate 
from other academic fields (Ruonavaara, 2018: 180). However, Ruonavaara takes a different 
approach in postulating a theory from housing, i.e. that it is possible to create a theory that 
can scrutinise the nature and experience of housing as an object unto itself rather than as a 
domain of a greater field of study (Ibid).   
For Kemeny (1992) in his work Housing and Social Policy, housing should be related 
within the social strata in order to focus attention on the socio-structural and economic issues 
in which housing plays either a minor or major role (Kemeny, 1992: 10), and should be 
conceived within the greater study of the welfare state (Ibid: 65-77). Attempting to formulate 
a theory solely on the basis of housing or a household is akin to “building a conceptual 
framework on shifting sands. (Clapham, 2004: 97)”  
On the face of it, Kemeny’s argument holds apolitical water: that because housing is 
such a wide-ranging object that it touches on so many fields, theorising around housing is a 
fruitless endeavour. That it can be made the subject of economic study, sociological study, 
market analysis (see Pugh, 1986), class divides, anthropological study, etc. shows that a body 
of coherent theory about and around housing would be massive and likely too complex to 
sufficiently explain social outcomes.  
However, rather than embedding housing within a discipline, we can make it the 




(2018) and King (2009) believe, as an object in which the occupier experiences society. 
Much like other social issues, such as public health, environment, work, etc., housing can 
comprise a social issue around which a theory can be developed when the nature of 
inhabitation becomes the focus rather than housing’s place in broader social study (Hatuka & 
Bar, 2016). In the case of refugees, their housing situations are suffused with power and 
political dynamics that can either embolden them or limit them.  
Handel (2019) applied critical theory to the study of houses and homes, underlining 
the basic assumption that housing/homes “are part of a power dispositive, built in certain 
form and material features, based upon theoretical and practical assumptions concerning 
good or bad, efficient or inefficient, desired or undesired. (Handel, 2019: 1050)” Power, in 
the sense of choice over construction and inhabitation is tiered, first at the hands of the state, 
and then to the manager/owner of the housing/home rather than the inhabitant (if they are not 
the owner). How the ‘recipients of housing’ (buyers, renters, occupants) situate themselves 
within society then contains a number of socioeconomic determinants which must be first 
allowed or allocated by the state: for example, a home buyer must contend with property 
taxes while a renter must contend with a landlord, who may or may not utilise his or her 
power to take advantage of a renter for excess fees, sidestepping local renter legal protections 
(if any exist). Refugees often have their housings chosen for them, and depending on where 
they arrive, their ability to choose housing could be generous, restricted, or exceedingly 
bureaucratic.  
  
3.3.3 Refugees and Theories Around Housing  
When we apply this power dynamic to refugee housing, we find that the state (or the 
relevant government level determining housing arrangements) marks the first determinant in 




refugees placed into accommodations far from the locus of social life in society, where access 
to societal resources is difficult because of being physically remote and refugees then have 
fewer options for choosing their own paths (Vey, 2018); a ‘permanent state of exception’ can 
be foisted on refugees, in which they exist in bounded legal limbo while in accommodation 
centres because of lack of transparency and trust on the state’s behalf (Engler, 2018); or 
refugees can be encouraged to enter into societal mainstream with aid from government and 
local organisations (Hamann & El-Kayed, 2018), among other possibilities.  
Because of the differing levels of interaction and agency pertaining to housing, its 
development, and its inhabitation (Hatuka & Bar, 2016), it is necessary to understand how the 
state/governing authority manages the agency of its potential inhabitants. For refugees, this is 
a question of where they are initially placed and to what resources they have immediate 
access. For example, refugees placed in a mass accommodation that allows for regular 
interaction with civil society gives them the opportunity to acclimate more to a new life 
(Bock, 2018: 580-582), though this depends largely on the allowances of the state. Berlin, for 
instance, allows for refugees to find private apartments while Saxony only allows for private 
residences for those in special need (Hamann & El-Kayed, 2018: 140). The inconsistency in 
practice across Germany can lead to uneven outcomes for refugees; housing for refugees thus 
cannot simply be a covered space to protect from weather or an army barrack-style 
accommodation, but a place that ensures a standard of living for refugees, as well as an 
opportunity for societal immersion (Murdie, 2008).  
Housing access and location may also determine community interaction, specifically 
volunteer organisation interaction, which has emerged as a key variable surrounding the 
debate on refugee integration (Gesemann & Roth, 2016: 23). These organisations, in many 
cases, have taken on duties typically reserved for the state in what Hamann & Karakayali 




society” (Hamann & Karakayali, 2016: 80)17. Thus, their services have become essential for 
refugees, especially when refugees are prone to experiencing uncertainty about the new 
society in which they live and discrimination when they attempt to obtain private housing 
(Ringel, 2017: 43; Sawert, 2019). Interestingly enough, refugees housed in rural areas may 
integrate slightly faster than those housed in urban areas, which may indicate a relative 
difference in how ‘community’ is perceived and contact is undertaken (Eichholz &  
Spellerberg, 2019: 5-6).  
Thus we find two central issues surrounding refugees and housing: agency, i.e. the 
ability to regain a sense of control over one’s life (see Vey, 2019) and community access.  
Agency with regard to housing, where a person has the ability to determine how and where 
they will live, enables a person a modicum of control and choice over at least one aspect of 
their life (Parsell, 2012: 160-161), which, as discussed by Al-Ali (2001) and Berry (2002), 
acts as an individual motivation to pursue active integration.   
Accommodation for asylum-seekers in Germany is typically limited upon arrival to 
reception centres/mass accommodations with varying conditions depending on local 
government capacity. Some towns/cities renovate unused buildings into accommodations 
(Bock, 2018) while others build ‘tempohomes’, small short-term container buildings meant to 
last for up to a decade, or sometimes longer (Kreichauf, 2018). Other cities have developed 
unique programmes to fit the circumstances of their demographics and available 
land/buildings, leaving an extremely varied arrangement of policies across the country 
(Schiffauer, et al., 2017). What agency the refugees are given after they are placed into these 
accommodations is largely up to the laws of the city and relevant state, and sometimes that 
agency may rest with the residents of a community who may vocally object and attempt to 
 
17 See chapter on Multi-Level Governance for an expanded discussion on the role of civil society within the 




block the construction of any type of refugee accommodation (Hubana, 2019; Hamann & El-
Kayed, 2018).  
The importance of access to community within the realm of refugee housing cannot 
be understated; imbuing neighbourhoods with access to key resources, as well as ensuring 
that poorer areas do not face exclusion or segregation is the way to ensure that poverty or 
deprivation do not become endemic to communities (Kearns & Forrest, 2000: 1010-1012). 
Refugees are often at the most risk of falling into deprivation and homelessness (Murdie, 
2008). Furthermore, organisations based within communities can provide key socio-cultural 
integration benefits, which also depends upon access granted by the local government for 
organisations to interact with refugees (European Foundation for Democracy, 2018: 64-65). 
Community aid to refugees comes back to the question of agency: by allowing more contact 
with refugees to help them acclimate to a new society, they would be better able to orient 
themselves rather than having to rely solely on the state or help organisations (Engbersen, et 
al., 2016).   
These aspects of refugee agency with regard to housing reflects on two aspects 
elicited by King (2009): housing policy, that which can be measured, controlled, developed, 
bought and sold, and dwelling, that which happens inside the physical structure in which 
someone lives (King, 2009: 43-44). The former can be measured and analysed en masse 
through statistics and other quantifiable means, such as quality inspection of buildings and 
overall occupancy; the latter, however, exists as an interaction between the residents, the 
owners, and the community around them. Accordingly, housing entails a political spectrum 
outside of economic measures, as access to housing (social housing in particular) becomes a 
question of policy differences between two (or more) political viewpoints (Allen, 1997: 88), 




1986: 23); but, the process of integration is a personal experience (Berry, 2002) and requires 
an understanding of the individual’s perceived position with his or her housing situation.   
Thus, the use of an ‘inside’ perspective on housing rather than an ‘outside’ 
perspective, i.e. an experiential-agency frame, provides a reasonable critique to Kemeny’s 
(1992) belief that housing must be embedded within a social discipline rather than existing as 
something around which a theory can be formulated. Especially when we take into account 
refugee interactions with both physical housing and policy surrounding housing and how that 
can differ from the general socio-economic study of housing, while utilising Ruonavaara’s 
(2018) notion of a theory from housing we can observe a marked investment in how housing 
can affect the wellbeing and integration prospects of refugees, as will be demonstrated in the 
chapters on Berlin and Leverkusen.  
  
3.4 Conclusions  
The literature covers a wide swath of ‘integration’ theories generally used to refer to 
both refugees and general migrants, though the term itself lacks a unified definition on which 
to draw from a cohesive body of theory. From theories at the personal level demonstrating 
how individuals may decide to approach, as Berry (2002) terms it, acculturation, to state 
individual interactions, to work-first perspectives and academic models, integration has 
different meanings in different locales, which can lead to different and uneven outcomes 
among populations.  
The chapter coalesced a definition of integration taking into account the ‘two-way’ 
nature of the phenomenon and the necessity to ensure that both the state and the individual 
are actively engaged in the process. Though the general process contains different measures 
of accomplishment to determine integration ‘levels’ depending on locality and state (see 




society and non-government organisations to aid refugees in their acculturation. Governments 
typically either act liberally, allowing for refugees to obtain housing and contact with 
organisations, or stringently, allowing only certain refugees under explicit conditions to 
access private housing.   
The local level has been shown to influence integration as much as or more than the 
state can, with cities/municipalities directing policies aimed at more inclusivity than 
otherwise. This can be observed in the differences between Berlin and Saxony, where the 
former has more liberal allowances towards refugee integration benefits than the latter.  
Housing is shown to be an important variable within the realm of integration because 
it can afford a refugee access to the community and increase both exposure and immersion to 
the new society in which they live. Though there are limited theories surrounding housing 
and its ability to help or hinder refugee integration, we can draw on Ruonovaara’s (2018) 
concept of a theory from housing to better understand and develop an interactive and 
dynamic application of how housing interacts with a refugee’s integration prospects. While 
this has much to do with the state and its proprietary nature over refugee accommodation, the 
refugee living inside the accommodation must also attempt to interact with the state and its 
citizenry, and where they are accommodated can have a massive impact on their ability 




















Chapter 4:  Deconstructing Multi-Level Governance: To be, 
or not to be, a Theory (or just a very useful concept)  
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter will overview the generalities and the specificities of the body of 
multilevel governance literature, going back to its conceptual creation in the 1990s up to 
today and will detail how the method of analysis has changed to accommodate different 
modes of analysis.   
Multi-level governance holds relevance both towards the understanding of integration 
policy development and its implementation. As demonstrated in the previous chapter on 
integration and housing theory, there are two general vertical levels to integration policy 
construction: national level and local level (with federal state level also included for those 
countries that have federal states within). They may be more synchronised in their outlooks 
on how integration policies should be structured, or they may clash more with decisions 
concerning inclusivity and access for refugees to greater societal resources (see Goodman & 




government, and this chapter will show how multi-level governance can help elucidate and 
evaluate those structures.  
Further, MLG also comprises the governance partnerships between governments and 
non-government organisations. This vertical-horizontal framework of analysis is relevant for 
studying integration policy given how often municipalities partner with or contract out 
various integration services to private organisations. This partnership is not always 
straightforward, and may involve the government taking a ‘back seat’ over governance and 
allowing the NGO to operate with relatively free reign, or may entail greater coordination, 
cooperation, or oversight rather than a relatively laissez-faire approach. Thus, MLG can 
provide us with the tools by which we will both analyse refugee housing policies in the 
proceeding chapters, and with which we will construct the theoretical framework in chapter 
7.  
Governance studies18, as a general body of work, comprise a ‘core concept’ rather 
than a cohesive, unpolemical school of thought, with MLG sitting as a more recent addition 
to the study of governance (Kjær, 2004). Because of how new MLG is and how many 
different academic studies in different fields have both utilised it as a framework of analysis 
and as an object to critique because of its relative lack of cohesive corpus, MLG requires both 
meanstesting and continual application and critique in different studies that contain different 
levels/hierarchies of analysis. Doing so allows and requires us to ‘break down’ what the core 
of MLG is, what components have been added on along the way, what its strengths and 
weaknesses are, and what its limitations are in order to best utilise and critique it in this 
study.   
 
18 Corporatist models of governance were considered as a method of analysis before settling on to MLG due to 




In that regard, we can identify a literature gap where MLG has not been actively 
applied to the study of refugee housing policy at the local level in the German example, or 
even more generally. MLG has been used to analyse migration and/or integration policy at 
the national and local level, sometimes in juxtaposition to analyse why they are similar or 
different (see Careja, 2019; Fakhoury, 2019; Homsy, et al., 2019; Zapata-Barrero, et al., 
2017; et al.). However, as it pertains to the specificities of housing policy as a prime 
facilitator of integration (or otherwise), studies have generally remarked upon the importance 
of housing as an area over which the local level has policy competence, but not upon the 
variations of how policy is implemented and the impacts of that implementation on refugee 
integration prospects (see Doomernik & Ardon, 2018; Hamann & El-Kayed, 2018; 
Jørgensen, 2012; et al.)19.   
  
In the current context of global affairs and situations regarding the rights and 
movements of refugees around the world, filling this literature gap is essential as MLG 
constitutes a wider structural mechanism through which many governments are divvying up 
the responsibilities over refugee affairs, both to the local level and to non-governmental 
organisations, whether they are non-profit or otherwise (see previous chapter). Whether this 
is a result of rational decision-making, structural pressures, individual preferences, or another 
factor is part of what MLG seeks to uncover (Cairney, 2012), and will be one of the 
foundational aspects of Berlin’s and Leverkusen’s respective policies that will be analysed in 
the following chapters.   
 
19 A slight exception to this is Lukes, et al.’s (2019) study of housing discrimination against migrants and policy 
in the UK. It covers a brief history of policymaking concerning housing discrimination based on ethnicity. The 
paper only touches briefly on refugees. Similarly, Ringel (2017) studied how refugees are able to create homes 
within Germany and the agency they have in differing circumstances, though without analysing the policies 




The following section will begin by overviewing the origin and development of MLG 
from the early 1990s to today, highlighting several critiques of MLG as a method of analysis. 
We will then briefly discuss MLG’s tangibility as a theory of policymaking, and whether its 
loosely-defined corpus should be considered a theory or something else. Then we will look at 
how MLG is applied in different policy circumstances, which include attempts by several 
academics to codify a solid theoretical structure around MLG. After, we will do a deeper dive 
into Type-II MLG, as it is the primary focus of our analysis and the eventual theoretical 
framework, and delineate several strands of public policy study that comprise Type-II as a 
method of governance.  
Finally, we will discuss the contribution of this chapter and thesis to the greater MLG 
literature: creating the building blocks of a functionally-specific model for local refugee 
housing policy utilising the aforementioned embedded MLG concepts.  
4.2 The MLG Corpus  
4.2.1 Origins  
Multi-level governance (MLG) as a concept began with Marks’ (1992, 1993) analysis 
of the then-nascent European Union policymaking structure regarding structural development 
funds and why/how those funds were increased, and how policy was formulated and 
advanced. It came as an alternative to liberal intergovernmentalist and neo-functionalist 
theorists who viewed, respectively, that European policy came from member states, or that 
the power to make policy was gradually being ceded to the EU as a result of ‘functional 
spillover’ (i.e. that the European Commission/Parliament/etc. was able to glean increased 
ability to oversee and adjudicate over issues because of the necessity to move those issues to 
the EU level rather than have them remain as something between individual member states) 
from the supranational level forming the general rules about which the EU will function. In 





“a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial 
tiers—supranational, national, regional, and local—as the result of a broad process of 
institutional creation and decisional reallocation that has pulled some previously 
centralized functions of the state up to the supranational level and some down to the 
local/regional level. (Marks, 1993: 392)”  
  
His research focused on the development of supranational EU bodies and their extent 
of contact with regional and subnational governments in forming the guidelines for structural 
development funding, dedicating specific attention to the work of individual actors within the 
spheres of power and influence. He found that information was exchanged between the 
various levels within the then-European Community and much of the process was 
decentralised, giving member states a say in how the funding would be allocated while those 
less-developed members gave a wider berth to the European Commission to finalise the 
budget. The Commission also had a large number of meetings with subnational governing 
bodies, which ultimately led to a wider shift in negotiating between all relevant parties (Ibid: 
402-403). Thus, for Marks, the centre of policymaking or influencing policy development did 
not rest solely with the Commission or the European Parliament, but was an active process 
involving the member states, the EU governance structures, and regional levels within the 
member states.  
To liberal intergovernmentalists this would only signal that, while the Commission 
had meetings with subnational levels, it was ultimately the member states that decided on the 
final allocations for the structural development funding and on the governing structure of the 
EU as a whole (see Moravcsik, 1993). The states maintained their centrality while all else, 




and the impetus and discretion for formulating and directing policy creation resided with the 
state (Piattoni, 2010: 18-19). However, analysing the EU only as an “international regime for 
policy coordination” (Moravcsik, 1993: 480) minimises the role that the supranational level 
inhabits in policy/law creation and judicial enforcement, as well as the regional and local 
levels did play and have increasingly played in both policy innovation and influence at the 
supranational level, which will be looked at further on in this section. Because the European 
Union is a sui generis international organisation and can enact binding laws and policies 
upon its member states, another method of analysis was needed to better understand how EU 
laws are formed.  
Marks, Hooghe, and Blank (1996) further developed MLG to explain that governance 
within the EU is not nested, as in federal systems, but rather governance structures are 
interconnected in such a way as to allow the subnational level direct access to the 
supranational level (Marks, et al., 1996: 346-347). They also further enumerated the 
importance of actors and institutions within the state, rather than referring to the state as a 
wholly unitary actor; this was a hard break from the liberal intergovernmentalists and the 
neo-functionalists, who both typically viewed the state and institutions through the lens of the 
more ‘traditional’ IR theories, i.e. realism and liberalism. By shifting the locus of study onto 
the actors within states, MLG could take a more holistic view of how policy structures 
operate and analyse the impact of actors on the different directions policies and governance 
can take.  
The example given by Marks, Hooghe, and Blank (1996) is of decisional reallocation, 
where some heads of governments decided to cede competence to the European Commission 
in areas of policy where the member state might normally have purview. This is done for any 
number of reasons: sometimes it enhances the ability of the member state, if it is a small one, 




blame for policies that could bring about some level of strife (Ibid: 349). Because of this 
possibility, the Commission is keen on developing contacts at the regional level, which is 
why the EU has bodies such as the Committee of the Regions (and others) that has 
representatives from regional and local areas within each member state.  
With the increased utilisation of MLG as a framework (Bache & Flinders, 2004a), 
Hooghe and Marks (2003) delineated two types of MLG, Type I and Type II, as a method by 
which to generally organise the different styles of governance that could be implemented. 
Type I is most familiar as federalism, or the ‘Russian nesting doll’ of governance, where the 
layers of competence are neatly stacked one on top of the other with general jurisdictions 
defined for each. These structures are very stable and durable, and typically resist large-scale 
changes or destruction throughout changes in ruling party or ideology (Hooghe & Marks,  
2003: 236).   
Type II is more horizontal than vertical. Here the number of jurisdictions are 
potentially infinite, with smaller organisations handling specific areas of policy rather than, 
for example, the municipal government handling a wide array of general policy (Ibid: 237). 
Jurisdictions may also overlap rather than staying firmly within the overall nested governance 
structure, leaving authority on a given policy typically decentralised to individual entities, or 
shared between two or more entities. An example of this is the Rheinisch-Bergischer Kreis20, 
a county/district within the German state of North-Rhein Westphalia that encompasses six 
cities and two municipalities. While the cities and municipalities within the Kreis develop 
their own policies on integration and housing, they consult with the Kreis and the other 
members within, and the Kreis is able to provide funding and support, as well as 
links/network associations that are of use to the cities and municipalities.  
 




Type II also involves issue-specific jurisdictions which may be made to last for the 
length of the issue, if it is finite (Ibid: 240). It is designed to fit as a panacea to specific policy 
problems, and the method of jurisdiction creation can vary between the creation of a new 
government body or, as has been increasingly seen since the last decade of the 20th century, 
public-private partnerships, whereby a government contracts out a specific service to be 
delivered either by a for-profit business or a non-profit (Cairney, 2012: 158-159), or a 
government creates single-issue agency or quango whose functions may then be parcelled out 
to other organisations (Talbot, 2003: 10-15). This practice has emphasised the role of 
nongovernmental organisations in fulfilling duties that would, typically, be occupied by a 
government body but are otherwise not engaged in doing so, or do so in a more limited 
fashion, in order to cut back on budget expenditure (Haque, 2011: 336-338).   
Scholten (2013) identified that MLG has a more ‘technocratic’ orientation in its 
cooperative maintenance, where there is more policy implementation focus between the 
relevant actors instead of engaging in political handwringing (Scholten, 2013: 220). He 
identified four ‘ideal type’ relationship paradigms between government levels, derived partly 
from Marks’ and Hooghe’s (2001) work developing MLG: centralist, localist, MLG, and 
decoupled. Centralist implies power is held almost entirely within the central government a la 
the Westminster Model, and all policymaking power comes from the top-down. Localist 
views the local level as an important asset in, in this case, migration policy, and possibly 
more important than the central government, with the local level producing more specific 
policy prescriptions than the national level could. MLG is, as expected, a coordination game 
with constant interaction between the different levels of government. Finally, decoupled 
refers to a complete lack of communication and coordination between levels of government, 





He found that while the local level set policies apart from the national level, the use of 
MLG determined that the different levels set different priorities for the same types of 
policies, i.e. the national level was far more reserved in engaging in both inclusive and 
adaptive migration policies while the local level often acted the policy entrepreneur, creating 
policies that could later be adopted at the national level (Ibid: 232-234). There was also a 
disconnect between how the local level and the national level portrayed their migration and 
integration policies, demonstrating that while MLG may be a common method of governance 
within the realm of migration policy, it is possible to adopt the characteristics of more than 
one of Scholten’s ‘ideal types’ of governance at a time to analyse the relationships between 
the levels, and in many cases the ideal types likely have overlap.  
But does Scholten’s (2013) reification of the ideal types of governance compress or 
disregard the dynamic adaptation and development of network governance that occurs within 
MLG? Supranational committee development and the (often spontaneous) creation of policy 
networks would suggest that in order to best analyse policy governance, one must take a 
more holistic view on a policy-by-policy basis in order to not silo oneself into a specific ideal 
type (Piattoni, 2010). Policy can be developed at the local level in tandem with the national, 
as seen in Germany’s National Integration Plan, or from market-based government partners 
(Cohen & Sabel, 1997), or from the supranational level; et al. Part of the appeal of utilising 
MLG rather than ascribing a specific ideal type of governance dimensionality is MLG’s 
ability to capture the relevant stakeholders and how they are able to implement policy, i.e. 
who the important partners are, how the policy is administered at different levels, what the 
centres of power are within a policy’s implementation, etc.   
With that in mind, MLG’s use as an analytical frame moved from mostly concerning 
the development of EU policy towards the study of other policy areas around the world 




develop policy responses to immediate issues (see Marti, 2019; Schiller, 2018; Fakhoury, 
2019; et al.). The component parts of policy development, i.e. issue reaction, specialist input, 
etc. can all be applied not at the state and local level because those component parts are found 
within local and regional policy; thus, Type II as a method of analysis had the chance to 
spread to other policy areas.           
  
4.2.2 Type II structures  
Rosenau (2004) postulated 6 types of governance in 3 structures that fit within the 
Type II MLG framework on an international or global scale: formal structure (top-down and 
network governance), informal structure (bottom-up and side-by-side governance), and 
mixed formal and informal structure (market and Mobius-web governance) (Rosenau, 2004: 
42). Top-down concerns governments, transnational companies, and intergovernmental 
organisations; bottom-up concerns public movements and (international) nongovernmental 
organisations; market governance involves a mix of the previous two, with governments 
interacting with the previously mentioned stakeholders along with elites and markets 
themselves. These three are directionally vertical or horizontal with regard to decision 
making and policy implementation, and are rather straightforward by design.  
The next three (network governance, side-by-side governance, and Mobius-web 
governance), rather than maintaining a hierarchy of movement with policy 
creation/implementation, rely more on cross-sectional interaction between the various 
stakeholders rather than dominance by any one body (Ibid: 43). Any one of the actors within 
these three categories can take the initiative with regard to steering policy direction and can 
influence the other members of the same category, typically through discussion or utilisation 




These are, as Rosenau states, governance models explicitly pertaining to international 
governance rather than state-subnational-society relations (Ibid: 43). However, it is possible 
to conceive of these models within the framework of a nation-state by simply removing the 
‘international’ label and applying their characteristics to national and subnational instances of 
unique governance. For example, the Startblok programme in Amsterdam is a collaboration 
between the City of Amsterdam, Socius Wonen (housing and building management 
company), and housing organisation De Key that works to house refugees within 
communities of Dutch nationals, which came about because of a collaborative and negotiated 
discussion between the city of Amsterdam and its housing associations (Doomernik & Ardon, 
2018). The same mechanisms of bargaining, cooperation, negotiation, and networks operate 
at the international level as they do at the sub-state level.   
As a German example, the German government held direct discussions with relevant 
community and representative national advocacy groups when developing the concepts 
surrounding the National Integration Plan in 2007 (Dekker, et al., 2015: 13-14). Though the 
initiation of the plan’s development formally came from the government, local advocacy (in 
cities such as Berlin) had already codified integration practices into local policies though 
direct consultations with the municipal governments, allowing for those local organisations to 
act as policy entrepreneurs and experts to inform the National Integration Plan’s development 
(Mushaben, 2010: 156-158). The National Integration Plan demonstrates both of Rosenau’s 
(2004) formal and informal governance structures, as community/advocacy groups are those 
that most often work to ensure that government policies are put into action for 
migrants/refugees, and while the start of the policy came from the top-most level of 
government, it was a bottom-up development that emerged from network and side-by-side 




With that in mind, Peters and Pierre (2004) argue that MLG, Type II in particular, is 
evidence that the standards of governance around policy implementation have been loosened 
from those of the 20th century: where governments once dominated the policy sphere, 
deregulation has opened up the utilisation of smaller agencies and non-
government/thirdsector organisations in place of the traditional oversight/implementation by 
centralised government power, and has devolved policy implementation to specialised 
organisations that engage in contracting with governments rather than being subject to them 
(Peters & Pierre, 2004: 83-84). This presents a potential problem in oversight and 
implementation of policies when these organisations interact with the general public, and 
how they are governed or monitored by the government (Haque, 2011).   
One recent example of the devolution of oversight in refugee accommodation 
practices was the Tempelhof reception facility in Berlin, which was notable in how much 
leeway the contracted company Tamaja was given to administrate the facility. There were 
few, if any, mechanisms for residents to make complaints or contact the Landesamt für  
Flüchtlingsangelegenheiten (LAF; State Office for Refugees Affairs), which is supposed to 
oversee Tamaja’s operations, and Tamaja was able to sub-contract several operating services 
without the oversight or approval of the LAF (Engler, 2018)21. A less deregulated example is 
a prior partnership between the Evangelische Jugend- und Fürsorgewerk (EJF; Protestant 
Youth and Care Council of Berlin) and the Berlin government. EJF and the government 
worked hand-in-hand to place refugees in private accommodations, though eventually the 
government ended the contract and shifted elsewhere the service EJF had offered (Bhagat &  
Soederberg, 2019).  
  
4.2.2.1 Factors Inherent to Type II MLG  
 




Here we will focus on smaller quirks that contribute to Type II governance, notably 
models of interaction between governments and private sector actors, establishments of 
policy networks, public-private partnerships, and policy implementation.  
Type II creates a horizontal rather than vertical (Type I) structure, where governance 
of an issue can be sequestered from government to a specialist organisation, or it can be 
shared within a network of divided and managed competences within complex markets 
(Kjær, 2004: 39-41, 48-49). As it pertains to refugee integration services, many of the shared 
governance contracts go to non-profit charitable organisations or refugee-facing 
organisations, among others (generally, non-governmental organisations (NGOs)). As per 
Haque (2011), the relationship between a government and a contracted NGO can be modelled 
in one of five ways:   
1. The Government-Dominant Model: the focus is on the power of the 
government to specify methods by which service delivery is done; typical of 
welfare states. NGOs are given limited autonomy by which they can act, and  
have agency as more of an extension of the state’s desire to deliver a service 
rather than as an independent body.  
2. The Third-Sector Dominant Model: NGOs hold greater autonomy over their 
operations, funding, and how they deliver services. This is indicative of states 
without strong welfare provisions.  
3. The Dual-Track Model: the government is unable to deliver all services, and 
thus duties are split between the NGOs and the government.   
4. The Collaboration Model: the government works directly with the NGOs, 
sharing competences with mutual responsibility and partnership. Unlike the 




between the NGOs and government, but rather has both working on the same 
issues together.  
5. The Competition Model: opposed to the previous models, the Competition 
Model implies that the NGOs and government are at odds with one another. It 
is a zero-sum game where only one can gain while the other loses. (Haque, 
2011: 333-334)  
  
The collaboration model is of particular interest to the German case. Given the wide 
variety of policies and methods of implementation across German states and cities when it 
comes to refugee integration service delivery, there is typically one common factor between 
them: actively working with and relying on local organisations, NGOs, and non-profits to aid 
with service delivery (see Deutscher Landkreistag, 2016, for an overview of different 
policies). As opposed to solely coordination, where governments and their partners remain 
separate but informed as to the activities of the other, and cooperation, which is more 
shortterm and less formal, collaboration implies a more durable, shared, dynamic relationship 
where each party stands to gain social capital with increased activity (Bingham, 2011: 391).   
Imperative within the collaborative model of governance is the presence of 
accountability between the government and the partner organisation in the practice of joint 
service delivery. Since government contracting partners are not typically chosen via 
referendum or by public approval, partnerships with the private sector may be viewed as 
nepotistic or plutocratic (Haque, 2011). The process of collaborative governance ensures 
conceptual accountability on behalf of both the contracting organisation and the government 
in three ways: first, the implied transparency in collaborative governance allows for each 
organisation to monitor the other, or to at least have better access to policy implementation 




is a greater chance of reporting on perceived malfeasance. Second, shared competence over a 
policy area creates a point of contact for the subjects who receive the policy benefits, where 
they might report on apprehensions or misdeeds perceived by one or the other partners in 
collaborative governance.22   
For example, individuals at the receiving end of policy implementation who may 
experience a type of discrimination by a government/contracting body member can voice 
their concerns directly to the other or to the superiors, who can act directly to rectify any 
malfeasance. Third, collaboration may entail growth of area-specific knowledge within 
government so that future policy implementations, even if it is done without the contracting 
organisation, will be better suited to rectify whatever issue the specific policy is covering. 
Thus, collaborative governance is better suited at tackling the accountability issue, which is a 
key issue surrounding governance in general (Kjær, 2004: 49-50).  
Collaborative governance also allows for direct input from civil society, adding 
another layer of accountability by countering criticisms of ‘private governance’ or lack of 
transparency on behalf of the networked actors in service delivery (Bingham, 2011: 398). In 
the German refugee case, this input can come in the form of volunteer outreach initiatives, 
which, while touching on both government and NGO organisational efforts, creates a third 
actor essential to both the governance bodies but maintaining a discrete, non-organisational 
viewpoint (Mayer, 2017). These volunteers will often have the most face-to-face contact with 
refugees and will understand their needs and issues better than the governance organisations 
(Bock, 2018).   
 




 4.2.2.2 Policy Networks  
A natural foundation in type-II governance is the utilisation and/or the development 
of specialised policy networks. These networks can be formal or informal, and involve civil 
servants engaged in the development and implementation of policies with an NGO that likely 
contains specialised knowledge surrounding that policy. Development of policy networks is a 
natural by-product of both the retreat of the public sector23 and the specialised nature of 
policy implementation: because civil servants cannot be expected to know the minutiae of 
every policy they help to develop or oversee, they require the input of organisations that are 
expertise leaders in that field (Cairney, 2012: 165). Policy networks are formed in variegated 
ways, both formally (through contracted partnerships, roundtable discussions, invited 
consulting, etc.) and informally (through personal discussions, lobbying, familiarity, etc.) and 
how they are utilised depends on the willingness and trust the government has of the NGO.  
These networks likely end up involved in policy implementation, with different 
members of the networks being involved to varying degrees and tasks. As with the models of 
interaction between governments and private sector actors discussed above, implementation 
of a specific policy depends on how the government is structured and maintained in relation 
to its partner(s) (Saito, 2011). These structures do not necessarily determine the success or 
failure of any given policy implementation, but rather serve as the backdrop onto which one 
can determine why and how a policy was implemented well or otherwise (Koliba, et al., 
2011). Networks typically have three determining characteristics: interdependence (the actors 
require each other to see objectives through), coordination (acting jointly maintains a network 
 
23 Much attention has been given to state failure in solving so-called ‘wicked problems’ (social, environmental, 
economic, etc.) on its own, which has given rise to increasing network governance over given policies and 
reliance on market forces to deliver services through New Public Management means. Some have called this the 
increased privatisation or hollowing out of the state, as accountability is shifted away from government bodies, 
while others believe that network governance can increase democratic accountability. For more information, see 




and ensures better policy outputs), and pluralism (networks are generally autonomous from 
other networks that cover other policy areas) (Enroth, 2011: 27).    
Network formation may be mandated by the central government as a form of top 
down policy implementation, or may form at the local level through advocacy organisations, 
relevant agencies, or municipal partnerships as a form of bottom-up implementation 
(Cairney, 2012: 37-39). However, cultivating networks at the local level that are either 
aligned with a policy’s goals (perhaps through political or ideological affiliation) or have 
field-specific knowledge and experience can facilitate the policy’s implementation and may 
create more favourable perceptions about the implementation of the policy, as a local 
organisation would have greater access to those whom the policy would affect (Weimer & 
Vining, 2010: 292-293).  
Germany holds countless examples of network formation between local government 
and local organisations, two of which will be studied in the following chapters on Berlin and 
Leverkusen. However, similar network formation dynamics take place in countries that have 
struggled relative to Germany’s situation in asylum integration dynamics. An interesting 
example of bottom-up network creation (or lack thereof, at the municipal level) comes from 
Italy, where Cappiali (2018) found that the political leanings of local government and refugee 
advocacy organisations determined how and under what conditions networks were formed 
with the local government. For instance, in traditionally ‘conservative’ Bergamo, the primary 
mover for refugee aid was the Catholic church, which partnered with pan-European charity 
Caritas and developed several local sub-bodies to aid refugees in areas of public 
administration where the local government was lacking; however, the church’s attitude 
towards immigrant-run organisations was paternalistic and often ignored their input, 




Contrarily, the city of Reggio Emilia had a strong network of both local government 
and civil society actors laid out in a governance strategy that promoted inclusion and 
diversity through co-planning of programmes and integration initiatives to treat refugees and 
immigrants as would-be citizens, an approach similar to that of civic integrationism while 
also adopting the ideals of interculturalism (Ibid: 123-124). Thus, in countries where either 
formal institutional integration power is devolved to federal state or the local level, or the 
central government neglects to take the lead on development of integration policy networks 
or implementation, variations between different cities’ political and policy alignments 
determine the strength of policy network development and implementation rather than the 
influence of local groups or the central government (Pilati & Morales, 2018).   
Key within this relationship for implementation is the transit and availability of 
information and information flow (Kobila, et al., 2011). Information transparency is a 
cornerstone of collaborative governance, and the state/government plays a make-or-break 
role in facilitating information flows for local policy implementation and, as an extension, 
accountability. In cases where the state has been ‘hollowed out’ and much of its services have 
been rendered to privately contracted organisations, these networks may exist as less of a 
coordinating/implementing body and more as a loose association between them with little 
direction, if any, given by the central/local government (Rhodes, 1997).   
  
4.2.2.3 Public-Private Partnerships  
But then, how are these networks formed? Are they spontaneous responses from 
private and civil society organisations to a wicked policy problem that the government finds 
itself unable to handle on its own? Or are they directly established or convened by the 
government as a novel way to handle a policy problem? Do they first begin solely between 




perceived inability or apathy towards solving a policy problem, or is it something else 
entirely?  
The answer is, as one would expect, varied by circumstance. But here, we can break 
down the public-private partnerships (PPPs) that take place within governance and form the 
basis of policy implementation networks, as the utilisation of private non-government actors 
for governance is often considered to be a linchpin in determining what constitutes Type II 
MLG (Caponio & Jones-Correa, 2018).  
First, we must delineate several factors why public-private partnerships are utilised:  
typically, PPP is done to facilitate government cost-saving. A government does it when it 
cannot provide a good or service by itself, or the good or service is too costly for overall 
budget expenditure, or the good or service can or has been delivered more proficiently by a 
private organisation (Cohen & Eimicke, 2011). It can also be used to reach local 
demographics more easily when uniting with a local or community-based organisation, thus 
eliminating the ‘faceless bureaucrat’ stereotype that often entails some policy 
implementation.   
Increased use of PPPs may also be a natural consequence of the modern age of 
communication. Because civil society groups and organisations are so much more 
widespread and visible through social media than in the previous century, civil society and 
advocacy organisations have the ability to reach far more people than before and more 
directly connect with and demonstrate an impact in their local community in a policy area 
(Bingham, 2011). Their increased visibility may lead to more direct collaboration with 
government and even direct contracting of services through partnerships that serve to benefit 
all parties involved24, though as in the above example on the two cities in Italy, whether or 
 
24 Chapters on Leverkusen and Berlin will explore several of these organisations involved in the governance of 




not these organisations are engaged by the government depends largely on the willingness of 
the local government to engage with them.   
As one would expect, however, not all PPPs are constructed with community and 
local organisations that advocate for policy pertaining to a specific group of people or a 
locality. Goods and services from all sectors of the economy are contracted out in PPPs to 
varying degrees of oversight and regulation, and how the partnerships are structured can 
“…structure public policies and their outcomes… and they structure the modes of 
governance. (Le Galès, 2011: 151)” Oversight, transparency, and regulation become 
paramount questions within the agreements forged in these partnerships, especially when 
lines between government and contracting partners have become more blurred over the past 3 
decades as governments have opened and extended the use of PPPs in a variety of policy 
areas (Koliba, et al., 2011). As governments have a democratic accountability to provide 
goods and services to its citizens and its for-profit contracting partners seek to engage in 
profit maximisation, how the partnership process is managed will shape the policy output, 
public perception, and the future possibilities of cooperation between the government and the 
partnering entity (Weimer & Vining, 2010).  
Issues of accountability, responsibility, and ethics, especially in cases of policy that 
cover issues of life or death, health and wellbeing of citizens or those receiving services 
becomes a major sticking point in the use of PPPs. There is general agreement that 
governments should not only hold its governance partners accountable for any ethical 
infractions, but that the government itself, whether it is the civil service or the elected 
politicians, must also be held to and hold itself and its contracted partners to a high standard 




exploded over the past few decades and governments have increasingly relied on both 
nonprofit and for-profit organisations to aid in policy governance, ensuring that organisations 
involved carry through policy implementation and monitoring ethically is a challenge and a 
key responsibility of governments, raising questions of whether governments should rely on 
PPPs (Haque, 2011). How that is done, however, is a matter of how the government’s role in 
governance is envisioned.  
To that end, countries have utilised PPPs (and more broadly, ‘New Public  
Management’, i.e. the extended use of third organisations to fulfil government policies) for 
different reasons: some states may do it as a way of decentralising government power from 
an ideological standpoint (an example being Thatcher’s reforms in the UK), or some states 
may justify the practice as extending the capacity of the government to cover more policy 
ground and thus reinforce the state’s ability to deliver goods and services (Cohen & Eimicke, 
2011; Saito, 2011). How this affects the governance of a single policy issue depends upon 
how much the central/local government involves itself in the oversight or implementation of 
a policy; for example, some states had poor control over peripheral functions in the past (civil 
service operations, nationalised industry monitoring, etc.), so a move towards a partnership 
with a specific organisation may be justified as a way to both return the government to its 
core competency and ensure that a specific policy area is enacted in a cost-efficient, ethical, 
and effective manner (Cairney, 2012: 160).   
  
4.2.3 A theory of sorts?  
However, discussions around MLG’s suitability of analysis raises questions of its 




the middle-ground between intergovernmentalist theory and neo-functionalist, where both 
posit hypotheses about how states will act and what will happen within certain situations 
(George, 2004). Piattoni calls MLG “at the same time a theory of political mobilization, of 
policy-making, and of polity structuring, hence any theorization about MLG must be couched 
alternatively or simultaneously in politics, policy, or polity terms” (Piattoni, 2010: 26). 
Bache, Bartle, and Flinders (2016) posit MLG as ‘fuzzy’, or as encompassing perhaps too 
many concepts without having defined borders as to what precisely MLG ‘is’ and where it 
‘ends’ (Bache, et al., 2016: 486).   
This conceptual ambiguity about MLG and its boundaries also follows the study of 
governance as a whole (see Bartolini, 2011), where there are many definitions of the concepts 
that are applied in slightly different ways. Generally, there is agreement that there is a 
hierarchical structure, involvement of partners (either through formal or informal 
agreements), and co-production/implementation of knowledge/policy, though the methods 
through which these are built or achieved differ between the varying strains of thought 
around governance.   
Bache and Flinders (2004a) sought to explicitly clarify how MLG can be considered 
different to other types of governance, such as network governance, by emphasising four 
common strands of characteristics: first, that decision making at various territorial levels is 
characterized by the increased participation of non-state actors; second, that levels of 
governance have become almost indiscriminate in some policies, marking a difficulty in 
differentiating them; third, the state’s role is transforming to where it finds its duties in 
coordination and policy development becoming more plastic depending on the specific policy 
being implemented; fourth, that in this changing context, the nature of democratic 
accountability has been challenged and need to be rethought or at least reviewed (Bache & 




enumerate MLG’s definitive qualities was to ensure that MLG can produce testable 
hypotheses, as a theory would.  
Hooghe and Marks (2003) refer to MLG Type II governance “theory” (Hooghe & 
Marks, 2003: 240) in their work, though their work does not claim to suggest how a state will 
act on a particular policy problem, rather describing the structure of a state’s decision-making 
or policymaking entity. Our focus when linking the study of refugee housing and integration 
with MLG is to identify the necessary variables by which one can determine whether or not a 
refugee housing policy will encourage integration; thus it is important to understand whether 
or not MLG constitutes a theory or a framework of analysis, as a theory would seek to 
postulate outcomes while a framework would only organise a policy implementation 
structure (Jordan, 2000: 204).  
The debate over whether or not MLG constitutes a theory comes down largely to two 
arguments, one enunciated by Peters and Pierre (2004) and one put forth by George (2004). 
The former take issue with how wide the application of MLG is towards the study of any 
interaction between government levels or between governments and non-state actors that 
engage in governance. For them,  
  
[a]ny complex and multi-faced political process can be referred to as multi-level 
governance. Second, and perhaps more importantly, multi-level governance appears 
incapable of providing clear predictions or even explanations (other than the most 
general) of outcomes in the governance process. As already noted, this approach has 
some similarities with network analysis, and one of those similarities is its 
indeterminate nature (Peters & Pierre, 2004: 88)  
  
  MLG began as a ‘third way’ of analysing and understanding the functions and 




bargaining between the national, subnational, and supranational levels; in that regard, it is 
understandable why it does not have any predictions to offer, simply because it was not 
initially conceived of having any. Conversely, George (2004) points to the fact that utilising 
MLG as a framework elicits questions about how policy is formed, changed, and influenced, 
thus leading to testable hypotheses “the findings from which can lead to further research 
questions, and to answer which further testable hypotheses can be formulated. (George, 2004:  
117)”  
  In that sense, MLG does not directly posit a theoretical outcome before a study is 
conducted and does not necessarily point to predictions without first having a grasp on how 
the structure of governance of a given issue works. It does not attempt to say ‘if a governance 
structure does not demonstrate that its Type-II setup facilitates bargaining at the local level, 
then X policy will fail’; rather, it tells us how governance is arranged today (Stephenson, 
2013: 818). This falls in stark contrast to the broad study of political and international 
relations theories, an example being international realist theory, which will typically claim 
that the state with more power will seek to dominate weaker ones, and that all states will seek 
to maximise power for themselves, no matter the situation.   
With how Hooghe and Marks (2003) established the outlines of how Types I and II  
MLG operate, much is left to interpretation as to whether or not MLG constitutes a theory 
(besides the brief mention within the same article labelling it as such). They detail the 
boundaries and borders of Types I and II and give them characteristics, but never delve into 
what they can and cannot do. The sole area that could be considered positing a theoretical 
base is in the coordination dilemma, i.e. what happens when limited jurisdictions have 
overlap. They prescribe two possible strategies that governing bodies can enact: limit the 
number of autonomous actors (indicative of Type I) and limit interaction among actors 




limit any sort of conflict between them (Hooghe & Marks, 2003: 239-240). Beyond that 
small aspect of governance, little can be said of them cultivating a fully-realised theoretical 
body.  
Then again, is it important if MLG as a whole can be considered a theory or not? 
MLG as a framework of analysis, separate from the claims of theoretical aptitude, have 
elicited studies from various disciplines to understand and detail the structure of governance 
that surround policies and their implementation (see Bisong, 2019; Hinterberger, 2018; 
Kearns & Forrest, 2000; et al.). These studies have shed light on how their respective 
structures of governance operate, what facets make them unique, what their shortfalls are, etc. 
MLG as a concept has entered into the fray as one of the main schools of thought when 
studying not just policymaking in the EU, but policymaking structures in general. To quote 
George (2004), “does it not really matter so long as a disciplined research agenda emerges 
that uncovers new knowledge about and understanding of, the nature of the European Union? 
(George, 2004: 117)” To put it another way, as long as MLG’s use can tease out new 
unanswered questions and reveal new understandings about governance and policymaking in 
any region of the world, is the discussion about whether or not MLG constitutes a theory a 
frivolous cavil against it?   
Because of the wealth of knowledge that has emerged from MLG, the debate on its 
applicability as a theory will likely remain moot. For the purposes of this study, however,  
MLG is a framework of analysis.  
  
4.2.4 Applying Types I & II MLG  
Type II MLG, in our case, allows us to juxtapose policy implementation in a specific 




connections that fall outside the scope of theoretical schools such as intergovernmentalism, as 
alluded to earlier) that could contribute to these outcomes.   
Hooghe and Marks (2003) mention several times how Type II structures contain 
‘functional specificity’, i.e. the ability to tackle a single policy issue with exacting policy 
prescriptions and oversight. Much of the literature surrounding Type II structures, as well as 
the MLG literature regarding migration and integration (Scholten, 2013; Zapata-Barrero, et 
al., 2017; Borkert & Bosswick, 2007; et al.), tends to describe the interactions between the 
levels of governance and how they function rather than engaging in how policy can be 
implemented efficaciously, or what an ideal MLG policy structure would look like.   
As an example, Panizzon and van Riemsdijk (2019) engage a general concept of 
MLG towards the study of large-flow migration into Europe by asking how the use of MLG 
affects both the movement of people and how MLG impacts the policies contained within. 
MLG is utilised because migration policies have been generally dispersed among levels of 
government within the member states of the EU, with local levels now handling more 
responsibility towards integration programmes than in the past (Scholten & Penninx, 2016:  
91)25.   
They evoke the MLG function of ‘blurring’, i.e. distributing risk and accountability 
around levels rather than engaging completely with the centre of power (Panizzon & van 
Riemsdijk, 2019: 1233). It is a natural consequence of both types of MLG: in the case of 
migration policy within and at the border of the EU, much was shifted away from the 
member states to the EU level, allowing for member states to shift blame of inconvenient 
outcomes to the EU (Scholten & Penninx, 2016: 96-97). Border and asylum policies became 
 
25 The local level has also engaged in ad-hoc arrangement for governance over migration (and asylum) issues, 
both sharing responsibilities with local organisations and skipping the national level entirely to deliberate 
directly with the EU level, which has demonstrated its willingness to support migrant integration-facing projects 





the domain of the Common European Asylum System, with the Dublin Regulation affecting 
how and where asylum seekers can declare their applications for asylum; with the Dublin 
Regulation requiring states of first arrival to process asylum claims and provide for initial 
reception conditions, member states at the borders faced the largest burden of all the EU 
member states (Pollet, 2016).   
This perceived stress at the state/national level gets shifted downward with cities 
bearing the brunt of integration duties, forcing cities to engage in ‘crisis mode’, which 
facilitated ‘blurring’ for better or for worse, i.e. delegating what used to be state power to 
non-state actors: accountability for negative actions within the scope of the integration 
services can then be directed at the non-state actor rather than the state, and the state can end 
or amend its relationship with the non-state actor (Careja, 2019: 1329).   
Accordingly, there has been much literature studying the differences between national 
and local migrant integration policy and how the structures either clash with or complement 
each other (see Scholten, 2013; Jørgensen, 2012; Poppelaars & Scholten, 2008; Schiller,  
  
2018; et al.). From the literature it becomes evident that the largest factor affecting 
sentiments towards refugees/asylum-seekers and what they receive with regard to integration 
aid is political ideology, where the national/central government is more restrictive while the 
local level advocates for greater inclusivity for refugees (OECD, 201826).  
Emilsson (2015) argues the opposite, that within the realm of integration policy, it is 
actually the state that sets the benchmark for integration practices within municipalities, 
rather than municipalities having leeway with which to conduct their distinct policies with the 
state’s use of power as the main focus (Emilsson, 2015: 2). However, while this may be more 
 
26 The OECD found that, in OECD countries, subnational governments oversee 40% of public spending and 




the case for states with higher degrees of central planning, such as his cases of Sweden and 
Finland, this does not take into account a federal system, such as that in Germany, where 
each of the federal states defines integration differently, and assigns different weight to 
different metrics therein27.   
While the central government may determine funding levels or broad principles for 
integration within a federal (Type I) structure, because of the distinctions among jurisdictions 
and power of implementation, the central government does not strictly determine the 
integration policies and procedures among the states and cities; rather, the central government 
within a federal system provides necessary resources to support policies, even if sometimes 
that support becomes contentious (Bogumil, et al., 2017: 31-32)28.   
Emilsson uses Germany’s development of its National Integration Plan in 2007 as 
evidence that the national government is ‘setting the agenda’ for the local levels; however, 
the National Integration Plan, rather than a method of centralised policymaking, proposed the 
general guidelines around which integration would be made, i.e. language acquisition, 
education, civics, etc. In addition, the National Integration Plan took cues from Berlin’s 2005 
integrationskonzept, demonstrating that the National Integration Plan was a bottom-up rather 
than a top-down policy (Dekker, et al., 2015). And, as referred to above, it was the advocacy 
 
27 An example of this can be found in the different definitions of integration provided by the states of Berlin and 
North-Rhein Westphalia (NRW). For Berlin, integration is defined as “in addition to promoting cultural 
diversity, above all that individuals or entire groups are given equal opportunities to participate in social life and 
the articulation of their interests, and are protected against individual and collective exclusion. Integration 
policy therefore essentially means creating equal opportunities. (Land Berlin, 2007: 3)” For NRW, integration is 
defined through its integrationsgesetz (integration law), which is “to support and accompany people with a 
migration background, regardless of their social situation, their origin, their gender, sexual identity, religion or 
belief, especially in their education, training, and employment” (§1), as well as offering explicit support for 
integration programmes and paradigms enacted at the municipal level (§2) (Ministerium des Innern des Landes 
Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2012).  
28 Issues of communication and coordination are common between central government and state/municipal 
authorities, leading to confusion among refugees about the competences of the various agencies to which they 





groups and civil society organisations that rallied to ensure that cities such as Berlin had 
integration laws and programmes.  
Further, cities have become actively vocal when the national government has been 
seen as inactive. In July of 2018, the mayors of Bonn, Cologne, and Düsseldorf sent an open 
letter to Chancellor Angela Merkel, requesting that German ships begin Mediterranean Sea 
rescues of refugees and that the refugees be brought to any of the three cities, while openly 
critiquing Frontex’s Mediterranean operations29 (Geisel, et al., 2018). Among other 
examples, this stands out as one in which the cities directly sought to critique and contravene 
the central government’s policies concerning refugees, settlement, and integration.  
Homsy, Liu, and Warner (2019) developed a framework with which to track the 
various interactions between the different levels of a policy within an MLG structure. It has 
five components: first, the coordinating and sanctioning role of a central authority; second, 
engagement of civil society; third, co-production of knowledge; fourth, capacity provision; 
and fifth, framing of co-benefits (Homsy, et al., 2019: 574). Inherent in the framework is 
actor tracking, a key component in understanding the relationships between the various levels 
involved in MLG. As actors are the key players in MLG, rather than governments as a whole, 
it is possible to glean exactly how co-benefits are produced and understood between the 
various levels. The existence and elucidation of co-benefits within MLG structures can be 
analysed from both a Type I and Type II perspective. With the example of refugee integration 
policies, the reception and integration costs to both the municipal and central governments 
can be offset by an understanding of how refugees can contribute to society.   
 
29 Frontex’s mission in the Mediterranean Sea, Operation Triton, is far less proactive than its predecessor, Mare 
Nostrum. Comparatively, the budget is 1/3 that of Mare Nostrum, and the borders it patrols are significantly 
further away from the North African coast than those done by Mare Nostrum. Further, the mandates differ:  
whereas Mare Nostrum was explicitly a humanitarian mission, Triton was aimed at border defence and deterring 




An example of this can be seen in Germany. Before Angela Merkel’s decision to 
allow refugees to come to the country despite having entered the EU at another member state, 
the country faced a demographic crisis of workers aging out of the workforce and areas of the 
workforce were suffering from labour shortages. In 2018, it is estimated that between 8,500 
and 10,000 refugees entered the labour force every month (Trines, 2019). In Bavaria, 
tradespecific German was taught to refugees allowing for accelerated entrance into the 
workforce and education programmes; in 2016, the year’s target was met in six months, 
while the 2019 target was already three-quarters achieved by 2017 (Bayerische 
Staatsregierung, 2016; Bayerische Staatsregierung, 2017). Applying this example to the 
above framework, it is clear that the infusion of refugees into Bavaria posed a benefit to both 
Bavaria and the central government, in that the refugees in work and education are already 
contributing to the economic potential of Bavaria and the country at large.  
However, allowances change by state and municipality given differing interpretations 
of federal law and differences in political and policy perspectives. Hamann and El-Kayed 
(2018) studied the housing allowances given by Berlin and Dresden. According to Berlin law, 
refugees may find private accommodation outside of the first reception housing before their 
asylum cases have been cleared; in Dresden, refugees must wait until they receive a decision 
on their cases, except if they have exceptional medical circumstances. A key difference they 
found is discrimination: local NGOs working with refugees in Dresden reported high 
amounts of outright discrimination from landlords and housing operators, whereas the Berlin 
government directly contracted (Type II) with NGO Evangelisches Jugend- und  
Fürsorgewerk (EJF) to help refugees find private accommodations (Hamann and El-Kayed,  
2018: 141-143)30.  
 
30 Further discussion and empirical data will be presented on this case in the chapter concerning Berlin’s refugee 





4.3 Conclusion  
  This chapter covered the wealth of literature written on and about multi-level 
governance, covering its origins and its development since its creation in the early 1990s. In 
particular, this chapter delineated the differences between Type I and Type II MLG, the latter 
of which will be more relevant for the upcoming empirical and analysis chapters. From its 
start as a way to analyse EU policymaking, MLG has evolved into a catch-all with which to 
study different types of policies at varying levels of government, leading to criticism that its 
applicability is limited.  
  Much of this argument coalesces into the debate as to whether MLG comprises a 
theory of policymaking or a framework of analysis, and it is this author’s opinion that the 
debate is largely a moot one and a minor cavil in the face of expanded and extensive study 
already done with MLG that has elicited new knowledge and analysis about countless 
policies and how the varying levels of government and governance structures implement 
those policies. So long as MLG allows researchers to pull out key variables of why and how 
a policy does or does not work, the discussions of ‘theory or no theory’ are less important 
than the use of the framework itself.  
 
  Finally, Type II MLG (and the study of governance over specific ‘wicked’ policy 
problems) has evolved as a method by which to study how governments partner with private 
organisations to implement and manage policy areas. This is done through the establishment 
of policy networks, bringing in key stakeholders to share input and oversee policy 
implementation through different models of partnership, which develop through 
 
NGOs helping to house and find houses for refugees. Notable in the EJF example is that the city of Berlin ended 




publicprivate partnerships, where services are directly contracted to organisations with 
varying degrees of autonomy.   
  Issues of transparency and accountability expectedly arise within these networks and 
PPPs when the government may take more of a ‘back seat’ in oversight and regulation, 
leading to ethical questions of how much involvement the government should have in the 
implementation process, and perhaps whether PPPs are necessary at all for policy 
implementation.  
  The following chapters will look at the cases of Leverkusen and Berlin, how their 
models of governance are similar and different, and what the outcomes have been for the 
governments, the organisations involved in policy implementation, and the refugees impacted 




Chapter 5:  Refugee Housing Policy in Leverkusen: ‘mit einer 
kleinen Hilfe meiner Freunde’, or analysing a potential 
model of best practice  
5.1 Introduction and Background  
  Nestled in an enclave between Cologne, Düsseldorf, and Wuppertal is Leverkusen, a 
mid-sized city best known as being the headquarters for multinational pharmaceutical giant 
Bayer, as well as home to Bundesliga football club Bayer Leverkusen. Its layout engenders 
the feeling of bordering larger cities, with its mixture of suburban, urban, and bucolic 
pastures spun together within a border wrapped by a frenetic bus system and punctuated by a 
few stops on the S-Bahn. Reaching its surrounding cities, as well as other cities in 




Leverkusen an attractive hub for working commuters who would rather not pay a premium to 
live within the boundaries of a more expensive city.   
  It is also the home to its eponymous model of refugee housing and integration policy, 
which this thesis considers to be a model of ‘best practice’31 with regards to how housing and 
integration policy can be structured. Despite its position as a ‘satellite’ city to the other cities 
around it, Leverkusen was able to coalesce a fractured governance landscape into a coherent 
policy centred on a balanced collaborative governance partnership that has endured and 
expanded since 2002, and has influenced those ‘main’ cities that it orbits.  
This chapter will go in depth on Leverkusen’s governing structure and its policies 
surrounding refugee accommodations and housing, along with the integration infrastructure 
built around refugee housing policy. Along with the next chapter covering Berlin’s refugee 
housing policies, this chapter will comprise the ‘juxtaposition’ of policies concerning refugee 
housing, and will allow us to analyse the similarities and differences and what we can learn 
from each in the following chapters. Leverkusen provides us with the ‘best practice’ model 
when juxtaposed to Berlin: the city has a higher degree of both centralised planning and 
durable, long-term relationships with NGOs whose missions are specifically catered towards 
ensuring refugees are able to acclimate to German society.   
  This is achieved through the eponymous ‘Leverkusen Model’, formed in 2002 out of 
the wake of the refugees who arrived in Germany after the collapse of the post-Soviet order 
in the 1990s. Leverkusen contained many refugees living in camps, tents, and generally poor 
conditions. Members of the NGOs Caritas and the Refugee Council of Leverkusen argued to 
the government that ensuring better quality accommodations and giving refugees access to 
the private apartment/housing market will both save the city money and ensure greater 
integration outcomes for the refugees.  
 




The Model insisted on moving refugees as soon as possible from shelters and 
temporary accommodations into full-time private housing, and had members of staff actively 
searching through classified ads in newspapers to find refugees places to live (Refugee 
council employee interview, 2019). Its creation was predicated on two tenets: first, that 
integration into society for refugees starts at day one of arrival into the country, and second, 
that helping refugees find accommodation in private housing is more affordable for the city 
(Schillings and Märtens, 2015). The former contends an external (humanitarian) reasoning, 
while the latter contends an internal (fiscal) reasoning, both of which are important facets of 
the Model. This enables asylum-seekers, regardless of asylum status, to obtain private 
housing, even if their asylum cases have not yet been decided by the Bundesamt. 
  The Model has expanded beyond its original intent of partnering Caritas and the 
Refugee Council with the government to include other NGOs and organisations throughout 
the city, and has also developed long-term collaborative governance structures where the 
multiple actors involved in the policy’s implementation all have input into how policies are 
designed and enacted. Though the city had to reopen its formerly closed refugee residences to 
cope with the 2014/2015 influx, the Model has continued to operate and its design and 
relative success in the area of refugee housing has drawn the interest of other cities and 
political parties in Germany (Caritas employee interview, 2019a).   
  This chapter will first begin with a brief description of Leverkusen’s governing 
structure, discussing relevant laws and the details of the Leverkusen Model itself, before 
moving into how refugee accommodations are managed throughout Leverkusen. This section 
will also discuss refugee access to the private housing market and what allowances are given 
for refugees to search for and rent their own spaces. The section after will cover the work 
done by NGOs, both at the outset of the Model and today, and how it has evolved in the 




through the government placing them in an accommodation, whether it is through NGO help, 
or some other means.   
  As stated above, this chapter and the next will elucidate key differences and 
similarities between Leverkusen and Berlin in how they organise their governance over 
refugee housing, both in built accommodations and access to the housing market. These 
differences will be analysed in subsequent chapters. Lessons will also be drawn from these 
two cities about what policy successes and failures occurred; these lessons will inform the 
theoretical framework that will be developed in chapter 7.  
  
5.2 Leverkusen’s Governing Structure  
  Leverkusen operates within a typical Type I MLG structure, i.e. federalism. It is 
subordinate to the German state of North-Rhein Westphalia (NRW) and its laws, though it is 
also free to make laws specific to its borders so long as they do not violate state or federal 
law. The city has 3 Bezirke (districts) and representatives from the districts are elected to sit 
on the city council. As of writing, the city is governed by a CDU/SPD coalition, with the 
mayor Uwe Richrath a member of the SPD. The administrating offices in the Bezirke, much 
like those in Berlin, do not have the power to craft or override the laws set by the city 
council, and must administer programmes and carry out policies as they are drawn.  
  The city operates its integration infrastructure under the aegis of NRW’s 2012 
Teilhabe- und Integrationsgesetz (Participation and Integration Law). The law gives 
municipalities a high degree of discretion in conducting their integration infrastructures 
independently and supports integration efforts so long as the efforts are in line with the tenets 
of the law, i.e. ensuring that minority and immigrant groups have access to education, work 
rights, and the right to participate in both local and state government (Ministerium des Innern 




Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2020)32. NRW’s law is unique from other integration laws throughout 
Germany given that it encourages refugees to re-enter the professions in which they 
specialised in their home countries even if they are not able to bring their credentials with 
them, or if their home credentials are inaccessible. This is done through active promotion of 
language and job training.  
  Leverkusen established its Communal Integration Centre in 2013 after the passage of 
the NRW Integrationsgesetz in 2012, which receives funding and support directly from the  
NRW Ministerium für Kinder, Familie, Flüchtlinge und Integration (Ministry for Children,  
Families, Refugees, and Integration) and also receives project-specific funding from the 
Ministry (Gesellschaft für Innovative Beschäftigungsförderung mbH, 2020).   
  For the governance of its refugee housing policy through the Leverkusen Model, the 
government partners with Caritas and the Refugee Council to directly provide both social 
workers in refugee accommodations and funding for integration programmes. The next 
section will discuss the types of refugee housing that are found in Leverkusen, as well as 
initiatives to move refugees from mass accommodations into private housing.  
5.3 Refugee Housing in Leverkusen  
5.3.1 First and mass accommodations  
  The city (as of writing) maintains 12 refugee accommodations distributed throughout 
the city with a new accommodation currently under construction; this new accommodation, 
however, will partially replace an older one currently existing at Sandstraße in the city’s 
north (see Figure 3) to upgrade the facility to current building codes and create more spaces, 
 
32 The law is regularly updated to reflect new changes in both asylum situations and federal allocations for 




a total of 450, at which refugees can stay upon arrival in the city (Bussang, 2019). These 
accommodations, much like those built in Berlin, are designed for short-term stays and are 
not meant as private residences, but rather a transitory place while asylum-seekers acclimate 
to living in Leverkusen and eventually attain their own private residences. While this new 
residence will have more of an apartment setup, the city will still seek to move refugees 
quickly into private residences. A map of the current accommodations and their locations in  
Leverkusen can be seen in Figure 3.  
  As in Berlin, Leverkusen has several types of housing structures for refugees: 
Zentraler Standort, i.e. those that are more durable and larger, and often comprise multiple 
rooms per unit similar in style to apartment buildings; Containerstandort, i.e. modular 
housing built in a similar way to shipping containers that are less durable and constructed 
quickly with the express use for emergencies and quick relocations from first arrival centres; 
and Landeseinrichtung, or the state’s initial arrival centre.  
 





  Many of these structures existed before the creation of the Leverkusen Model, though 
in addition to the mass accommodations, the city utilised tents as emergency shelters to 
accommodate increasing refugee movements from Eastern Europe (Refugee council 
employee interview, 2019). The city was prepared to continue building mass accommodation 
centres, though the transition to the governance regime utilised by the Leverkusen Model 
meant that the city was able to close all but one of the refugee accommodations up until the 
number of asylum seekers rose dramatically beginning in 2014; all were subsequently 
reopened in 2015 to accommodate the influx (Schillings and Märtens, 2015).  
A number of temporary spaces, such as school gyms, were utilised during the height 
of the refugee influx though they were able to be closed ahead of the city’s proposed 
timetable (Leverkusener Anzeiger, 2017).   
  The new accommodation centre in Sandstraße is meant to largely centralise refugee 
housing with more durable facilities and ultimately replace the 7 temporary modular 
housings located throughout the city (the yellow markers in Figure 3). It will add 350 more 
spaces to the existing 100 at the accommodation, though refugees are not meant to spend 
more than 5 months in the accommodations as the Leverkusen Model operates to distribute 
and help them find private residences throughout the city (Bussang, 2019).   
The governance partners (Caritas, Refugee Council, and the Leverkusen government) 
continually interact with and discuss with refugees the necessities of living on their own to 
ensure that they are knowledgeable enough about how the German housing market works, as 
well as responsible enough to take care of themselves once they leave the refugee 
accommodations; doing so enables refugees to spend less time on average within the mass 
accommodations, estimated by aid workers to be between 6 months to a year per person 




accommodation will also contain a wing dedicated to social work and care centres, occupied 
by Caritas.   
  However, members of the civil service and the city’s NGO partners have criticised 
the location of the Sandstraße accommodation as being too far outside the city centre and 
contradicting the general agreement that refugee accommodations should be embedded in 
neighbourhoods and communities to best facilitate integration and immersion into German 
society (David Nelson interview, 2019). The counterargument for this is that the area has 
more space for development, which allows for more spaces for refugees and further expedites 
shuttering the lower quality modular accommodations.  
In a 2017 study, the city found that, in 2015, 450 refugees were able to move from the 
accommodations into private spaces, while in 2016 411 refugees were able to obtain private 
spaces from a total refugee population of ~3500 in both years; unfortunately the report does 
not delineate what percentage of those ~3500 lived in accommodations or otherwise (Stadt 
Leverkusen, 2017). A Leverkusen civil servant interviewed for this study (with numbers 
provided through email and updated at the time of writing this chapter) reported that, in 2017, 
267 people moved out of the accommodations; in 2018, 411; in 2019, 308; and in the first 8 
months of 2020, 137 (Leverkusen civil servant interview, 2019).   
What this indicates is that even with declining numbers of refugees being allocated to 
Leverkusen as a whole, turnover within the accommodations is nearly consistent year over 
year as refugees are able to transition into the private housing market (pandemic conditions 
notwithstanding). With the primary function of the Model being to move refugees as quickly 
as possible from the accommodations into private residences, a good percentage of refugees 





5.3.2 The private housing market  
However, as in many other German cities, Leverkusen suffers both from a lack of 
social affordable housing and housing availability in general, thanks in no part to the 
privatisation of German housing over the previous 30 years (see Wijburg and Aalbers, 2017). 
In an immediate effort to mitigate this housing crunch, Leverkusen initiated a short-term 
programme where it would buy out the leases on select apartments throughout the city in 
order to ensure refugees can live in private apartments with low costs. In 2017, there were 
1,121 refugees living in both refugee-specific accommodations and city-rented apartments, 
approximately 32% of the total refugee population of the city at the time (Stadt Leverkusen, 
2017). The city’s recent study of its housing sector found that the tension in the medium- and 
lower-cost rental sector will continue to intensify as Leverkusen’s population grows, the only 
exception to this being in the upper-cost rental sector, where tensions in acquiring spaces 
have been lower; while construction has been at decade-long highs, prices continue to rise, 
demand still remains high, and occupancy of available housing remains high (Stadt 
Leverkusen, 2019).  
Because of this housing shortage and projections that the city’s population will 
continue to grow, the city has embarked on a Wohnungsbauprogramm 2030+ that will seek 
to construct at least 500 places (available bedrooms in both 1-bedroom and multiple-bedroom 
flats, given the number of people who live alone) per year until around 2035 to adapt to the 
estimated continual population growth, while similar scaled necessities are projected for 
other German cities (Freudenberg, 2018; Hanhörster, et al., 2020). Discussions are still 
ongoing as to locating appropriate construction sites, as well as delineations of social housing 
percentages.  
The city actively advertises and requests citizens to volunteer any open rooms within 




Leverkusen, 2016). This is done as part of the Leverkusen Model, i.e. developing a network 
of owners and occupants willing to give first priority to refugees for room rental. This effort 
is mainly coordinated through Caritas and Leverkusen’s Refugee Council NGOs, and those 
organisations are then able to report changes in residence directly to the government.   
Leverkusen has a ‘rent ceiling’ for all renters, meaning that there is a maximum 
amount of money that can be charged, as detailed in Figure 4. Maintaining the centrality of 
the housing search for refugees through the governance structures and subsequent volunteer 
initiatives ensures that, first, the volunteers helping refugees are informed as to the legal rent 
limits, and second, that refugees are not bilked out of the legal terms for rental payments by 
shady landlords.  
 
Figure 4- The 'rent ceiling' (Kaltmiete) levels per number of occupants in 2016. (Stadt Leverkusen, 2016) 
    
  This is a far more expedited venture for the Leverkusen Model than from its 
inception, where the members of Caritas and the Refugee Council did not have the aid of the 
internet to help them search for apartments for refugees (Refugee council employee 





5.3.3 How the government defines its objectives in refugee housing  
The city government (in Stadt Leverkusen Kommunales Integrationszentrum, 2017) 
specifies 4 objectives to achieve with regard to refugee accommodation:  
1. Studying how land can be made available for residential building development;  
2. Systematic reviews with new immigrants to assess what sizes of accommodations 
will be needed when taking family reunification into consideration;  
3. Unaccompanied minors will be given appropriate living conditions for their 
respective situations;  
4. For the sake of civic planning and development law, living with others in the district 
will be promoted over choosing to live by oneself.  
These objectives are a direct consequence of the city finding itself with a population 
influx without the adequate building measures for new living space; however, they are also 
an extension of the ideals within the Leverkusen Model, i.e. consulting with new immigrants 
as to the space they require even before family reunification is exercised. The city will try to 
achieve the objectives through 4 specific methods (Ibid):  
1. There will be administrative checks with policy planning and the private housing 
developers as to which areas are eligible for inner-city consolidation, as well as a 
mandatory quota for all new housing projects to include affordable housing;  
2. There will be further analysis of immigration figures and preliminary assessments of 
the prospects of refugees staying and family reunification will be made, including 
with round-table discussions; home-sharing methods will also be designed and tested;  
3. Funding opportunities will be explored, as well as a catalogue of requirements for 
youth living developed;  
4. Support the development of district-shops, i.e. availability of housing by district; 




programmes; promote the expansion of care networks; if needed, create more open 
meeting spaces for residents and refugees with intercultural neighbourhood 
management.  
These measures, in tandem with the yearly building programme and the consolidation 
of refugee housing at the Sandstraße accommodation as well as the continued utilisation of 
the  
Leverkusen Model, will likely allow refugees faster entrance into the private housing market. 
By actively offering decentralised housing for refugees, the city can avoid some of the major 
issues that plague mass accommodations, such as risks of disease, building decay, and 
delayed integration prospects, among others. And for refugees, a sense of ownership and 
privacy over their space inculcates satisfaction and a desire to learn the native language: 
“[T]hat plays a large role that one has at least a room, say a chair to sit on and a desk to learn 
on, that is very helpful to learn the language. That is very helpful. That is at least having a 
room for a full feeling, that one has a desire to do and to learn. (BDL interview, 2019)”  
What the government’s proactive integration measures point to is an ingrained 
strategy of dynamic policy governance through active collaboration with both its NGO 
partners and civil society (see Haque, 2011; Bingham, 2011). It also utilises an across-and 
horizontal method of governance, i.e. both Type I and Type II MLG, where the city 
government utilises its governing structure to establish and develop housing and determine 
affordable housing availability while maintaining its collaborative governance policies 
around the administrative operations behind the housing and care within. The flexibility of 
this dynamic is largely owed to the efforts of the city’s NGOs, which will be explored in the 
next section.  




5.4 NGO Efforts and Cultural Advocacy  
5.4.1 Basis of the Leverkusen Model  
  The relative success of the Leverkusen Model in moving refugees from mass 
accommodation to a sense of normalcy in private residence rests in the city’s NGOs and 
other social advocacy groups and individuals. As previously mentioned, before the 
Leverkusen Model was enacted, refugees fleeing the wars that erupted in the post-Soviet 
order were housed in unhygienic conditions within mass accommodations and tents, as well 
as other extemporaneous housing ‘solutions’ that the city could develop to actively deter 
refugees from coming to the city (Refugee council employee interview, 2019).   
  At the time, the NGOs were the ones actively providing help and services to the 
refugees due in part to the widespread sale of German public utilities and welfare as well as a 
not-yet-consolidated sense of national German migration policy, and understandably had a 
tenuous and antipathic relationship with the city government given the poor conditions to 
which the refugees had been subjected upon arrival (Caritas employee interview, 2019). 
Caritas and the Refugee Council were able to convince a member of the city government (the 
sozialdezernent, i.e. the head of social services) to tour the areas where refugees were forced 
to stay, who then recommended to the mayor and the city council that a new model of 
housing be put in place in partnership with Caritas and the Refugee Council.   
  The 2002 amendment to the Grundgesetz (Basic Law) of Germany devolved many  
powers down to the states and municipalities, allowing them greater ability to interpret and 
develop their own integration procedures (Bundesamt für Justiz, 2019).  
  Both Caritas and the Refugee Council recommended moving refugees into private 
accommodations with help from the two organisations to secure leases for the 




some believed that the refugees would not be able to adapt to living in apartments, while 
others were concerned about cleanliness and refugees being unable to operate utilities 
(Refugee council employee interview, 2019). However, the pilot operation was sold on 
economic and budgetary savings: 80 refugees were moved from mass accommodations to 
private residences. It was estimated (in 2012 prices) that the cost of keeping a refugee in a 
centralised accommodation was €223 per person, whereas the price of a rented room cost the 
city €148 per refugee (Schillings and Märtens, 2015).  
The pilot programme saved the city a total of €145,000 in expenses (Ibid). The Model 
was then instituted full-time with the two following guidelines: there would be no minimum 
or maximum required time spent in group accommodations (as opposed to the policies used 
by other cities in Germany, such as in Berlin), allowing refugees and asylum-seekers 
(regardless of asylum status) to live in private accommodations and access integration 
benefits immediately (including language classes), and Caritas and the Refugee Council 
would help refugees with their searches.  
This fledgling connection between the NGOs and the government has expanded in the 
years since the Model’s inception and has become formalised as a staple of the city’s policy 
regarding refugee rights in housing and accommodation.  
  
I was signing up to search for an apartment, and that’s good in Leverkusen that one could 
find an apartment search even though one doesn’t have an aufenthaltstitel [staying 
permit]. That was a big help to find, not every city is like that. One can do that in 
Leverkusen. (KPL interview, 2019)  
  
Thus it was the impetus of non-profit and civil society organisations that were able to 




accommodation: the city was able to save a not-insubstantial amount of money on its refugee 
accommodations, and the NGOs were better able to aid refugees. An additional benefit not 
considered by the government was that normalisation of life for refugees, i.e. actively helping 
them into their own spaces, would help move them into work and education faster. We can 
see an extension of this idea in the next section, where the influence of the Model became a 
general collaborative framework for the city’s integration infrastructure.  
  
5.4.2 Normalisation of the Model  
  The Model’s continued operation and entrenchment into Leverkusen’s integration 
governance structure has normalised the active collaboration, coordination, and cooperation 
between NGOs, community organisations, and government in both the procurement of 
private accommodations for refugees and in the development of community-oriented 
outreach endeavours. In 2017, the city updated its ‘integration conceptualisation’ to reflect 
this collaborative structure in the face of a new wave of refugees declaring asylum in  
Germany.  
  The new concept reinforced the city’s position that integration is a collective action 
that necessitates a “constructive interplay of educational institutions, charities, business 
enterprises and other civil society groups… [and] the resources, actions, and motivations of 
migrants also play a decisive role,” with housing and accommodation existing as one of the 
key factors in facilitating integration (Stadt Leverkusen Kommunale Integrationszentrum, 
2017: 8). With the NGOs and the government able to communicate transparently and 
actively, and coordinate between each other, they are able to increase interactions between 
refugees and the locals: “[B]ecause of organising even meeting points by volunteers inside 
the camps or beside in the neighbourhood by the camps and there are certain contacts even to 




people or of certain people who I meet increase. (Refugee council employee interview, 
2019)”   
  This concept also developed a structured ‘communications flowchart’ between the 
‘controlling group’ (i.e. the government institutions typically responsible for policy areas, 
such as the Department of Education or the Social Services Department) and the ‘specialist 
groups in integration’, which can be both other government entities and specialist NGOs and 
organisations dedicated to those policy areas, i.e. the Department of Education has direct 
input from the Social Services Department and the head of the Migration Office (Stadt 
Leverkusen Kommunales Integrationszentrum, 2019: 8-9).  
  Further, the new integration concept proposed the extension of ‘intercultural 
offerings’ and facilitating the creation of new representative groups for refugees in order to 
ensure a ‘two-way’ understanding of integration, i.e. that refugees’ voices and needs can be 
adequately and directly communicated to the government by refugees themselves rather than 
through interlocutors, who may misunderstand more specific cultural issues (Stadt  
Leverkusen Kommunales Integrationszentrum, 2017: 14-15). This elicits the points raised by 
Zapata-Barrero in his work developing ‘interculturalism’, demonstrating the necessity of two 
perceptibly different cultures bridging the notional divide between them to better adapt both 
sides for coexistence (see Zapata-Barrero, 2015). How governance on this issue is handled 
can determine cultural representation and government relations between groups involved in 
establishing community ties and aiding in facets of integration.  
  Further, Leverkusen initiated cultural sensitivity seminars for its employees and 
invited professional speakers from outside the government and even the city to lead these 
seminars and classes, which received high approval (~90%) and satisfaction from the 
employees, though this is only a beginning measure that the city intends to expand upon 




perspectives into those who both implement and craft policy is a key tenet of removing the 
one-sided nature of integration policies that can often lead to uncertainty for refugees 
(Ersbøll & Gravesen, 2010).   
  Part of this intercultural work has been carried out through the Leverkusen  
Integrationsrat (Integration Council), an arm of the Leverkusen government that specifically 
works to facilitate the creation and support the maintenance of migrant organisations in 
Leverkusen. Contact first begins as a relay from refugee-facing NGOs operating in refugee 
accommodations or working with relevant refugees directly to the Integrationsrat. “When a 
new group, for example, the Syrian Kurds, when they organise, then comes Caritas or the 
Flüchtlingsrat, they tell me there is a new group, and here in the house we have rooms that 
they can use for their groups. Because that is often, the first question, where can we meet?  
(Andreas Laukötter interview, 2019).” The migrant-facing organisations working through the 
Integrationsrat act almost as a ‘council’ of representatives on behalf of refugees and interact 
with the government to represent their interests (Ibid). The city recently facilitated the creation 
of a representative Kurdish cultural group, of which one interview participant (KPL) is a 
supporting member.  
  The city also pledged to increase the ‘intercultural orientation’ of its employee base, 
ensuring to have employees who represent a diverse set of cultural and linguistic 
backgrounds (Stadt Leverkusen Kommunale Integrationszentrum, 2017: 14). By establishing 
a more diverse civil service, the government can then be more responsive and dynamic in its 
approaches to integration, such as through its volunteer coordination efforts (Leverkusen 
civil servant interview, 2019a), and sensitive to cultural peculiarities that would not 
otherwise be known by a more homogeneous employee corpus. For instance, AQL, a Syrian 




refugees near Bonn while living in Leverkusen, but still volunteers his time with Leverkusen 
when he can spare it (AQL interview, 2019).  
  
5.4.3 Extension of the Model’s tenets  
  One of the more remarkable and unique aspects of the Leverkusen Model, enabling 
asylum-seekers to attain private housing regardless of their asylum status (including those 
awaiting asylum decisions) and without minimum or maximum mandatory times spent in 
refugee accommodations, also applies to the city’s offered formal language courses (Stadt 
Leverkusen Kommunale Integrationszentrum, 2019: 12-13). Asylum-seekers can then 
register for German classes as soon as they arrive in the city regardless of whether they have 
received an asylum decision from the BAMF.  
  Housing was adopted as one of the primary foci for the city’s integration platform, 
which melded with the recognition that housing availability and construction were not 
keeping up with either rent inflation or an increasing population, with or without the addition 
of refugees. In this sense, the Leverkusen Model and the 2014/2015 refugee influx acted as a  
‘spark’ for the city to recognise the absolute necessity to create new housing through the 
Model’s preference to have refugees in private accommodation rather than in mass 
accommodation and the recognition that housing comprises an integral aspect of integration, 
not just for refugees, but for the growing non-refugee migrant population as well. These 
needs are taken into account in the Wohnungsbauprogramm 2030+ (Ibid: 25).   Through 
this immersion of the Leverkusen Model’s precepts, the Type II MLG structural 
interconnections between civil society organisations and the government became 
normalised throughout the realm of the city’s integration policy. Ironically, one might even 




actively supports smaller local organisations for their efforts in promoting integration as a 
state would support a city, as will be discussed in the next section.  
  
5.4.4 Community Access and Local Help  
  A culture of local access and help around refugee accommodations emerged in the 
neighbourhoods in which the accommodations were built. This help was rendered by a 
variety of organisations, small and large, both religious and not, and was further aided by the 
more active collaborative governance instigated by the Leverkusen Model, though it was an 
unintended result. Smaller local organisations, such as churches, could ask the city 
government for material and financial help in holding intercultural events and have a strong 
focus on creating immersive interactions within the specific boundaries of a small 
community (Jürgen Dreyer interview, 2019). Events within Jürgen Dreyer’s church, such as 
‘tea time’ for the women of the community (including refugees) help to remove the 
uncertainty around interaction and provides clarity on how to do mundane daily things, such 
as going to the grocery or taking the bus, while churches and other small organisations can 
also hold small language classes for children not yet of school age both inside and outside the 
refugee accommodation.  
The government also partners with Caritas and volunteers with a programme called  
“Willkommen im Quartier” (Welcome to the Neighbourhood), which was implemented in 
2019 as a means to introduce refugees to native Germans in the neighbourhood in which they 
will live without the burden of presenting an ‘official face’ from either Caritas or the 
government. The native Germans are responsible for acting as tour guides for the refugees’ 
new neighbourhoods; there have been 11 pilots of this programme, and they involve guided 
tours (with language support) of the areas of commerce, culture, and leisure in the area. The 




refugees, such as on the technical aspects of accessing the health system and getting a mobile 
phone contract (JOB Service Beschäftigungsförderung Leverkusen, 2019; Stadt Leverkusen 
Kommunale Integrationszentrum, 2019: 26).  
One of the most reliable means of neighbourhood integration and help for refugees 
within Leverkusen has been through the sprachcafes. Each major (and many smaller) NGO 
in Leverkusen hosts a sprachcafe that is open for refugees and Germans alike. Typically, the 
NGO offices are near the accommodations, allowing for refugees to easily access the place 
and have a space of interaction and learning.  
  
I was there for 6 months, but I didn’t stay there much. I was always out, for example, 
we went to cafes, to learn German, to see how quickly we can learn German.  
Therefore I had only six months of staying there… We didn’t learn any German in 
Sandstraße [accommodation] sprachkurs. We had there, there is a, they gave a 
sprachkurs, and that was also voluntarily… next door was an international café. The 
people meet there and talk, for example, they help when one gets mail and we don’t 
understand. And I show them, and they helped me… more helpful, the international 
café [was than the sprachkurs]. They help a lot when you need, for example, for post, 
they take time, they clear things up well so you can understand. (YSL interview, 
2019)  
  
  At the height of German volunteering efforts during and after the Summer of 
Migration, the sprachcafes in Leverkusen became an epicentre for refugees to informally 
learn the language and create a network of contacts and friends. It also enabled refugees who 
were able to learn German faster to act as interlocutors and ease other refugees into learning 





For new arrivals, I had helped in these cafes when they put forward questions, I had 
accompanied them when they needed German volunteers, and I was always 
translating and a [Syrian] wanted to find a flat for himself, there was volunteers… 
They had asked me where do you live, I said in the Sandstraße, and ‘you have no 
place to live, and you help the people to search for apartments?’ I said it’s normal, I 
like to help. (KPL interview, 2019)  
  
  The availability and promotion of sprachcafes, intercultural events, and the 
organisational support enabled by the extensions of the Leverkusen Model reflects on the 
importance of Ager & Strang’s (2004) tenets of social bonds and social bridges, derived 
from Putnam’s (2000) studies in solidarity and community mobilisation through social 
capital, as being integral to the process and practice of integration. Social bonds are those 
relationships between members of a specific group, i.e. between Syrians, and social bridges 
are those that help to anchor a person in a new culture. Social bridges, rather than requiring 
intensive government planning to construct or maintain, often only require small instances of 
friendliness or openness to develop and blossom (Putnam, 2000: 39-40; Ager & Strang, 
2008). The two compose what is termed ‘social capital’, i.e. that which serves to connect and 
advance a person to and through society (see Putnam, 2000).  These friendships often allow 
for opportunities for the refugees to find places to live, work, or study, i.e. these small-scale 
interactions broach larger-scale life outcomes (Granovetter, 1973); these small aspects of 
network creation also lend refugees a sense of agency33, in that once they become immersed 
in a new cultural system, they are better able to navigate it and find their own living spaces, 
jobs, and opportunities (AQL interview, 2019; MPL interview, 2019).   Much of this 
 




community access and events surrounding the refugee accommodations is developed through 
intensive discussions between the government and the NGOs, reflecting on how governance 
initiatives and policies can influence societal and community integration. There are numerous 
standing group meetings discussing different subjects around both refugee accommodations 
and integration, where communication and direct network access is  
facilitated:   
  
[W]e have a very good structure of co-working with different institutions like AWO, 
Caritas, Flüchtlingsrat, and the Kommmunales Integrationszentrum and we manage 
to do a very, very good cooperational work. We're not like confronting with the 
Flüchtlingsrat, we have a very strong connection with them… I think I have like, four 
or five meetings every week with different actors. (David Nelson interview, 2019)  
  
Additionally, there was much less conflict between the NGOs and civil society groups 
and the city government (especially when compared to Berlin) because of the entrenched 
connections between those groups and the governing structure of refugee policy in 
Leverkusen. Changing the locus of control over integration from being centrally focused or 
top-down to a more holistic, neighbourhood- and collaboration-based approach removes what 
might be seen as domineering or faceless demands on refugees, which are replaced with the  
  
relative inclusivity promoted by community integration efforts. The difference is not lost on 
refugees: “I always say that the refugee integration process is not successful from the 
government but from the people, from the community, the initiatives… I think that the 
process needs more time about it, and the process had to make clear, to work with refugees.  




It is clear that Leverkusen’s focus on community-based governance and volunteering 
will continue, with the ties between the NGOs, the government, and the volunteers remaining 
durable for the foreseeable future. The next section will focus on how refugees find housing, 
and whether these methods are facilitated through policy or by other means.  
  
5.5 How Refugees Attain Housing  
  Table 1 shows how the refugees interviewed found their housing. It is not uncommon 
for refugees to become friends with those who volunteer at either the refugee 
accommodations or the sprachcafes, or in the camps outside Germany34. This muddies the 
division between the categories of ‘friends/family’ and ‘volunteers’, but for all intents and 
purposes it maintains the strong division between those two categories and the ‘government’ 
category, the latter of which usually denotes placement into either an emergency 
accommodation vis a vis a mass accommodation centre (where a room is shared with 
multiple occupants) or into a specialised modular notunterkünfte30 or pre-fabricated 
accommodation where room occupancy numbers are lower and residence types are closer to 
private accommodations.  
  
It is important to note in this chapter that none of the interview partners partook in the 
temporary programme where the Leverkusen government purchased the leases for a number 
of private apartments in the city specifically sequestered for refugees. This would obviously 
represent an anomaly in the reported housing methods given the typical distinction between 
 
34 Chancellor Angela Merkel’s 2015 decision to freeze the rule of the EU Dublin Regulation meant that many of 
the refugees in camps in Greece, Italy, and other countries were able to come to Germany to declare asylum 




government-placed housing, i.e. mass accommodation, and methods of attaining private 
housing.  
Another important note is that HSL is a refugee living with his family in a modular 
notunterkünfte at the far end of Cologne rather than in Leverkusen. I was referred to the 
social worker at the accommodation through a mutual contact, who then suggested I 
interview the man. The accommodation, while centred within a smaller neighbourhood, does 
not have the same type of access or community activities established around it from the 
neighbours, and with few, if any, volunteers from the surrounding area (Cologne social 
worker interview, 2019). The occupied accommodation sits across from an older, decrepit 
unoccupied one. The reason given for the lack of neighbourhood interaction is that the 
neighbourhood had poor experiences with refugees who lived in the now-decrepit 
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Table 1- How refugees attained their housing at the time of interview (including changes with any follow-up notices). 
Arrows indicate trajectory of housing attainment, i.e. moving from government accommodations to private residence 
through help of volunteer/NGO 
 As clearly shown, all Leverkusen respondents (save MPL, who had a friend already living in 
Germany) were placed in their initial housings by the city government, and most of those 
then quickly (less than a year within the mass accommodations) moved on to private 
accommodations through the help of volunteers and friends/family in the area. Only HSL had 
remained in the accommodation due to lack of connections and his difficulty in acquiring 
more advanced German due to his age (HSL interview, 2019).   
  Otherwise, all respondents first placed in government accommodations were able to 
move quickly into private apartments or houses with the help of volunteers, NGO employees, 
or friends.   
  The table and the interviews demonstrate the importance of connections and social 
bridges for refugees: volunteers act as direct links for refugees to engage with the receiving 
society and facilitate the search for housing, especially in housing markets that largely rely 
on word of mouth and informal methods of obtaining housing, which, as previously 
discussed, is largely the case in Germany (Caritas employee interview, 2019).   
  All respondents who received help from volunteers and friends to move into private 
accommodations reported that they likely would not have been able to secure a place on their 
own, or at least not in the timeframe they were able to, if they had not had the help. This is a 
natural by-product of the principles of the Leverkusen Model, but also a by-product of its 
principles extended into the city’s integration concept: deeper ties between the NGOs and 
government to extend collaborative governance can lead to the mobilisation of civil society 
through organised volunteer efforts. These volunteer efforts create social bridges and 




learning curve of adapting to a country whose administrative, business, and personal cultures 
may feel different to that found in Syria35.   
  Because this volunteering system is coordinated through the governance regime of the 
Leverkusen Model rather than in the ad-hoc dimensions experienced by Berlin, the city can 
better ensure an equal standard of integration service delivery across many, if not most of its 
new refugee residents. Whether this is a unique function of the city’s size in comparison to 
Berlin is a topic to be discussed in chapter 7.   
  
5.6 Conclusion  
  This chapter looked at Leverkusen and its eponymous model of refugee housing by 
diving into its history and its development since its inception in 2002. The collaborative 
governance aspect of the Leverkusen Model has helped the Model be effective in its goals of 
re-housing refugees from mass accommodations into privatised housing over the course of its 
existence, though the refugee influx of 2014/2015 demonstrated that while the Model is 
conceptually effective, it requires the city to adequately maintain housing stock for a growing 
population.   
  The city updated its concept of integration in 2017 to include several things: 
‘intercultural offerings’, a deepening of the government’s employee base with more workers 
from migration backgrounds, continued partnerships with city NGOs, and an expansion of 
housing development throughout the city, among others. The city also began construction of 
a large refugee accommodation centre in the north to consolidate and shutter other 
accommodations, which has come under criticism by both civil service employees and NGOs  
 
35 Another common refrain discussed by the interview partners was the demonstrable uncertainty of interacting 
with Germans, with almost all respondents (both in Leverkusen and Berlin) saying they felt Germans were more 
‘closed off’ and ‘cold’, with some saying they were apprehensive and uncertain about how to approach Germans 





because the accommodation is not centralised; regardless, the Leverkusen Model will 
continue to operate and the city intends for refugees to only spend 3 to 5 months in the 
accommodation.  
  NGOs and the government maintain consistent lines of communication and meet 
often to coordinate and collaborate on both operations and inform one another of 
developments for refugees. This is an extension of the Leverkusen Model’s design, 
demonstrating that established ties can expand into other fields concerning integration and 
can help to mitigate issues that arise.   
  These policy stipulations arose because of the incremental learning and expansion 
of the original precepts of the Leverkusen Model (and the perception of general failure of 
the previous policy), though like many other cities throughout Germany, Leverkusen had 
been slow to develop new housing within the city itself and now has enacted a reactive 
housing programme to continually develop and expand housing availability throughout the 
city. It is likely that, had refugee arrivals not been so high, the city would not have 
embarked upon its housing expansion and a general house availability shortage would have 
continued.    The following chapter will detail and analyse Berlin’s governance over its 
























Chapter 6:  Berlin’s Refugee Housing and Integration 
Policies: Fixing a (governance) hole through civil society  
6.1 Introduction  
  This chapter will cover Berlin’s multi-level governing structure, how it has adapted 
its laws and infrastructure to accommodate increasing levels of refugee inflows, and how the 
non-profit and NGO36 sectors have taken on additional responsibilities to care for refugees in 
ways that the government is traditionally supposed to cover. Because of Berlin’s size and 
how its governance is distributed (centrally governed but with tasks delegated to district 
administrations that do not have legislating ability), it acts as a city-state, in that it has 
 
36 ‘Non-governmental organisations’ and ‘non-profits’ are differentiated here as two different entities because of 
the spontaneity of the ‘refugee moment’ in 2015 leading to volunteer efforts crafting organisations that only 
operate largely as a collection of people working together that utilises volunteer leaders and small donor support 
rather than an organisation that relies on large grant funding or receives operational funding from the German 
government. For instance, Caritas is the largest NGO in Germany, and it receives several million euro in grants 
from the German government (Caritas Germany, 2017). Place4Refugees, one of the organisations created in 
2015, relies on volunteers donating their time and supporters donating in any meaningful way (Karin Windt 




‘governing structures’ in the districts networked with the central Berlin government but 
ultimately has final say in all policies regardless of district refusal or reluctance to enact 
them.   
  Germany and Berlin have also created exceptions in its building laws that allow for 
temporary accommodations for refugees to be built with immediacy, as well as convert older, 
unused structures or public spaces (such as school gymnasiums) to act as temporary shelters. 
These accommodations are typically built with a short lifespan, either ~3 years or several 
decades, and are quartered for refugees only, leading to questions of whether this segregates 
refugees and hinders their integration.  
  As this chapter will show, Berlin and Leverkusen share similar governance structures 
over their refugee housing policy, with utilisation of Type II MLG in connections with 
private organisations, as well as mandating construction of refugee accommodations within  
 
neighbourhoods. Oversight is held at the government level with instances of documented 
accountability enacted by the Berlin government (see 6.5.2). However, Berlin utilises more 
of a short-term ‘cost-efficiency’ consideration in their governing methodology than 
Leverkusen does, utilising tender offers from various companies (either state-owned or 
otherwise) to run its various refugee accommodations, rather than using either a single 
company/NGO across its accommodation spectrum or utilising government resources to 
unilaterally run the accommodations. This landscape leads to organisational anarchy, where 
there are many organisations doing the same or similar functions that can change often or run 
with low oversight.   
Many of the refugee-facing non-profits and NGOs in Berlin are ad hoc and emerged 




asylum seekers, and played a pivotal role in filling the gap of governance displayed in 201537 
(Ahrens, 2015: 13; Mayer, 2017: 5-6). Several years on, however, numerous non-profits and 
NGOs have found themselves either at odds with the Berlin government’s policymaking 
towards refugees and integration, or suspicious of its new government’s promises while 
movement on those promises is perceived to be glacial.   
  Though the Berlin government allows refugees to leave initial accommodation 
centres after 3 months and find housing on their own, the government recommends refugees 
stay in refugee-designated accommodations given the high demand for housing in general 
across Berlin. This, some would argue, has led to de facto segregation of refugees in 
accommodations both near and far from areas with native populations, thereby hindering 
integration efforts. Building plans for Berlin have emerged recently, though assessments 
indicate that there will not be enough housing to keep up with demand, as Berlin has become 
a centre of immigration in Europe. 
  This chapter will cover Berlin’s governing structure in brief, describing how the state 
government interacts with the districts, and how its refugee integration infrastructure is 
woven into that government-district interaction. It will then give an overview of the relevant 
housing and integration laws in Berlin from the period of 2005 to present, as well as the 
many issues within the Berlin housing market for both refugees and non-refugees alike. 
Following that the chapter will detail the rise of civil society organisations that took on an 
integral role in housing and caring for refugees and ultimately became advocacy 
organisations for refugee wellbeing. The key argument of this chapter is that the Berlin 
government’s multi-level governance structure since 2015, utilising private for-profit 
 
37 All but two NGO/non-profit interview partners in Berlin began their work in 2015 in the middle of the 
‘Summer of Welcome’ (Flüchtlinge Willkommen interview, Karin Windt interview, Christiane Beckmann 




companies to run many of its refugee housing, has generally hindered its ability to adequately 
deliver housing solutions for refugees given its reliance on ‘contracting out care’ rather than 
instituting a standard across its districts.  
  
6.2 Berlin’s Governing Structure in Brief  
  Berlin exists as a unique entity within German federalism: along with being the seat 
of power for the whole of Germany, it is also a city-state. Unlike other cities in Germany that 
are typically beholden to the laws set down by the state government (for example, Bonn is 
subservient to the North-Rhein Westphalia government) Berlin is beholden unto itself. 
Encircled by Brandenburg, it is the city with the highest population concentration in the 
country, and the second most populous city in Europe behind London. There are two other 
city-states in Germany, Hamburg and Bremen, though neither is as populous or as densely 
populated as Berlin.  
  It is governed by a senate, along with a governor and a mayor. While it has 12 
districts (Bezirke), these districts are not governing municipalities in the sense that, for 
example, Bonn, Cologne, or other cities in Germany are municipalities with local policies 
under the aegis of their federal state: the districts are subordinate to the Berlin senate’s 
regulatory supervision and have very limited lawmaking power. The districts are autonomous 
in administration and have local offices for services and representation, but otherwise they 
are limited in rulemaking by the auspices of the senate (Kramer, 2005). The pure governance 
structure of Berlin’s policymaking apparatus is, at first glance, Type I multi-level governance 
(see Hooghe & Marks, 2003). Berlin is nested under the federal government, while the 





  Its refugee integration infrastructure can be described generally as Type II multi-level 
governance (see Hooghe & Marks, 2003) given Berlin has established public-private 
partnerships with organisations delivering some services, for better or for worse (see Haque, 
2011 for discussion on shared governance), though it is constantly adjusting to forge new ties 
with non-profits and independent organisations that worked to aid refugees after the Summer 
of Welcome in 2015. The two principal government bodies that handle refugee issues are the 
Landesamt für Flüchtlingsangelegenheiten (The State Office for Refugee Affairs, LAF) and 
the Senatsverwaltung für Integration, Arbeit, und Soziales (The Senate Administration for 
Integration, Work, and Social Affairs, Senatsverwaltung).   
  
6.3 Issues in the housing market  
6.3.1 The City of Berlin  
  Berlin, like so much of Germany, suffers from scarcity of housing both for 
nationals/EU residents and asylum-seekers/refugees alike. The city, like Germany as a whole, 
has a higher level of individuals renting rather than buying. Approximately 46% of all 
German citizens are owner-occupiers within the country, but that number should be divided 
further to exemplify that only approximately one-third of Germans own and live in a home in 
former east Germany (a relic of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), which discouraged 
private ownership of property as a policy), whereas approximately half of the citizens in west 
Germany are owner-occupiers (Kuhn & Grabka, 2018).   
  Social housing, i.e. that which is built and subsidised centrally through the federal 
government, has seen a different outcome. From 1990, Berlin, whose current overall housing 
availability in general is already tightened due to incredible demand and lack of ability to 
construct new units (due to planning regulations), sold off over half of its social housing 




15%, the majority of which were sold to global investment funds (Aalbers and Holm, 2008). 
The city followed the nationwide trend, where it is estimated Germany held around 3 million 
social housing units in 1990, down to an estimated 1.25 million (Manthei, 2018). The sell-
offs attempted to shed municipal debt and balance budgets during a time of economic 
pullback.  
  The previously mentioned Law on Social Alignment, which would designate 20% of 
residences for those in special circumstances, only covers housing developed by state-run or 
owned companies and does not cover housing that is owned by private housing companies. 
Private companies cover 75% of the rental market in Berlin, with municipal companies 
covering the remainder (Ibid). At the same time, the average rent for general housing in 
Berlin per square meter has nearly doubled in the decade between 2009 and 2019, from €5.51 
per square meter in 2009 to €9.57 in the first quarter of 2019, down from a high of €9.91 in 
the 3rd quarter of 2018 (Statista, 2019). For apartments only, the average rent in 2018 was 
€10.32 per square meter (Investitionsbank Berlin, 2019: 7), with the average size of an 
apartment at 73.2 square meters (Ibid; 4). New constructions (Neubau) typically are more 
than 10 square meters larger than older existing structures (Altbau) and tend to be more 
expensive at open than their older counterparts (Invest-AB, 2019).  
  Between 2013 and 2017, the highest period of first-time asylum applications in 
Germany (BAMF, 2019), Berlin’s population grew 5.6% while the average rent increased  
25% with just a 2.6% increase in the number of apartments (Investitionsbank Berlin, 2019: 
8). The increasing demand for places to live around Berlin means that, oftentimes, a refugee 
would compete with perhaps 100 or more others, both German and otherwise, to get a flat 
(BBC News, 2019), though their chances are often hindered by their status as receiving 




The LAF guarantees a certain amount of rent cover for refugees without employment 
(Figure 5), though with the rising cost of average rent in the near term the fixed amount will 
become less able to cover rents. That, coupled with the sudden and dramatic rise in the cost 
of rent and the inability of housing construction to keep pace with population growth 
encouraged the Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Wohnen (Senate Administration 
for City Development and Housing) to develop a 5-year rent freeze on Berlin, which took 
effect January 2020.  
 
Figure 5- Rental coverage levels per household size. Gross rental coverage in the second column from the left, with 
coverage in social housing in the third column from the left. (Senatsverwaltung für Integration, Arbeit und Soziales , 2019). 
  
  The rent freeze covers 1.5 million apartments in buildings with 3 or more apartments, 
typically, though this excludes subsidised social housing and recently completed apartment 
complexes from 2014 onward (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Wohnen, 2019). 




both a burgeoning field with high demand for services but also one suffering from 
underemployment (ECSO, 2018: 11).   
  A further, and harder to measure issue with refugees finding housing is racism38 
and/or discrimination, though these manifest themselves in several forms: first, with ‘shadow  
brokers’, i.e. those who prey upon the naivete and desperation of refugees to find apartments. 
They charge refugees extortionate amounts of money to live in apartments without legal 
contracts, sometimes using fraudulent credentials to earn the trust of refugees before 
swindling them of money, and sometimes the apartments the refugees think they are going to 
rent end up not existing at all (Loy, 2016). It is often difficult to regain lost funds from these 
‘shadow brokers’ once they disappear, leaving refugees without any recourse to either 
recover their stolen money or find a solution to their housing issues.   
  A second manifestation of discrimination and/or racism comes from the more 
expected hesitation or outright refusal by landlords/existing tenants to rent to refugees. One 
method to counter this impediment came in the form of a pilot programme from 
Evangelische Jugend- und Fürsorgewerk (EJF) entitled Wohnungen für Flüchtlinge 
(Apartments for  
Refugees) which was able to broker over 4700 apartments from the period between 2014 to 
January 2017 (EJF, 2018). In the first edition of the Masterplan, Berlin partnered with EJF, 
which provided refugees with a counselling service to help them overcome the traditional 
barriers they might normally face when searching for housing, i.e. language and 
discrimination (Land Berlin, 2016).   
 
38 Though discrimination is studied by the Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes (Federal Anti-Discrimination 
Agency) in the context of refugee integration into the country, its studies are organised through the large 
charities, i.e. Caritas, Diakonie, etc. which would likely work with refugees who are more open to discussing 
instances of discrimination. Further, explicit allusions to racism are hard to determine and assess as factual 




EJF’s placement programme was ended in January 2017 and competence shifted to 
the LAF, and EJF was given an advisory role. The cooperation was continued until 2018, at 
which point the city allowed the contract to expire in order to shift the full competence to the 
government and save on expense reimbursement, which EJF argued was not being fulfilled 
by the government (Julia von Stülpnagel interview, 2018). EJF was able to provide 
multilingual services to refugees that greatly alleviated the anxiety of those not comfortable 
with the German language to access the Berlin housing market (Foroutan, et al., 2017: 25- 
  
(Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes, 2016: 11). The essential difference, at least argued by the government, 
is that discrimination can happen based on residency/legal status or ability to work, even when 42% of refugee 
respondents stated they experienced discrimination in the housing market. (Ibid: 3)  
26), and it is unclear whether the government will continue with a similar structure as EJF 
had (Julia von Stülpnagel Interview, 2018).   
  Despite awareness and aid programmes, 42% of refugees claimed they experienced 
discrimination while searching for housing (Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes, 2016: 3). 
Whether this is attributed to racism is a question of debate that is left undefined by the 
government, given that some landlords may prefer not to rent to those without gainful 
employment; however, the stigma against renting out to those dependent on the Job Centre, 
or to refugees in general, can be overcome with the aid of volunteers speaking on behalf of 
the refugees to the landlords and accompanying them to the apartment viewings (Hamann & 
El-Kayed, 2018). In a study by Sawert (2019) where he tested the response rate of student 
lets to a German applicant, a Syrian applicant, a Turkish applicant, and an American 
applicant, response rates to Syrians were markedly lower than the response rates for others, 
with an overall response rate of 19% for Syrians (Sawert, 2019: 13). Syrian applicants who 
wrote in good grammatical German had a higher response rate, but they still had ~20 
percentage points lower than the response rate for German applicants (~49%).  




6.3.2 The Districts  
  The districts have enacted various programmes under their auspices as 
selfadministrative entities to counter housing market stigma against refugees and to aid them 
in searching for housing. Treptow-Köpenik, for example, has a dedicated time every Friday 
between 14:00 and 17:00 for volunteers and refugees to network and find a place to live; 
additionally, the service organises workshops and events to help refugees understand the ins 
and outs of the housing market (Bezirksamt Treptow-Köpenik, 2019). After the LAF ended 
its contract with EJF for its Berlin-wide service, Mitte continued working with EJF to help 
refugees acquire flats until November 2018, at which point the city administration ended the 
contract and took on fully the competence of buying up and renting out residences (Julia von 
Stülpnagel interview, 2018).   
  Alternatively, the district of Charlottenberg-Wilmersdorf supports the independent 
voluntary organisation Charlottenberg Hilft to coordinate and organise refugee aid initiatives, 
including community activities such as sports, meet-ups, and helping refugees in their 
housing situations (Charlottenberg Hilft, 2019) though for the district itself there was no 
central administrative contact point that specifically helped the refugees in their housing 
search (Willkommen in Westend, 2018: 4).   
In specific districts (Friedrichhain-Kreuzberg, Reinickendorf, Pankow, and Spandau 
and Steglitz-Zehlendorf in special circumstances), refugees can be issued rental licenses in 
advance of their housing search along with an immediate rental contract with binding social 
law conditions, rather than having to wait to receive a permission from the local Job 
Centre/LAF once a room/apartment has already been found, which in many cases can lead to 
the room offer falling through (Willkommen in Westend, 2018: 27; Bayram, 2017: 8, 14)  
There is no underlying standard across the districts for refugee assistance for housing, 




districts are free to utilise the money they receive from the Berlin government for refugee 
integration in whatever way they see fit, a key component of Type I multi-level governance.  
  
6.4 Integration and Housing- Laws and the Like  
  Berlin has had a Senate Commissioner for Integration and Migration since 1981, long 
before former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder ushered in immigration reform for the whole of 
Germany in the latter part of the 1990s. The work of the Commissioner includes, as expected, 
mainstreaming the intake of migrants into the city, typically through means of work or 
gaining work through ausbildung, or trainee/apprenticeships to further develop qualifications, 
as well as consulting with organised migrant groups to further policy directions.    In 2005 
Berlin developed its Integrationskonzept and the country quickly followed suit with its own 
National Integration Plan two years later, a case where Dekker, et al. (2015: 649) argue that 
the city of Berlin set the pace and precedent for the central government to instigate its own 
national policy. The concept was updated and finalised in 2007, and many of the proposals 
put forward are similar to those found in the National Integration Plan: promotion of work 
and ausbildung as the strongest method for integration, promotion of ‘intercultural offerings’, 
promoting a welcoming culture (Willkommenskultur), (Land Berlin, 2007) et al.  
  In 2010 Berlin enacted the Gesetz zur Regelung von Partizipation und Integration in 
Berlin (Law Governing Participation and Integration in Berlin, ‘Integrationsgesetz Berlin’). 
The law seeks to help those with a migration background obtain the opportunity for equal 
participation in society (Der Beauftragte des Senats von Berlin für Integration und Migration, 
2010: § 1).   
  When the numbers of asylum seekers rose precipitously in 2014/2015, the city was 
caught unaware: the Landesamt für Gesundheit und Soziales (the State Office for Health and 




‘Summer of Welcome’ influx (Muschter, 2018: 16-27), found itself incapable of handling the 
queues of people who waited outside the offices for days on end to register as asylum 
seekers. Particularly notable was the effort by civil society to help house the refugees who 
were effectively sleeping outside the Lageso offices. Organisations sprung up almost 
overnight, such as Place4Refugees, Flüchtlinge Willkommen (Refugees Welcome), Be An 
Angel, etc., that sought to connect refugees either with an open bed or a place to sleep, 
effectively taking over a function of integration management that the government was unable 
to do.   
Given the inability to organise itself during the ‘crisis of governance’, the city sought 
and received free advice from McKinsey & Company, though Lageso was still short-staffed 
and unable to acclimate to the persistent numbers of refugees arriving in Berlin, either 
intentionally or otherwise39 (Muehlebach, 2016); so, the Mayor forced out the head of Lageso 
and replaced him with Sebastian Muschter, then a Senior Consultant with McKinsey  
(Soederberg, 2018: 12). With Muschter, the first ‘Masterplan’ for Berlin was implemented in  
2016, which established the Landesamt für Flüchtlingsangelegenheiten to both re-brand 
Lageso and move the administration to a new building, as well as creating 7 organising 
principles for the city’s asylum infrastructure: first, arrival, registration, and benefits; second, 
accommodation and places to live; third, ensuring education; fourth, ensuring access to the 
job market; fifth, security for both refugees and the city; sixth, an inclusive and open society; 
and seventh, active participation of refugees in social life (Land Berlin, 2016: 7).  
  The Masterplan also enabled the conversion of the decommissioned Tempelhof 
Airport, then used as a museum/landmark, into a refugee reception centre for centralised 
processing of asylum claims. Given the building’s historical monument status previously 
 
39 In January 2016, an anonymous source within Lageso revealed that up to 5000 applications for asylum had 
been mishandled, meaning that up to 5000 refugees had not been properly registered for months in Berlin while 




anointed by the government, no permanent alterations could be made to the structure, which 
made converting a former airplane hangar into a liveable space extremely difficult (Parsloe, 
2017). Even when infrastructure was created within the hangar, it was packed tight for the 
refugees: typically there would be 12 people living in a small area of 5x5 meters and without 
privacy (Soederberg, 2018: 4). The registration process is supposed to take several days-  
  
instead, many ended up living in the hangar for weeks or months due to the LAF’s lack of 
employees, among other problems (Keilani, 2018).  
  The LAF oversaw the contracting of certain reception services, such as management 
of the Tempelhof registration facility at the former Tempelhof Airport in Berlin to the 
company Tamaja. Otherwise, integration services, such as integration and language classes, 
were organised through the districts and the local Job Centre and provided for with funding 
by the Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 
BAMF). Federal integration services were clarified and expounded upon in the 2016 German 
Integrationsgesetz (Integration Law), which was aimed at getting refugees into the workforce 
faster and having those with high prospects to remain (typically benefitting Syrians, who 
apply in the largest numbers and whose asylum/protection acceptance rate is higher than 
90%40) begin integration courses immediately regardless of status, as well as having a place 
of residence assigned to them (typically in mass accommodations) in order to deter massive 
movements into already densely populated urban areas (Bundesregierung, 2016).   Under the 
Masterplan, the development of modular container housing (modular notunterkunfte) was 
 
40 At last reported by the BAMF statistics collated by the European Council of Refugees and Exiles, in 2018  
Syrians had the lowest asylum application rejection rate at 0.2%, while Eritreans had the second lowest at 6%.  




promoted as a quick-fix solution to ensure that refugees would have a space to live while the 
city continued developing a new urban planning agenda (Land Berlin,  
2016: 24, 28). This was based on the Sonderregelungen für Flüchtlingsunterkünfte (Special  
Regulation for Refugee Accommodation), which was incorporated into Germany’s  
Baugesetzbuch (Building Code) by the federal government in 2015. It allows Berlin (and  
Hamburg) to sidestep legal boundaries and create emergency refugee accommodations  
(Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz, 2017: § 246)41. The terms of the  
  
Special Regulation ended at the end of 2019, which then put all modular accommodation 
operated by Berlin up for tender to private accommodation companies. Berlin allows 
refugees to leave the initial reception centres and search for apartments after a minimum of 
three months, but the city advises for refugees to stay in the mass accommodations given the 
relative ‘security’ of being able to stay in one rather than the uncertainty of finding a private 
room in an apartment (Land Berlin, 2019).  
In 2015, Berlin passed a new affordable housing law, the Gesetz zur sozialen 
Ausrichtung und Stärkung der landeseigenen Wohnungsunternehmen für eine langfristig 
gesicherte Wohnraumversorgung (Law on Social Alignment and Strengthening State-Owned 
Housing Companies for Long-Term Housing Supply), which designates 20% of all newly 
built units as sequestered for special needs groups such as refugees, homeless people, those 
needing assisted living, and other special circumstances (Land Berlin, 2015: §2). It also raises 
funds for the development and modernisation of social housing.  
  After the election of a ‘red-red-green’ coalition government in Berlin in September 
2016, i.e. a coalition between Die Linke (the left party), The Green Party, and the SPD, 
 
41 The law allows for Berlin, Bremen, and Hamburg specifically to make special allowances in order to quickly 
construct and develop refugee accommodations. For temporary mobile (or modular) accommodations, the 




overthrowing the previous coalition between the SPD and the CDU, the government took a 
new direction in refugee and asylum matters. It chose Elke Breitenbach of Die Linke as the 
Senator overseeing the Senatsverwaltung, which allowed for the injection of Die Linke’s 
particularly inclusive policy proposals on refugee integration and participation in society into 
the government’s development of a new Masterplan42 (Katina Schubert interview, 2018).   
 First, in October 2017, the Senatsverwaltung established the Koordinierungsstelle 
Flüchtlingsmanagement (Coordination Office for Refugee Management) which was created 
to “accompany and support the communication of the LAF with the actors in the 
management of refugees in Berlin” (Senatsverwaltung für Integration, Arbeit, und Soziales, 
2018). The office holds monthly meetings with relevant stakeholders in the NGO, volunteer, 
and non-profit sectors that work with refugees, though their reception has been mixed. 
Though some working directly with refugees praise the increased conversations with the 
government, other organisations are still critical of how they do not directly engage with 
refugees (Christiane Beckmann interview, 2018; Andreas Tölke interview, 2018).  
  The post-2016 government then set out to create a new Masterplan given the previous 
Masterplan had “a lot of ideas, but without enough specifics in it to make it a workable 
entity” (Sebastian Muschter interview, 2018). Some aspects of the first Masterplan, such as 
the objective of integrating housing needs of refugees into the broader housing needs of  
Berlin (Land Berlin, 2016: 24, 30) and promotion of temporary modular accommodation 
(Ibid: 28) remained, though the new Masterplan recognises the effectiveness for integration 
of moving refugees from mass accommodations into private rooms/apartments, and seeks to 
increase its correspondence with private/non-profit organisations to aid in the moving process 
(Land Berlin, 2018: 56). Mayor Michael Müller celebrated the passage of the new  
 
42 Die Linke, on its website, states outright that the party’s platform is one of moving asylum-seekers as quickly 
as possible towards social participation and professional qualification recognition, as well as access to jobs, 




Masterplan, as it confirmed that Berlin would follow a position that “integration starts on day 
one” (Land Berlin, 2018a).  
  Another aspect of the new government’s action plan is that new modular 
accommodations will be constructed in each district regardless of any complaints or 
hesitations on the part of neighbourhoods or the district administration (Land Berlin, 2018). 
The districts are required to indicate two places to the Berlin Senate where new 
refugeespecific accommodations can be built. Consultations between the neighbourhoods, the 
districts, and the senate administration take place prior to finalising construction plans; these 
include typically the Staatssekretär für Integration (City Secretary for Integration), the  
Senator for Integration, district council political representatives, a representative from the 
Landesamt, the media, and building planners. However, there is no explicit representative 
from the refugee community, or a refugee advocacy organisation speaking on behalf of them 
at the planning meetings. “While the participation of refugees is not, I don’t remember one, 
they’re there, they’re in the audience sometimes, but I think it could be more” (Berlin Senate  
Representative interview, 2018).   
  The relevant laws are summarised in Table 2.  
  
Year  Law (Berlin/Federal)  Highlights  
2005 - 2007  Integration Concept and Plan 
(Berlin)  
● Promotion of ausbildung 
(apprenticeships) and work as 
best method to integration ● 
Intercultural offerings  
2010  Law Governing Participation and 
Integration in Berlin  
● Obtaining equal 
participation in society by 
increasing percentage of 
migrant employee 
population  
● National Advisory Council 
on Integration and 
Migration established  





2015  Law on Social Alignment and  
Strengthening State-Owned  
Housing Companies for Long-Term  
Housing Supply (Berlin)  
● 20% of newly constructed 
housing units sequestered 
for special needs groups  
● Raises funds for 
modernisation of social 
housing  
● Controlled increase of rent 
by max. 15% over four years  
2015  Special Regulation for Refugee  
Accommodation in the Building  
Code (Federal)  
● Allows city-states to 
sidestep building 
regulations and develop 
emergency shelters for 
refugees  
● Refugee accommodations 
are run by Berlin until the 
end of 2019, at which point 
they are available for offer 
by private accommodation 
companies  
2016  Masterplan for Integration and 
Security (Berlin)  
● Created Landesamt für 
Flüchtlingsangelegenheiten 
as the central refugee agency 
for Berlin  
● Centralising registration and 
distribution efforts  
● Attempted streamlining 
asylum decisions  
● Created ad-hoc shelter and 
accommodation system  
● Encouraged partnerships 
with NGOs  





2016  Integration Law (Federal)  ● 3+2 rule of residence 
allowance and extension 
based on achievement of 
vocational training  
● Residences decided by 
government if refugee has 
financial needs  
● Increase in German teacher 
allowance  
● Immediate access to 
integration benefits before 
asylum decisions to 
nationalities with higher 
acceptance rates  
2018  New Masterplan (Berlin)  ● Development of refugee 
accommodations (modular) 
within district community 
areas; direct consultations 
with neighbourhoods  
● Increasing communication 
with non-profit/NGOs for 
regular consultations  
● Moving refugees as soon as 
possible from mass 
accommodations to private 
houses/apartments  
● Ensure access to 
psycho/social care in refugee 
accommodations  
2020  Senate bill no. S-2365/2019  
(Berlin)  
  
● Imposes a rent freeze for 5 
years on 1.5 million  
apartments in buildings with 
3 or more apartments  
Table 2- A table summarising the relevant laws governing refugee housing and integration in Berlin. 
  
6.5 Types of housing for refugees  
  Though there is a stated preference by refugees for private apartments/houses, the city 
constructed and continues to develop different types of quick-building housing for refugees. 
Berlin allows refugees to leave the initial reception centres and search for apartments after a 
minimum of three months, but advises for refugees to stay in the mass accommodations 




accommodation (Land Berlin, 2019). There are several different types of specially 
constructed housing allowed under the previously mentioned amendments to the Building 
Code. Many of these are operated by different organisations whose tender offers were 
accepted by the Berlin government, exemplifying the public-private partnerships of Type II 
multi-level governance where the government pulls back from direct oversight of an issue 
area and ‘steers’ rather than ‘rows’ (Le Galès, 2011).  
  
6.5.1 Tempelhof, the Reception Centre  
  The hangars at the decommissioned Tempelhof Airport were converted, through the 
edict of the first Masterplan, into an erstaufnahmeeinrichtung (First Reception Centre) in 
order to centralise the first accommodation and processing of asylum claims in Berlin (Land 
Berlin, 2016: 11). Refugees were supposed to spend only 2-3 days in the hangar 
accommodations (see Figure 6), but the reality was that they spent 3-4 weeks or more in the 
hangars awaiting a decision on their asylum applications (Keilani, 2018). The spaces 
refugees had to share in the facility allow about 3 m2 per person, sometimes fitting 8 people 






Figure 6- Inside of one of the Tempelhof hangars, showing accommodations and shower units. (Fahrun, 2016) 
  
  Converting and maintaining the hangar accommodations was an expensive task: 
water and showers had to be piped in without damaging the infrastructure given Tempelhof’s 
historical protected status, while the hangars had to be insulated against lightning strikes, as 
if lightning struck the hangars then all electrical equipment would short out and people would 
possibly be killed. Noise travelled unencumbered throughout the hangars, making it a 
difficult environment in which to sleep. Additionally, the walls were not insulated for heating 
or cooling, so maintaining a liveable temperature became another massive expense. The 
complete addition and renovation cost the city administration several hundred million euros  
(Sebastian Müller Interview, 2018; Senatsverwaltung für Finanzen, 2018: 230 - 239).   
Tempelhof was managed by a company called Tamaja, contracted by the LAF, which 
many of the refugee-facing non-profits and NGOs within Berlin say had been neglecting care 




social aid benefits that they would be guaranteed to under Germany’s Asylum Seekers 
Benefits Act (Flüchtlingsrat Berlin, 2018; ET Interview, 2018). Flüchtlingsrat Berlin, in 
conjunction with 9 other legal, medical, and refugee advocacy organisations called for 
Tempelhof to be closed in 2018 because of the hazardous health conditions faced by refugees 
living there rather than for the facility to be gradually wound down, as the refugees will only 
be moved to another facility rather than a more stable form of housing (Flüchtlingsrat Berlin,  
2018).   
The LAF defended its choice of Tamaja, as the LAF had “dissatisfaction with 
renowned NGOs [initially chosen to care for residents at Tempelhof] that seemed to be 
cutting costs to residents” and Tamaja demonstrated that it cared about the refugees living 
there (LAF employee interview, 2018). ET, who worked as a translator for Tamaja, spoke of 
how refugees attempted to ‘escape’ Tempelhof to find a better accommodation:  
  
It’s better we do this, we can now fight and make problems and then after a while 
they had to kick us out and they for sure have to find us a place’, which in most cases 
will be in a proper room… Even the social workers would tell you that this is, some 
people are doing this and that because they are repeating this because it’s obvious that 
they could go somewhere else. And sometimes it could be like some kind of 
conclusion, because every time when someone is kicked away, he still has connection 
in the camp, and the camp asks him ‘where are you now’, and he answers ‘it’s way 
better now here’ (ET Interview, 2018).  
  
 The facility was closed at the end of 2019 as a first accommodation centre, but 
remained open as a processing centre for asylum applications to capitalise on the relative 
centrality of Tempelhof within Berlin without invoking the high upkeep costs as a residence. 




barracks, old factories, or defunct hospitals, many of which faced similar (but ultimately 
lesser) problems to the Tempelhof hangars: how to convert a space that was not previously 
used for residency into one that can accommodate several hundred to several thousand people 
for days, weeks, or even months while maintaining the integrity of it for historical 
preservation. Given the employee shortages at the LAF (Keilani, 2018; Flüchtlingsrat Berlin, 
2018) that contribute to longer wait times for asylum applications, these converted spaces 
become the refugees’ first ‘home’ within Germany, subjugating them to a lack of privacy, 
space, and hygiene while they endure the stress of waiting on their asylum decisions (LD 
Interview, 2018).   
The employee shortages in the LAF reflect a broader trend in Berlin, where the 
government-oriented social care sector is shrinking in favour of private organisations taking 
over operations (Soederberg, 2018: 6-7; Tamaja employee interview, 2018). This has become 
problematic for those who work in the social non-profit sector, as the cost-saving motive for 
the city/state is seen as a deterrent to effective oversight of companies operating care homes 
(Flüchtlingsrat Berlin, 2018).   
  
[T]amaja social work represents the shittiest, and this is because they, the observation 
over them, oversight over them is very weak… It’s not that I’m criticising Tamaja 
exactly by itself, but I’m criticising the situation because I think that whatever 
company comes in this setting, the same shit would happen… If you are trying to 
minimise your costs in the situation where nobody is going to observe what you’re 
doing then you completely or definitely will go and cut the spending. So the major 
concern at the end, in this way, to keep people as much as possible and no matter how 
they are staying, how they are there, because this how we generate income or profit. 





  Tempelhof, like much of Berlin’s new refugee infrastructure, was constructed out of a 
crisis of governance and uncertainty at the necessary logistics to care for and properly house 
the number of refugees that arrived in the city. Though it was replaced as a first 
accommodation centre and asylum applications have slowed dramatically (BAMF, 2019)43, it 
remains to be seen if the city will adapt a more government-centric approach to refugee care 
or maintain the structures that arose from 2015.   
  
6.5.2 Tempohomes  
  These are basic modular accommodations, typically made of metal. They are referred 
to as ‘container villages’, as they resemble shipping containers, and are touted as a temporary 
solution until such time as more permanent structures can be built around Berlin. The 
analogy is apt, as I had the privilege of touring the container village in the Tempelhofer Feld, 
including entering and looking around in one of the residences. Three containers are joined 
together: two on either end consist of bedrooms where two to four people share a closed 
space (2.5 meters x 7.5 meters) with the middle container holding a kitchenette and a 
bathroom (Senatsverwaltung für Gesundheit und Soziales, 2016).   
  
The roommates are assigned randomly except for family or gender, and can lead to 
conflict between ‘housemates’ given the small amount of shared space, as in the case of my 
interview partner HD: HD’s roommate was a religious fanatic and gave HD a lot of stress, 
 
43 According to the BAMF, first-time asylum applications up to June are down nearly 11% from the same time 
in 2018. This is due to several factors: first, the EU-Turkey deal, which stemmed the flow of refugees from 
Turkey into the EU; second, FRONTEX’s (EU coast guard) pullback of active patrol zones near Africa in the 
Mediterranean when compared to the first rescue mission Mare Nostrum, which ran from 2013 to 2014; third, 





preventing HD from focusing on his studies while in his room, and though HD complained to 
the camp administration about the roommate, the administration did not act; instead, the 
roommate left of his own accord to a neighbouring room (HD Interview, 2018).  
  
 
Figure 7-  a Tempohome community in Berlin. (Landesamt für Flüchtlingsangelegenheiten, 2019) 
  
  The containers are noticeably not insulated and do not retain either heat or cool air 
well. In winter the structures become extremely frigid without the use of an installed radiator, 
and during the summers the containers become dangerously hot given the metal structure and 
poor ventilation. When there is rain and wind, the noise echoes in the container. It is also 
very easy to hear neighbours during all times of the day. My interview partner lived next to a 
married couple, and he noted hearing them having “intimate time” through the walls 
occasionally when he tried to sleep (HD Interview, 2018). Even during our interview, sounds 
from the neighbours permeated the walls on occasion.  
  There are small social areas outside, as well as playgrounds in which children can 
play. All of it remains behind the fenced perimeter of the camp with a view of the larger field 




  The tempohomes are arranged in a ‘camp’ style: as shown in Figure 7, the containers 
are arranged in ‘blocs’ and given a fenced perimeter. Services such as laundry and postal 
collection are kept in a separate area and given limited accessible hours (typically normal 
business hours). The tempohome camps are given a 3-year permit of existence, as they are 
not made to last longer. They are dispersed throughout Berlin in different locations, both near 
and far from more populated areas, sometimes near the border of Brandenburg far from 
populated areas (Vey, 2018). Upon the end of their 3-year life spans, the Berlin government 
has replaced some with longer-lasting modular accommodations, also termed Modulare 
Unterkünfte für Flüchtlinge (to be expanded upon in the next section).   
  The camp at Tempelhofer Feld has been a point of contention between activists and 
the Berlin government, the former who want to keep the field open as a park and not open to 
building developers. Activists see the partial development of the camp under emergency law 
as a way to justify further housing development on the field, though this argument may mask 
a Not-In-My-Backyard sentiment that is ultimately based in xenophobia (Hubana, 2019). 
Either way, their location in Tempelhofer Feld has put refugees in the crossfire of a 
longstanding debate of how to treat one of Berlin’s largest open green spaces (Schönball, 
2017). The limited options with Tempelhofer Feld is why the tempohomes next to the hangar 
were removed at the end of 2019, and all remaining refugees were moved to a facility in 
either Spandau or a former hospital in Reinickendorf, in the north of the city (Amin, 2019).  
 Kreichauf (2018) argues that the creation of such structures serves to exclude and stigmatise 
refugees from society, making them extremely visible and discernible from the normal day to 
day (Kreichauf, 2018: 10-11). It also creates both a physical and metaphysical border 
between refugees and the citizenry: where there is a hard border between the camp and life 
outside, either with a fence or with the remote location of a camp outside of a populated area, 




circumstances; many end up feeling trapped and excluded from society and exhibit nihilistic 
tendencies (Vey, 2018; Dalal, 2018: 73-74). My interview partner, HD, stated his opinion of 
living in the tempohome succinctly: “I want to get out of here” (HD Interview, 2018).   
  In follow-up messages, HD received a new roommate who was no better than the 
first, but was able to leave Tempelhofer Feld soon after when HD found an open room in an 
apartment with the help of a friend.  
  The tempohome ‘villages’ are run by different companies throughout Berlin: EJF,  
Deutsche Rote Kreuz (DRK) Müggelspree gGmbH (German Red Cross), Tamaja, Hero 
Norge, Milaa GmbH, and many more, all of which were awarded contracts by the Berlin 
government (Land Berlin, 2019a). Though the companies are given leeway to operate the 
accommodations, they must still adhere to LAF standards and are subject to oversight by 
social workers employed by LAF and district council officials who conduct visits to ensure 
standards (ET interview, 2018). There were several notable instances of fraud committed by 
companies that operated refugee accommodations, where the operators extorted money from 
the government to run shelters without delivering needed services (see Haak, 2017; and 
Memarnia, 2017), which encouraged the government to increase its contracting standards to 
companies that have 3 good references from previous operations and operations lasted at 
least one year (Public Tenders Germany, 2019).  
  
6.5.3 Modular Accommodations  
  Though similar in concept to tempohomes, i.e. quickly constructed and with a  
‘temporary’ lifespan, the programme Modulare Unterkünfte für Flüchtlinge (Modular 
Accommodations for Refugees, MUF) aims at constructing accommodations that are both 
easily built/deconstructed and are more similar to actual apartment buildings while also 




are rated to last 50 to 80 years and can eventually be used to house the general population if 
the refugee population that requires a place in the MUFs falls below a consistent 
replenishment level (Land Berlin, 2019b).  
  MUFs represent a midpoint between managing the necessities of refugee 
accommodation and mitigating the needs of a city that would have been growing even 
without the refugee influx (Larios, 2017: 42). The initial round of MUFs were designed as 
‘dormitory style’, which would allow for them to be used as student housing or as a nursing 
facility after it is no longer needed for refugees; they had shared dining and common areas, as 
well as shared bathrooms (divided by gender).   
The ‘MUF 2.0’ are designed to be closer to individual apartments with each unit 
holding its own bathroom, kitchen and dining areas, typically called a klassische 
gemeinschaftsunterkünfte (classical shared accommodation), though the structures will still 
have a protective fence and security managing the building, as well as a ground floor with 
spaces for social workers (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Wohnen, 2018).  
Figure 8 shows an example of 3 layouts in the MUF 2.0 that will be constructed at 
MarzahnHellersdorf. Of note is that each bedroom is designed to hold two beds, while each 
room is accorded a maximum occupancy of double the number of rooms, i.e. 3 rooms is 
given a maximum occupancy of 6, 4 is given 8, and 5 is given 9.  





Figure 8- the various layouts of the MUF designs, with different apartment sizes depending on the need of the group 
applying, i.e. individual refugees or families. (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Wohnen, 2018) 
  
  Single rooms (not shown in Figure 8) are reserved for those with special needs/issues, 
while 4 rooms and up are reserved solely for families. The single rooms are located on the 
ground floor next to the social worker area for ease of access. They also have their own 
bathrooms and kitchenette, affording those who live there the ability to sustain themselves 
without needing to share dining space, as one would in other refugee housing situations.    
As mentioned previously, the Berlin Senate gave each district the option to choose a 
location in which two MUFs would be constructed (see Figure 9). Planning meetings are held 
regularly within the districts that include representatives from the Senate, the Coordination 
Office, the Landesamt, the media, and the relevant neighbourhoods, though without any 
explicit representation on behalf of refugees, either in the form of an advocacy organisation 




which has been criticised by representatives of the NGO and non-profit communities as 
serving the needs of the government for its budget before the needs of refugees who actually 
require help (Andreas Tölke interview, 2018; Karin Windt interview, 2018).   
 
Figure 9- A map of MUF locations around Berlin. Green are ones that are currently open; blue are ones that are either 
currently being built or under planning; and red are ones that are under consideration as new locations. (Senatsverwaltung 
für Finanzen, 2018a) 
  
While refugee-facing nonprofits and NGOs and refugees themselves have said that 
MUFs are an improvement from tempohomes and the mass emergency accommodations 
because of a better sense of privacy, cleanliness, and control over their lives (living with 2-6 
others in a larger space rather than more in just one room), they state that the MUFs are 
isolating and restrict a refugee’s ability to facilitate a feeling of normalcy, welcoming and 
integration by encouraging them to only be around other refugees whose circumstances, such 




Interview, 2018; PD Interview, 2018; XD Interview, 2018; ZD Interview, 2018; Christiane 
Beckmann Interview, 2018; Karin Windt Interview, 2018). The districts have shifted some of 
their integration programme focus onto both MUFs and existing tempohome areas in an 
attempt to avert ‘ghettoization’ of refugees; the districts receive ~€30,000 per year from the 
Berlin government to focus on local projects through the Berlin Entwickelt Neue 
Nachbarschaften (Berlin Develops New Neighbourhoods, BENN) programme, which they 
use to work with neighbourhood-specific organisations for community interaction and to 
avoid social exclusion of refugees (Bezirke coordinator interview, 2018).   
  
6.6 Non-profit and NGO work on Behalf of Refugees  
  As previously mentioned, during the height of the ‘Summer of Welcome’ 
multitudinous organisations sprang up to help refugees find places to live or sleep for a few 
nights given the havoc that occurred outside of Lageso. Some, such as Flüchtlinge 
Willkommen and Be An Angel dealt directly with finding refugees rooms in private 
apartments, whether through connecting refugees directly with landlords or leasing 
apartments for refugees; others, such as Place4Refugees searched for immediate places, 
whether in hostels, hotels, houses, or apartments where refugees could sleep. Other 
organisations such as Moabit Hilft brought items such as clothes, blankets, and food to the 
refugees who had no choice but to camp out overnight outside the Lageso building. All the 
organisations provided services that should have been legally guaranteed by the 
government44, which ultimately failed to do so in the hour of need.  
 
44 In the case of refugees applying for asylum, they are covered by two laws for before and after the asylum 
application has been made: the Sozialgesetzbuch (Basic Law) in § 67 through § 69 assures those who are 
involuntarily homeless or sleeping rough have the same rights as citizens to receive benefits to help mitigate and 
prevent homelessness, while the Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz (Asylum Seekers Benefits Law) entitles all those 
who have applied for asylum the immediate right to certain material reception conditions (Bundesministerium 
der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz, 2003 & 2017a, respectively). Given the disarray with Lageso, reception 





Caritas, the largest charity in Germany and one of the largest in Europe, established a 
shelter on its campus grounds in November 2015 to ensure that refugees were not waiting at 
Lageso overnight in the cold (Caritasverband, 2019). They also established an advisory 
service in partnership with the Berlin-owned housing association HOWOGE to consult 
refugees on how to navigate the housing market and understand what they need to do to abide 
by terms of a lease, to understand how to maintain utilities, etc. (Caritasverband, 2019a).  
 The initial turbulence stated in the previous sections instigated a confrontational relationship 
between the organisations and the government, which was seen to be inept in its handling of 
processing asylum claims while employee levels at Lageso were still unfilled (Christiane 
Beckmann interview, 2018). Be An Angel, for example, took on additional responsibilities 
beyond just the limited function of helping refugees find places to live:  
  
After registration and the inability of the German government or the senate of Berlin 
to provide all the acclaimed rights in the asylum law, we had to go to the social court 
to force the authorities to hand over whatever the people needs are, and that was 800 
people that we had been with at the social court. The registration process for some 
individuals took more than 4 months. After the registration, our expectation has been 
that the government would take over or that the authorities, so the volunteers could 
lean back. Unfortunately that did not happen, so what we did afterwards, we were 
confronted with different tasks in terms of asylum laws, in terms of educational 
programmes, language skills, learning the language, providing homes, and during 
from September 2015, to March 2016 we rented, as an NGO, 17 apartments in Berlin 
which we handed over even to people who were not registered. (Andreas Tölke 





The non-profits became housing consultants for refugees, not only by directly helping 
them find places in which to live, but also providing translating services and accompany them 
to the relevant government offices when they had to register their intent to move out of the 
mass accommodations, where they often experienced difficulties when enumerating the rights 
of refugees to move or encountered overworked government employees (Karin Windt, 2018). 
Some refugees who were helped by these organisations then turned around to volunteer or 
work with them to further help other refugees. ND, a refugee who speaks 8 languages, 
performs a vital job with Moabit Hilft, helping to translate both documents and in person 
while interacting with landlords and the government.   
  
You need like WBS [housing certificate], we need schufa [credit]… you must have to 
also know German language and for this you also need certificates if you have b1 or 
b2, they will know ok, you can talk to them, you can live there and you don’t make a 
problem... If you don’t know German, then it will be tough for them and they need 
every time a translator… we cannot go each and every time with them. (ND 
Interview, 2018)  
  
  In general, volunteer engagement with newly arrived refugees was essential in 
ensuring that refugees, across age groups, genders, and national backgrounds, were able to 
adapt to new circumstances in the country in which they apply for asylum (Hemmer, 2017; 
Hamann & Karakayalı, 2016). With regard to Berlin however, the volunteer, NGO, and non-
profit efforts became integral and imperative to ensuring that refugees were able to navigate 
their new realities given the failure of the city’s governance. NGOs also became employers 




This was especially the case when it came to housing. For those refugees unlucky 
enough to not meet someone who could help them find housing, the organisations provided a 
valuable lifeline. Without the aid of native or fluent German speakers, refugees faced 
discrimination and extortionist practices when searching for housing from landlords who 
either refused to rent to refugees outright, or who refused based on their reliance on a stipend 
from the Job Centre (Soederberg, 2018: 11). Beyond interacting with landlords, difficulty 
with paperwork is common, where refugees (and even native Germans) have trouble 
understanding the requirements for living standards set down by the government and sorting 
through the various forms, as refugees have to report to numerous agencies when looking to 
move: Job Centre, Auslanderbehorde, LAF, etc. Without outside help or clarity from the 
government on how it handles paperwork, refugees are often left with uncertainty in what to 
do with their documents, which adds stress onto their obligations to integrate under German 
law.  
  
…this country needs to be active, need to be always motivated, and you have to do a 
lot of stuff, you have to follow your work, you have to follow your papers every day 
or two days you get a post with some Amt, Burgeramt, Bundesamt, Sozialamt, and so 
[on], and you have to follow and you have to take paper from here, send it to here; 
but you don’t have this energy, and you spend a lot of your energy at work also, 
because here they are working always under pressure. (DD Interview, 2018)  
  
I have to go to 6 or 7 auslanderbehorde, like migration office, amt, a whole 6, 7 
government circuits just to show them that I need my issues done, and each one takes 
their time and they’re very slow with it, they need a lot of papers and stuff, and it 




lot of work and very time consuming. And as a student I don’t really have that luxury. 
(ZD Interview, 2018)  
  
As previously mentioned, EJF ran for some time a programme that helped refugees 
find places in private apartments, and was successful in several thousand cases. A remarkable 
aspect of this was that, instead of negotiating only with property management companies or 
housing collectives, EJF was able to broker contracts with private landlords on behalf of 
refugees, who are notoriously more difficult to contact than the larger housing collectives or 
companies (Julia von Stülpnagel interview, 2018). Though EJF still runs several tempohomes 
across Berlin, they do not know if the LAF will be able to replicate EJF’s success in placing 
refugees in private apartments given the general staff shortages in the government body, as 
previously mentioned.  
  Another exceptional case is the ‘Sharehaus Refugio’ that works in tandem with Give 
Something Back to Berlin (GSBTB), in which refugees can live and learn in one apartment 
building. With a café on the ground floor and apartments for both refugee families and 
individuals on the numbered floors, the building serves as a school for the residents (with 
GSBTB organising German language classes and sprachcafes), as well as a community space 
in which events are held to encourage refugees and local Germans to interact and develop a 
sense of community (Give Something Back to Berlin interview, 2018).   
The local and larger organisations began networking with each other, holding 
workshops and roundtables on their efforts in order to better coordinate and ensure that, if the 
refugees they were helping needed services that one organisation could not handle, they 
would be able to point refugees in the direction of the organisation that could help them  




Berlin interview, 2018). Flüchtlinge Willkommen has hosted several roundtable discussions 
with other NGOs, along with members of the city/state government and the political parties 
to discuss all the issues surrounding housing for refugees and the work done by civil society 
organisations (Flüchtlinge Willkommen, 2017).   
  Some of the recommendations of the organisations, such as establishing central points 
of contact for housing within the districts and closer ties between district mayors and the 
local organisations, have come to fruition in some districts, but not all (Willkommen in 
Westend, 2018: 34-35). In a March 2019 roundtable between the Senate, the districts, and 
civil society, the government demonstrated its increased willingness to heed suggestions by 
refugee-facing organisations by adopting several recommendations made by Flüchtlingsrat  
Berlin, such as studying ways through which refugees can have easier access to a  
Wohnberechtigungsschein (a permit to access social/reduced cost housing options) with more 
transparency in the district’s awarding process, and housing companies letting some larger 
apartments (4 rooms or more) directly to the LAF for rent to refugees with larger families, as 
well as others (Land Berlin, 2019c). Thus, despite the initial animosity and conflict between 
the civil society organisations and the Senate, the new government has enabled a stronger 
measure of communication and coordination with civil society.  
  Homelessness among refugees is also an issue, with an estimated half of the 30,000 to 
40,000 homeless in Berlin having recognised refugee status, living either on the street or in 
homeless shelters (Willkommen in Westend, 2018: 31). The city established the first 
Strategiekonferenz Wohnungslosenhilfe (Strategic Conference to Prevent Homelessness), 
where representatives from the Senate consulted with representatives from charities, 
nonprofits, NGOs, district representatives, and others to discuss and workshop ideas to 
counteract the rising numbers of homeless (Senatsverwaltung für Integration, Arbeit, und 




issue of homelessness, the conference released draft guidelines on homelessness assistance, 
and followed up with another conference in October 2019 to produce a new resolution based 
on the working groups’ final study results (Ibid).   
  
6.7 How Refugees Find Housing in Berlin  
  Besides initial placement in mass accommodations, the most common way the 
interview partners (13 total; DD is a married couple where the wife arrived on a reunification 
visa) found their housing at the time of the interviews was through friends and family, with 8 
of them having found their first and/or subsequent rooms/houses/apartments through their 
friend/family networks (see Figure 7). 4 interview partners found their housing through 
volunteers and/or NGOs (with DD and LD overlapping for both friends/family and 
volunteers), and just 3 found their housing through government services, though PD was 
moved around several camps and MUFs and MD lives far from the school he attends. HD, as 
previously mentioned, was initially placed in the Tempelhof container housing before finding 







BD   X 
DD    
HD    
JD  X  
KD   X 
LD    




ND  X  
PD X   
QD   X 
XD   X 
ZD   X 
Table 3- A table denoting how each interview partner was able to find their housing up to the time of the interview and the 
trajectories taken from initial placement to their then-current housing. Arrows indicate movement from being helped by one 
category (gove 
 
  While the clear favour is finding housing through friends/friend networks, it should 
be noted that many of the refugees’ German friends began as volunteers, either working 
through the various non-profits, teaching, or in refugee camps in Greece (LD interview, 
2018; HD interview, 2018; DD interview, 2018). This highlights the importance of social 
links, bridges, and bonds within Ager & Strang’s (2008) integration model, where 
encouraging contact between native and non-native people enables both the material aspects 
of integration, i.e. finding a house or a job, and the cultural aspects, such as language 
acquisition and societal interaction.  
  Encouraging both volunteering and community events that involve both the refugee 
and native populations, both at the city/state and district level, is reinforced by Gesemann & 
Roth’s (2016) study on integration, which found “productive cooperative relationships with 
civil society actors on the ground and the involvement of the population as a whole are seen 
as important design tasks of municipal integration policy” (Gesemann & Roth, 2016: 4). 
With further encouragement and direction from the Berlin Senate across all districts to 
establish minimum standards of district-centred housing aid and integration information 
points, increased interaction between the native population and the refugee population will 





6.8 Conclusion  
  This chapter mapped out the development of Berlin’s multi-level governance 
structure with regard to refugee policy. In 2015, Berlin emerged at the forefront of refugee 
integration politics, taking in 5% of the more than 1 million refugees let into Germany when 
Angela Merkel bypassed the Dublin Regulation. The city was caught unaware of how best to 
process and care for the refugees, even if there were warning signs from within the 
government that the country and the city needed to prepare for an influx of refugees (Karin 
Windt interview, 2018; Sebastian Muschter interview, 2018). Refugees faced harsh situations 
while trying to register their asylum applications, leading to a mass civil society movement to 
care for and support refugees in the ways that the government should have fulfilled.   
  The refugee influx also laid bare the housing issues that had been percolating in 
Berlin and across Germany, in that a lack of social housing and increasing immigration 
before the refugee movement were leading to the Berlin housing market becoming more 
unaffordable over time. Other key issues for refugees as presented in the chapter are 
inordinate times waiting for asylum decisions, leading to long waiting times within mass 
accommodations; discrimination from landlords and rental companies; employee shortages at 
relevant government bodies, leading to increased wait times for asylum decisions and returns 
on paperwork; rents rising beyond the stipend amounts provided by the government to 
refugees; and no universal standards of housing information assistance across the districts, 
among other issues.  
In adapting to the crisis of governance, Berlin adopted several policies, as well as two 
Masterplans to facilitate and expedite areas of focus for the Berlin government to streamline 
integration services. The government encouraged the development of rapidly built modular 
housing in which refugees would be given first priority, but would also serve the needs of the 




The government also took the step of mandating that each district choose two locations for 
the development of refugee modular accommodation rather than giving the districts the 
option of vetoing the development (Berlin Senate Representative interview, 2018). This was 
done to intentionally encourage placing refugees into a native community to better facilitate 
integration. The Berlin government also mandated that social housing become a priority for 
the future building development of the city.  
It remains to be seen if housing building and development can meet constantly rising 
demand.  
The government also encouraged the development of district-level integration 
programmes and directed funding towards each district through the Berlin Entwickelt Neue 
Nachbarschaften programme. Funding can then be put towards neighbourhood-level 
programmes, or district-wide programmes that work in conjunction with local organisations 
and refugeefacing NGOs.   
Though housing is an important issue in each district, there are no minimum standards 
set by the Berlin Senate for how the district should create access points for refugees to 
receive counselling about the housing process. Some districts (such as Treptow-Köpenik) 
have dedicated times for refugees to interact with both the government and native volunteers 
to have their housing questions answered, while others (such as Charlottenberg-Wilmersdorf) 
outsource housing competence to the local non-profits.  
Local non-profits, NGOs, and civil society groups play an integral part in both acting 
as welcome and support services for refugees, and as advocacy organisations on behalf of 
refugees, as the new government has increased the frequency of policy workshops and 
roundtables to include many organisations across Berlin that work both within a specific 




government on the side of the non-profits, they are generally more satisfied with the direction 
the new Berlin government has taken towards refugees.  
How Berlin ensures equal access to housing for refugees will determine integration 
outcomes and whether or not the newest arrivals to Germany become unintentionally, or 
otherwise, self-segregating. The next chapter will take into account the important aspects of 
the two case studies to best syncretise the successful practices in both cities into a functional 






















Chapter 7:  Policy Lessons: Constructing a theoretical 
framework for refugee housing governance   
7.1 Introduction  
The previous two chapters have demonstrated the similarities and differences in 
integration policy implementation between Leverkusen and Berlin, notably that while their 
governance structures are similar in how the city governments envision their respective 
housing policies to be implemented, there is a distinct difference between the cities in both 
the collaboration style between the government and its governance partners and the durability 
of the structures established to implement policy. From these examples and the prior 
theoretical sections, we will draw policy lessons of success and failure to develop our 
functionally specific theoretical framework as it pertains to refugee housing policy 
implementation.  
We will first discuss what it means for a policy to either succeed or fail, and whether 
or not failure within the realm of refugee integration policy is, to paraphrase the film Apollo 
13, ‘an option’. We will then elicit the strengths and weaknesses observed in governance and 
oversight of policy from both the Leverkusen and Berlin cases and juxtapose them with the 
ideal-type models and concepts we discussed in the chapter on multi-level governance 
through a discussion on how the respective policies may have succeeded or failed. 
Specifically, we will utilise Homsy, et al.’s (2019) framework for multi-level governance 
actor tracking to analyse why there are differentiations in policy outcomes between Berlin 
and Leverkusen despite similar governing structures, which will determine the four key 
variables we will use as the foundation of our theoretical framework. These factors will be 
expanded upon in section 7.3.  
After the section on core MLG variables, we will reflect on how housing choices and 




will involve reflecting on the differences between how the refugee residents of Berlin and 
Leverkusen perceive the respective cities either helped or hindered them acclimate to their 
new lives. Here we will link the interviews and observations conducted in the respective 
cities with the integration literature and what it tells us about what can be considered the most 
important aspects of integration into a new society, and what role housing plays in that, 
whether it plays any role at all. One of the key aspects that will be elicited from our analysis 
is the importance of community and neighbourhood immersion for refugee accommodations 
and private residences, which is key in ensuring that refugees have the opportunity to interact 
with the native population as well as access nearby social and economic infrastructure, i.e., 
parks, sports venues, shops, restaurants, etc, and the spaces in which curated interaction with 
the native population occurs, i.e. in sprachcafes and other community areas that promote 
interaction. Another key aspect is the quality of housing and the ability for refugees to obtain 
a modicum of agency over their housing options, whether it is in something as simple as 
decoration or in being able to navigate the rental market and obtain a residence of their own.   
We will then reflect on several models and definitions of refugee integration, notably 
Ager and Strang’s (2008) model, as well as how Berlin and North-Rhein Westphalia define 
integration and how they perceive integration should proceed. This is done to allow us to 
better understand the respective policies and the results of those policies in context, and 
reflect on whether those policies achieve their stated goals or could be improved upon.   
Finally, we will construct a conceptual theoretical framework based on the previous 
variables and justify the use of certain structures of governance and implementation over 
others. The framework will serve as an analytical tool through which we will reflect on how 
Berlin and Leverkusen structured their policies at the time of this study, and will hopefully be 
applicable to other cities and municipalities that find their refugee housing policies to be 





7.2 Success and Failure in Policy Implementation: An 
Overview  
While the phrases ‘policy failure’ or ‘policy success’ may elicit certain images of 
checklists and official reports of how resources were allocated, measuring the output against 
the desired outcome, or news articles decrying a policy as one or the other without a deep 
dive into what they mean, the reality of defining just what entails a ‘policy failure’ or 
‘success’ is far more vexing. If determining that a policy was either a success or a failure was 
a straightforward, quantifiable process, academia around the subject would not be so prone to 
argument about what can truly constitute either concept (see McConnell, 2015). As it is, we 
will attempt to syncretise the main points about defining both of the terms and establish a 
baseline of how we perceive success or failure in refugee housing policy, and how that 
reflects on the theoretical framework to be built at the end of this chapter.  
Both success and failure of policies and their objectives, unsurprisingly, exist in a 
spectrum of implementation and contextual analysis, as well as through perceptions of how 
policies change over time. As with any public policy, considerations have to be made as to 
the context in which it is developed, whether it has defined goals, what the targeted 
population is, what the unintended consequences were of the policy’s implementation, who 
were the main and secondary stakeholders, was there a power disparity in the relevant 
stakeholders, et al. before beginning an assessment of a policy’s success or failure 
(McConnell, 2015). Marsh and McConnell (2010: 571) highlight a heuristic guideline about 
how to assess policy success across three dimensions, the process (the development of the 
policy, i.e. the policymaking stages), the programmatic (the operations, the implementation, 
and the outcome), and the political (popular or not for the government), though it can apply 




the places where to look for evidence, i.e. in how the policy was implemented, who 
benefited, whether it was popular, etc.  
Failure (and success) of policies can be a result of the governance over 
implementation of a policy just as much as outside unrelated factors, such as a sudden 
economic shock or a natural disaster, or an unexpected mobilisation of civic engagement 
(Peters, 2015). Determining success and failure also lays on a spectrum; that is, policies may 
have succeeded to some degree in being designed with relatively high support from 
government and implemented ubiquitously, but the policy may be received poorly by the 
public even if it is effective in its goals, ultimately becoming unpopular with its 
implementation waning over time, i.e. a relative process and programmatic success, but a 
political failure (Marsh & McConnell, 2010: 578). One must also ask, for whom was the 
policy a success/failure (McConnell, et al., 2020)?   
In the case of refugee housing policy, what we search for in terms of benchmarks for 
policy success or failure is, similarly, piecemeal. Generally, we can refer back to Marsh & 
McConnell’s (2010: 580) and McConnell, et al.’s (2020) list of considerations when asking if 
a policy is successful or not, or somewhere in between: is the policy durable? Does it 
change/get amended often to contravene or winnow its original intentions, or does it become 
expanded? Whose interests are primarily being served by the policy? Are those interests 
onesided, i.e. in the interest of cost-savings on behalf of government budgets, or is there a 
dual interest for the public? Is it popular among the citizenry? How do we establish reference 
points to determine a baseline for success or failure? Can this policy be viewed in isolation as 
a success/failure, or was there an exogenous factor that altered the policy’s trajectory? What 
conflicts affected the policy’s implementation? These notions of temporality, maintenance, 
power relationships, popularity, connection to other related policies, and internal/external 




Policies regarding refugees are subject to endogenous and exogenous shocks that can 
change how policies are created, implemented, and received. The most obvious example is 
within Germany, which saw a number of new laws enacted at the federal level after 2014 to 
set deterministic restrictions on refugees45 as well as the rise of the far-right Alternative for 
Germany (AfD) party as a direct response to refugee arrivals. Where some states enacted 
more inclusive policies when compared to the national level, others whose electorates 
showed growing favour with the right-wing enacted harsher measures as a method to either 
exclude refugees from society or to deter them from arriving or remaining once their asylum 
cases are settled, while maintaining favour with voters who may turn away from the 
mainstream parties and support the AfD (see Christian & Schmidt-Catran, 2017, and Hamann 
& El-Kayed, 2018).  
For our study on refugee housing policy (and the neighbourhood integration policies 
that follow establishments of refugee accommodation), we can look at a spectrum of success 
and failure from Marsh & McConnell’s (2010) list of considerations, while adding an 
important one for the study of housing: delivery capacity, or the ability to continually provide 
a resource to attain a policy goal as needed. In our case, ‘housing’ is a limited and 
timedependent commodity, meaning that a government has a limited control over an issue of 
housing in general when a policy shock is immediate, i.e. in our case, the government may 
not have the capacity to ensure that all refugees gain private housing because housing 
occupancy rates are near full saturation (Hupe & Hill, 2014: 12). This entails the construction 
of temporary accommodations, another policy output orbiting the central issue of refugee 
housing and eventual normalised integration (i.e. employed, secured housing, etc.) into 
society.  
 





Our heuristic for analysing the spectrum of success or failure in the realm of refugee 
housing policies will take into consideration the following variables and the questions 
therein:  
1. Temporality:   
a. Was the existing policy (or policies) drastically altered, changed entirely  
(perhaps with the same name), or ended from its inception?   
b. Has the existing policy (or policies) enjoyed support over time from all 
relevant stakeholders, i.e. the government, refugee advocacy 
organisations, and the refugees themselves?  
2. Delivery capacity:  
a. Have the essential resources to the policy (in this case, housing) been 
maintained at sustainable levels? Have adjustments in resource numbers 
been required?  
b. Does the delivery capacity of the government to the specific policy depend 
on other unrelated policies?  
3. Power relationships:  
a. How are relationships between the power brokers (i.e. government and 
organisations implementing policy) and the receivers perceived and 
determined? How are the relationships between the government and 
organisations dedicated to implementing policy (if not the government  
itself)?  
4. Maintenance  
a. Does the policy still exist in the face of exogenous shocks? Has it been 




b. Has the policy been expanded upon, or have its precepts been adapted to 
other related orbital policies?  
These four variables were chosen because of how they associate with both refugee 
housing and the policies that surround refugee housing, such as how a city conducts or 
manages the neighbourhood integration policies that work around the refugee-specific 
accommodations, especially in times where asylum applications drop to miniscule numbers 
compared to 2014/2015 and fewer resources would be required. These variables also speak to 
the long-term nature of integration and the policies that surround them, as integration is a 
longitudinal process and cannot be understood as an action that can be implemented within a 
year or two (Goodman & Wright, 2015). For our assessments of success or failure, ‘success’ 
will largely depend on whether the policy has been maintained and will continue to exist with 
general support from all relevant parties. A policy that is maintained over time, with its 
power relationships kept relatively static in the face of little to no pushback by either voters 
or political processes, can be assumed to be generally ‘successful’, though even then, there 
are considerations.  
This leads us to the sticky subject of policy ‘goals’. The desired outcomes stated by a 
specific policy can be vague but proactive, i.e. ‘ensure as many refugees as possible do not 
become homeless’, or extremely specific, i.e. ‘ensure a consistent refugee private housing 
rate of at least 90% for all incoming refugees over the next ten years with a turnover rate 
within refugee accommodations of at least 50% year over year’. The latter can lend itself to a 
greater perception of failure than the former for obvious benchmarking reasons as well as a 
litany of problems with constant data-recording, which can also hamstring policy 
maintenance in times of sudden exogenous shocks. Policies with decidedly vaguer goals can 
thus be touted as relative successes if they can demonstrate moderate success over previous 




There are also dichotomous goals, of which the Leverkusen Model is an example:  
where the NGOs advocating for the Model desired to implement the policy to ensure that 
refugees are able to live in sanitary, stable housing, the city’s priority in implementing the 
Model was in cost-saving. This is an instance of having one’s cake and eating it too, at least 
in the sense that the two primary power brokers in the Model both achieved what they 
wanted without suffering at the expense of the other.   
Because goals are built on policy paradigms, i.e. political ideologies, they can also 
change with the electoral winds (Cairney, 2012: 228-230). If and how a policy is able to 
survive changes in the political landscape is also a determining factor to success and failure 
(a la temporality), and one that will be taken into account as we move ahead with our analysis 
of Berlin and Leverkusen.  
  
7.3 Governance and Government Structures  
7.3.1 Leverkusen  
As identified in the chapter covering Leverkusen, the city has maintained a direct 
collaborative partnership with both the local Caritas organisation and the Refugee Council to 
ensure a standard of governance and policy implementation over its housing and integration 
policies and programmes. Because the Leverkusen Model has been operating since 2002 and 
has seen reported success and satisfaction from both the Leverkusen government and its 
refugeefacing partners, there has been little reason to change or adjust the structure of the 
policy (Leverkusen civil servant interview, 2019).  
The sole changes within the scope of the policy has been the reopening of previously 
closed refugee accommodations due to the refugee influx of 2014/2015, though this was a 
temporary measure with accommodation space being centralised along with refugees moving 




the refugee accommodations are embedded within neighbourhoods, and each is staffed both 
by city social workers and employees of Caritas and the Refugee Council. This creates an 
incentive for transparency and accountability within the framework of the Type II MLG setup 
of the Model, both on the part of the city government and the organisations. As referred to in 
the chapter on Leverkusen, a resident of the accommodations was able to contact the city 
government directly and ensure that an abusive non-government employee was removed 
from their job at the accommodation, demonstrating the ties and assurances of accountability 
between the collaborating organisations within the Model (AML interview, 2019).  
A point of contention surrounding the housing is the development of a new refugee 
accommodation further outside a neighbourhood than any of the others, to the north of 
Leverkusen rather than being more centrally located within Leverkusen (David Nelson 
interview, 2019). Both local government civil servants and members of Caritas and the 
Refugee Council have voiced minor opposition to the location of the accommodation relative 
to the city centre when compared to the existing ones, though the new accommodation will 
have enough spaces to shut many modular accommodations across Leverkusen and will 
include Caritas care offices within the structure (Refugee council employee interview, 2019;  
Leverkusen civil servant interview, 2019).  
The Leverkusen government and its relevant civil servants meet regularly and 
informally (several times a week) with members of the various local neighbourhood groups, 
along with Caritas, the Refugee Council, and the other larger NGOs to ensure maximum 
transparency and information flow (David Nelson interview, 2019; Leverkusen civil servant 
interview, 2019; Caritas employee interview, 2019). All relevant Leverkusen government and 
NGO stakeholders who agreed to be interviewed for this study reported their relationships 
with their partners to be amicable; no requests for interviews with relevant stakeholders were 




directly for help in funding outreach events aimed at promoting inclusivity with refugees. 
The city government also promotes the creation of advocacy groups through consultations 
with relevant stakeholders and by providing areas in which to meet and organise (Andreas 
Laukötter interview, 2019).   
As opposed to Berlin, where the city government adjusted its policy several times 
over the past several years and faced pressure from refugee advocacy groups to include them 
in discussions regarding integration policies, the Leverkusen Model was pushed for by 
members of Caritas and the Refugee Council on the premise that moving refugees quickly 
into private apartments rather than maintaining refugee accommodations and tents would 
save the city money. Because of the declining asylum numbers in Germany throughout the 
late-2000s to early-2010s, the functionality of the Model precipitated the closure of most of 
the city’s refugee accommodations.   
With the recent increase in asylum applications, the Model was both able to adapt and 
grow to include greater community outreach and coordinated volunteer efforts through the 
long-established connections between the civil society groups and the local government. The 
Model also expanded to include larger NGOs that were not initially included in the Model, 
such as AWO, which were then able to offer community outreach programmes such as 
sprachcafes and volunteer initiatives to their local areas, among other offerings. While the 
refugee accommodations were reopened, the city government recognised the core issue 
surrounding private housing for refugees was the availability of housing for the general 
public (Stadt Leverkusen, 2017).   
While there has been some pushback in some districts of Leverkusen for having more 
refugees moved to certain accommodations or ensuring that private apartments/houses are 
available to refugees, the refugees have easy access to volunteers, both from the city 




the rental market (Caritas employee interview, 2019). This is done in part with both native 
German volunteers and with refugees who have gone through the process before and have 
acclimated to both the language and the necessary paperwork needed to rent a place. The 
refugee volunteers are able to translate documents for the newly-arrived refugees and confer 
with the Leverkusen government authorities overseeing the monthly monetary disbursement 
all refugees receive, as there are limits on rental contracts for refugees that may be difficult to 
understand for those who are new to the German system (AQL interview, 2019; KPL 
interview, 2019).   
The Model enjoys political support from not only the left SPD (currently in power), 
but also the centre-right CDU and CSU wings of the city government, meaning that it would 
likely remain constant as an anchored policy even if the city government were to shift 
rightward in an election (Leverkusen civil servant interview, 2019). The Model’s preference 
for privatised housing also encouraged the Leverkusen government to develop new housing 
with dedicated social housing structures (David Nelson interview, 2019).  
The city also expanded the core precepts of the model in 2017 by enacting a number 
of measures to formulate a broader neighbourhood/community-oriented basis for integration, 
with the refugee accommodations acting as the loci of these efforts. These efforts were done 
to promote contact between newly arrived refugees and native Germans, and was enacted in 
collaboration between the NGOs and the Leverkusen government (Stadt Leverkusen 
Kommunales Integrationszentrum, 2019). The ability of both the Leverkusen government and 
its governance partners to adapt the Model to the shifting circumstances of the exogenous 
shock demonstrates that the governance partners are able to engage in policy learning and 
adjustment for the shortfalls encountered, both within the circumstances of 
neighbourhoodlevel challenges46 and city-level challenges.  
 





The Leverkusen Model represents a circular or dome-shaped model of governance, 
where the main governance partners, i.e. the city government, Caritas, and the Refugee  
Council oversee refugee housing policy and implementation of integration efforts in tandem. 
Shared between the city government, Caritas, and the Refugee Council are the 
responsibilities for implementation, with clearly defined pathways for accountability, 
transparency, and policy entrepreneurship vis a vis the extended partnerships with the other 
participating NGOs. Through this circular model of Type II governance the civil society 
organisations are also able to encourage and enlist refugees as volunteers through a 
centralised focus on specific policy areas, either at the neighbourhood or city level, further 
reinforcing the Model’s aptitude to help newly-arrived refugees adapt to their new 
accommodation circumstances.   
7.3.2 Berlin  
As identified in the chapter covering its refugee and integration housing policy 
structure, Berlin engages in numerous public-private partnerships with both for-profit and 
non-profit organisations (as per Type II governance) which are managed by the Berlin 
government’s Landesamt für Flüchtlingsangelegenheiten (State Office for Refugee Affairs). 
Housing operations partners are found through contract tenders. The Landesamt does not 
select only one operator to oversee all its refugee accommodations; rather, it selects multiple 
to operate the numerous accommodations developed throughout the city.   
As noted, there have been incidents of recorded lack of oversight on behalf of the 
Berlin government in terms of ensuring the partners are held to a standard of regulation, 
which can be a by-product of multiple contract tendering over a single policy area (Cohen & 
Eimicke, 2011: 239-241). The most prominent example is that of Tamaja, the company 




of Tamaja were uncertain as to how the company was accountable to the Berlin government 
given the lack of a consistent city government presence on the premises, and if there was a 
feasible sense of transparency in its decisions regarding refugee complaints and 
subcontracting services (ET interview, 2018).  
The city of Berlin also contains a Type I MLG structure in how the Bezirke (districts) 
have administrative capacity over their small areas within the city; however, unlike a city 
within a state, the Bezirke do not have the capacity to create laws, only implement them in the 
way they see fit. Each Bezirke has different advice and offerings for accommodation-search 
counselling services, with some involving private partners (mainly local community non- 
profits).   
Though the Berlin Senate now holds regular monthly meetings with various refugee 
advocacy and stakeholder organisations to better coordinate integration and outreach efforts, 
this was not always the case. When the city became inundated with asylum applicants, its 
understaffed and underfunded asylum office (Sebastian Muschter Interview, 2018) was 
unable to adequately provide the compulsory necessities refugees were entitled to under 
Germany’s asylum law. Through this publicly perceived failure of policy implementation 
rose numerous civil society organisations to fill the gap and provide shelter for refugees with 
whatever means they had available. Even with these monthly meetings, some civil society 
and advocacy organisations are dissatisfied with what they perceive as reluctance on behalf 
of the city government to actively take the organisations’ consultations under consideration 
(Karen Windt Interview, 2018).  
While the city government developed quick accommodations (including Tempelhof), 
the civil society organisations continued to advocate on behalf of refugees, though there was 
a noted disconnect between the policies being formulated within the first Berlin Masterplan 




attempting to navigate the complex bureaucracy surrounding their statuses, their housing 
allowances, their allotted government funding, etc. (Christiane Beckmann interview, 2018; 
Julia von Stülpnagel interview, 2018). Given the factors of the language barrier, the stress of 
acclimation, and the lack of guidance on the part of the Berlin government, many civil 
society organisations developed an antagonistic attitude towards the city government because 
the organisations perceived the Berlin government at the time to prefer budgeting exercises 
over ensuring stable integration tracks for refugees (Andreas Tölke interview, 2018). While 
the Berlin government invited several organisations to discuss options and programmes, the 
organisations were often left feeling that they had not been listened to.  
Even now, the Berlin government faces ongoing criticism from many civil society 
organisations who see the Berlin government’s continued contracting of services to for-profit 
companies as undermining the integration efforts they do in favour of cutting expenditures or 
keeping the city’s budget in line (Karin Windt interview, 2018; Andreas Tölke interview, 
2018).   
Similarly with finding housing for refugees, accommodation development by the city 
has evolved from constructing temporary accommodation (of varying types) anywhere land 
can be obtained to ensuring that the accommodations are embedded within a neighbourhood 
rather than far away. However, these development plans sometimes face resistance and 
backlash from residents within the district neighbourhoods for approval, and it is not 
uncommon for residents to adopt a ‘not-in-my-backyard’ attitude (Berlin Senate  
Representative interview, 2018). This policy of neighbourhood consultation, while intuitively 
democratic and accessible to civil society, lacks a strong civic participation variable in the 
sense of requiring the potential refugee residents (or a representative of them, or an advocacy 
organisation) to sit in on the meetings or partake as a relevant stakeholder (Berlin Senate  




This relative disconnect between the Berlin government and the civil society 
organisations points to a more ‘umbrella-shaped’ model of cooperative governance, where 
the local government stands at the tip of the umbrella and the functionalities of policy 
governance are pointed downward towards the Bezirke and the contracted partners a la 
German ‘corporatism’ (Döhler, 2011: 523). The city’s government has discretion towards its 
housing and integration policy, which strongly favours immediate budgetary cost-savings as 
a priority (Kuhlmann, 2009). This is indicative of how Germany has postured its governance 
reforms since the 1990s, where broad policy goals are largely dictated vertically from the 
central government and the Länder while oversight/regulation/implementation maintenance 
is not uniform across the policy region within cities, and relies on more horizontal 
governance (a la Type II MLG) at the municipal level.   
In the differences between the two cities, we begin to see how each utilises type II 
MLG structures differently, which allows for us to reflect on the first two variables 
mentioned at the start of the chapter: first, while there was active civil society participation 
and entrepreneurship in Berlin and Leverkusen, the disconnect between civil society and the 
Berlin government at the time of the first Berlin Masterplan created tension between the 
Berlin government and civil society organisations, while in Leverkusen these organisations 
were largely ‘brought into the fold’ both by the Leverkusen government and its governance 
partner NGO Caritas; second, in Leverkusen that there is active collaboration between civil 
society and the city government, including fostering development of cultural groups to help 
represent refugee interests, which also fulfils our third variable, while comparatively Berlin 
only began direct consultations with refugee-facing groups only recently, an instance of 
policy learning and adjustment by a more politically left-leaning government. The next 
section will expand on these two variables by examining them through Homsy, et al.’s (2019)  





7.3.3 Derivations from the literature (key literature variables)- pulling out successes and 
failures  
When we juxtapose these two cities’ governance frameworks alongside the key MLG 
literature, we discover both how some policy areas can be considered failures, and how some 
can be considered successful and entrepreneurial. We begin with Homsy, et al.’s (2019) 
framework47 for tracking actor interactions within an MLG (specifically Type II) structure 
because of its ability to capture key elements while analysing MLG (see Schiller, 2018). The 
five key variables within the framework (summarised in Table 4) are:   
1. The coordinating and sanctioning role of a central authority;   
2. Engagement of civil society;  
3. Co-production of knowledge;   
4. Capacity provision; and   
5. Framing of co-benefits.  
  
  Leverkusen  Berlin  
Coordinating and sanctioning 
role of central authority  
City government has strong 
coordinating and sanctioning 
role while also maintaining 
active collaboration with NGO 
governance partners as equals 
in policy development and 
implementation; 
communication and meetings 
between the groups is constant 
and continuous  
The city brought in independent 
consulting company McKinsey 
& Co. to help organise its 
asylum infrastructure in 2015; 
election of a new government 
in 2016 changed the organising 
dynamic to become more 
inclusive for civil society 
organisations; initiated the  
BENN programme; now 
mandates refugee 
accommodations to be built 
within neighbourhoods  
Civil society engagement  Civil society groups, even 
those at the neighbourhood 
level, have access to 
government resources for 
integration programmes; 
volunteer utilisation is  
Experienced a massive flood of 
civil society engagement in 
light of the government’s 
failure to adjust to the refugee 
influx in 2015; organisations 
maintain independence away  
 
 




 coordinated between the civil 
service and the NGOs for 
where they are needed; new 
neighbourhood-oriented 
programmes (Willkommen in 
Quartier) are focussed around 
volunteers in the local 
community helping refugees 
acclimate to Leverkusen and  
Germany  
from coordinating with Berlin 
government; now invited to 
monthly meetings with the 
Berlin government to discuss 
integration matters, but NGOs 
still feel kept at arm’s length 
from being able to coordinate 
policy implementation with the 
government  
Co-production of knowledge  Because of the direct 
partnership between the 
government and the NGOs, as 
well as the inclusion of 
neighbourhood organisations 
and the development of 
refugee-representative 
organisations, the governance 
model can ensure that 
viewpoints and unique 
knowledge pertaining to 
refugee situations in  
Leverkusen are included in the 
knowledge base  
Initial developments of policy 
and integration programmes 
were conducted solely within 
the crafting of the first 
Masterplan, though this has 
now changed with more 
inclusion of the civil society 
organisations; civil society 
organisations still feel they are 
outside the range of being 
impactful on how Berlin 
implements its refugee housing 
and integration policies  
Capacity provision  The Leverkusen Model was 
able to provide refugees access 
to both the housing market and 
integration benefits through a 
centralised, coordinated effort 
from the governance partners 
and the utilisation of civil 
society; as demonstrated, there 
is a consistent level of refugees 
moving from the 
refugeespecific 
accommodations into private 
accommodations  
Initial capacity to provide basic 
accommodations and services 
was lacking and required a  
disjointed effort by  
independent volunteer services 
to come to the aid of the 
refugees; accommodations  
were built far from 
communities, leaving refugees 
difficult access to Berlin; now 
more durable and spacious 
accommodations are being built 
in neighbourhoods; housing 
options are still inconsistent for 
refugees with the city 
government recommending 





Framing of co-benefits  The city saves money on its 
refugee expenditures, and 
refugees are better able to both 
support the Leverkusen Model 
by volunteering and are able to 
enter into work/education faster 
through the faster immersion 
into society; because the 
Leverkusen Model does not 
discriminate based on asylum 
status, refugees are better able 
to start integration  
The city continues to prioritise 
cost-savings in how it chooses 
its housing operators though it 
has recognised the need to face 
its housing crisis and has 
implemented a rent freeze and 
building programme to ensure 
that there will be more places 
not just for refugees, but for the 
city’s overall growing 
population; refugees still 
require help from civil society  
 immediately rather than being  
left to wait in uncertainty; 
Leverkusen enacting new 
construction programme to 
adjust to rising population  
organisations disconnected 
from the Berlin government,  
though the BENN programme 
seeks to adjust that  
Table 4- A summary of the actor tracking variables using Homsy, et al.'s (2019) MLG tracking framework. 
 
7.3.3.1 Leverkusen  
The city government’s coordinating and sanctioning role with the Model leads to the 
inclusion of civil society, where there is an overt and obvious inclusion of civil society in 
both the development and implementation of the policy as key stakeholders. Communication 
with the Leverkusen government is facilitated through active meetings and contact points 
with the city government’s civil service, while even smaller community organisations and 
churches/mosques are able to engage directly with the city government for neighbourhood 
integration programmes. Because refugee accommodations are based in neighbourhoods, 
both the larger NGOs not already given a collaborating role in the Leverkusen Model 
(Diakonie, AWO, etc.) and the smaller community groups can facilitate refugee entrance into 
German society.   
Additionally, the city has volunteer coordinators in its civil service that also 
coordinate volunteer activities with the NGOs. Communication is regular and often, and 




must attend a doctor’s appointment but is uncertain of the procedure how, or does not yet 
know conversational German.   
Co-production of knowledge within the Leverkusen Model has an interesting history, 
given that, before the Model’s inception, the refugee-facing NGOs had an antagonistic 
relationship with the city’s government. There was reluctance on the Leverkusen 
government’s part to engage in directly finding private housing for refugees, as some in the 
city government viewed the poor conditions in the camps and tents as a deterrent to prevent 
more refugees from wanting to stay in the city, thus ‘lowering costs’ (Refugee council 
employee interview, 2019). Caritas and the Refugee Council engaged directly with members 
of the city government who were concerned with the poor conditions refugees were 
experiencing, which gradually enabled the two organisations to propose the underlying 
structure of the Leverkusen Model to the Leverkusen government’s leadership: by actively 
seeking to move refugees into private housing, the city can save costs it would normally 
spend on upkeep for accommodations/tents.   
Capacity provision is not an issue within the scope of the Model: because all relevant 
organisational players have a seat at the table or can directly discuss needs and ideas with the 
city government, they are free to provide organisational capacity as is necessary. An example 
of this is the Leverkusen Integrationsrat, which provides a regular, secure space and 
encourages communication and the formulation of interest groups that can assist newly 
arrived refugees in acclimating to life in Germany. The Integrationsrat is thus able to provide 
the material needed for refugee advocacy groups while the advocacy groups are then able to 
provide support services to refugees. Similarly, the refugee accommodations owned by the 
city are co-staffed by members of Caritas and the Refugee Council, which are able to bring 
along refugee volunteers to help in translation and acculturation services for the newly 




organisations that work directly with refugees, such as churches and mosques, which can then 
provide spaces both for social activities or for education services for children and adults 
(Jürgen Dreyer interview, 2019). The open lines of communication between the city 
government and the community organisations ensures that maximum knowledge and material 
capacity can be brought to use.  
Finally, co-benefits have been framed since the inception of the Model in 2002: the 
city saves money on the cost of maintaining refugee accommodations by encouraging 
refugees to move into private housing and the NGOs achieve their goal of ensuring that the 
refugees are better able to settle down in Germany. While it may seem counter-intuitive that 
the city would save money on refugee expenses because the city (and the state) are obliged to 
cover (at least a portion of) rents and a monthly stipend to refugees, the city does not need to 
hire personnel for security, cleaning, upkeep, etc. for the accommodation itself, as the refugee 
accommodations are not built for long-term dwelling and require maintenance. Unexpected 
co-benefits are that refugees helped by the system are likely to reinforce it in some way, 
either by volunteering occasionally or actively working on behalf of the city or the NGOs to 
help other refugees (AQL, BQL, KPL interviews, 2019). This cycle helps to encourage 
refugees to learn German faster and participate in the economy, ultimately creating a boon for 
the city.   
Further, because of Germany’s sectoral worker shortage, many refugees are entering 
fields that have high demand but low entry. A natural consequence of facilitating a refugee’s 
entry into society through a model of civic participation and active housing aid is ensuring 
that those job shortages are filled.   
Assessing the success/failure of the Leverkusen Model is a streamlined task: the 
Model’s implementation has not ceased since its creation in 2002 and is politically popular 




tenets have expanded into other facets of refugee integration policy, such as language classes, 
and has spurred the expansion of tangential policies such as development of housing 
throughout the city and neighbourhood integration policies. We can consider this a strong 
success, as it is supported by the Leverkusen government, those in the civil service who work 
with and within the refugee accommodations, and the refugees themselves, who have stated 
they are thankful that Leverkusen allows them the option to gain their own housing 
regardless of asylum status (KPL interview, 2019; Leverkusen civil servant interview, 2019).  
  
7.3.3.2 Berlin  
It is initially clear that the coordinating and sanctioning role of a central authority is 
placed strictly within the confines of the Berlin government; however, when we pull back to 
view the circumstances around Berlin’s development of its integration Masterplan in 2016, 
the coordinating role becomes muddled. The Berlin government brought in consultants from 
consulting group McKinsey to help organise and develop Berlin’s response to the refugee 
influx with consultant Sebastian Muschter becoming temporary head of Lageso, suggesting 
that the city government itself was unable to adapt with its organisational structure as it was 
and could not adjust on its own because of a lack of provision over the previous years 
(Muschter, 2018). This could be due to the city government’s own obstinacy regarding the 
role Germany would eventually play in the run-up to the Summer of Migration (Sebastian 
Muschter Interview, 2018), but it is clear that, at the time, the Berlin’s government’s response 
was uncoordinated, prompting the development of ‘subversive humanitarianism’ through 
local civic organisations and volunteer initiatives specifically to counter perceived 
government apathy or inaction (Vandevoordt & Verschraegen, 2019: 105).  
Since that time, the Berlin government has taken a more front-foot approach with 
regard to its refugee housing policy, such as mandating that communities cannot block 




Senate Representative Interview, 2018) and that the Tempelhof facility would be closed and 
moved to a former hospital, where living conditions would be far more amicable for the 
refugees and the costs of maintenance would be far lower. However, secondary policies 
surrounding refugee housing, such as active counselling and help for refugees trying to enter 
the rental market, are left up to the Bezirke to dictate and local organisations to navigate48.  
This leaves refugees with varying degrees of help depending on where they live within the  
city.   
Engagement of civil society organisations has not been an issue in Berlin, as 
previously stated; however, we must make the distinction between civil society being 
engaged with the issues surrounding refugee housing and integration policy, and the Berlin 
government engaging directly with civil society. Organisations such as Be an Angel had to 
actively represent refugees in court against the city to ensure that they were receiving the 
appropriate benefits to which they were legally entitled (Andreas Tölke interview, 2018), 
while other organisations actively found themselves at odds with the Berlin government and 
its position regarding the Tempelhof facility, construction of accommodations in remote 
areas, etc. This testy relationship has gradually been eased with the new Berlin government’s 
mandate of regular meetings with NGO and organisational stakeholders, however these 
organisations still find themselves at an arm’s length from direct partnership with the Berlin 
government.   
Cost-effectiveness as a motive still predominates with the current Berlin government, 
as an employee of the Landesamt stated that while they had trialled partnering with nonprofit 
organisations to operate refugee accommodations, the Berlin government found they could 
contract out the services more cheaply to a for-profit company (Landesamt employee 
interview, 2018).   
 




Similarly, under suggestion from the 2016 Masterplan for Integration, Berlin 
partnered with NGO Evangelisches Jugend- und Fürsorgewerk (EJF), which was already 
helping refugees find rooms and apartments throughout the city. The partnership was unique 
in that EJF dealt directly with landlords and letting organisations on behalf of refugees. The 
partnership was ended near the end of 2018 and the responsibilities were transferred to the 
specific Bezirksamter (district offices), with the likely reason being to save on costs (EJF 
interview, 2018).  
Another reason may be the Berlin government’s reaction, or lack thereof, to the 
refugee influx in 2014/15. After years of the Berlin government trimming back Lageso’s 
personnel and operating budget (Muschter, 2018), the office was perceived as being both 
ineffectual and apathetic to the needs and issues facing asylum seekers, precipitating in both 
the office space being relocated to a different part of the city and the office itself being 
rebranded as the Landesamt (Christiane Beckmann interview, 2018).  
Co-production of knowledge, as it concerns Berlin’s refugee housing policy, is 
another scattered area. On the one hand, the 2016 Masterplan involved the input from several 
refugee advocacy groups, but at the same time held little in terms of practical implementation 
ideas (Sebastian Muschter interview, 2018). On the other hand, NGOs and refugee advocacy 
groups found their efforts to interact with the Berlin government in terms of crafting policy 
ideas to be either stymied or ignored. This has, of course, changed with the reformulation of 
policies, where various NGOs now have monthly meetings with the city government to 
exchange knowledge and detail programmes; however, this is a far cry from the refugee-
facing organisations having more direct input into policy formulation or implementation. 





Capacity provision, where the government mobilises material and intangible 
resources (such as consulting those with specialist knowledge), is another complex area for 
Berlin. When the city faced its administrative failings, it reached out to McKinsey& Co. to 
structure its policy response rather than operating with refugee-facing organisations. This 
could be understood as the city wishing to create a structured, formalised policy framework 
through which it can work and eventually formulate more specific policy responses; however, 
there was a discrepancy between the material capacity mobilised by the Berlin government 
and the knowledge/practical capacity mobilised by the organisations. The city’s refugee 
accommodations were initially placed wherever land could be obtained, something to which 
the refugee-facing organisations strongly objected. When refugees attempted to obtain private 
residences, they found both issues of discrimination and cost, as private rents nearly doubled 
in Berlin from the period between 2009 and 2019 (Investitionsbank Berlin, 2019). The money 
allotted to refugees for living expenses and rent coverage was becoming insufficient (Karin 
Windt interview, 2018).  
Organisations such as Flüchtlinge Willkommen that work directly with refugees and 
landlords to secure places in private apartments or houses also began to recognise the 
difficulty and disparities between those with different statuses assigned by Germany (for 
instance, ‘tolerated’ status versus full asylum) where full asylum gets more immediate rights 
and ‘tolerated’ must have a waiting period before moving into a private accommodation, 
which can invariably delay or impact a refugee’s opportunity to integrate (Flüchtlinge 
Willkommen interview, 2018).   
For Berlin, framing of co-benefits became the most pressing matter in 2015 with 
Lageso’s administrative failure. In this case, the immediate benefit was obvious: helping 
refugees and shaping up the administrative shortfalls of the Berlin government. However, 




crisis in Berlin and how, even before refugees arrived in 2014/2015, availability and 
construction of housing as a corollary of the city’s increasing population had fallen off 
considerably (Investitionsbank Berlin, 2019). This forced the city to not only engage in 
building new apartment complexes, but also instituting a 5-year rent freeze for all residents as 
well as increased investment in social housing availability.  
Much as Bavaria demonstrated the benefits of accelerated workforce training and 
entrances for refugees, another obvious co-benefit to ensuring that refugees can establish a 
sense of stability and security is their ability to obtain work, pay taxes, and participate in 
society and the economy.  
We can identify the relative successes and failures within Berlin’s policy landscape 
since 2014 through our previously mentioned variables of temporality, delivery capacity, 
power relationships, and maintenance: the exogenous shock of Angela Merkel’s suspension 
of the Dublin Regulation exception for asylum applications exposed the general neglect of 
Berlin’s asylum office operating capacity (Sebastian Muschter interview, 2018). Thus, policy 
was completely reformulated, with a new office for asylum created through the first Berlin 
Masterplan (2016). We can call existing Berlin asylum support policies at that point both 
political and implementation failures given popular support to revamp the city’s asylum 
infrastructure.  
The policy landscape after that becomes more relativistic. For construction of refugee 
accommodations before the second Berlin Masterplan (2018), the city government may argue 
that the policy was successful, as numerous accommodations were developed quickly and 
refugees were housed in these places, with a centralised first reception centre constructed at 
Tempelhof to handle initial asylum cases. As previously mentioned, the refugee 
accommodations were constructed anywhere land was available, including far from 




2018). It was not uncommon to see refugees overstay the maximum recommended time of 
stay within Tempelhof, and refugee rights advocates continuously criticised its managing 
company and the Landesamt for poor oversight of the facility (Christiane Beckmann 
interview, 2018; Karin Windt interview, 2018).   
With the election of the red-red-green coalition government in 2016, the second 
Berlin Masterplan was developed in 2018 and a new residential locality requirement for 
refugee accommodations was implemented, altering the policy espoused in the previous 
Masterplan. The Tempelhof facility’s use was not renewed and was closed at the end of 2019, 
with its operations moving to a defunct hospital in another district. Thus, that policy was a 
(relative) political and implementation success for those who developed it at the time, though 
the alteration indicates that it was not favourable with the new governing coalition.   
The new governing coalition also instituted monthly meetings with relevant NGOs 
and community-based organisations after recognising the essential work these organisations 
did while the Berlin government was unable to accommodate all refugees. This we can 
consider a relative success on behalf of the organisations and the Berlin government, though 
some of the groups still remain sceptical that the Berlin government will actively heed their 
advice (Andreas Tölke interview, 2018).   
The differences and similarities between Berlin and Leverkusen are clear, even while 
their governance structures are both Type II MLG: greater communication and collaboration 
between local government and the refugee advocacy organisations allowed for greater policy 
clarity and implementation of both specific housing policies and the neighbourhood 
integration policies that followed. The essential difference, as referred to by Kjær (2004: 
4447), is the utilisation and management of a policy implementation network versus a policy 
hierarchy, i.e. fostering a community-based approach to policy implementation versus 




governance allows for the inclusion of relevant actors while keeping the city government as a 
key stakeholder in oversight of a policy issue (Piattoni, 2010: 22).  
We can infer that success or failure of refugee housing policy, or at least how durable 
a policy is, relies on the approach of the city government towards implementing uniform 
standards across its jurisdiction as well as continuous transparency and consultation with its 
refugee-facing implementation partners. In other words, rather than taking a ‘feudal’ 
approach where oversight of an issue is delegated outwards, government (and refugees) 
benefit from active government participation and coordination in refugee housing because of 
ensured standards of policy and regulatory maintenance.  
Local governments taking a more central role in actively collaborating and partnering 
with the established non-profit organisations also acted as a way to mobilise organised 
volunteer efforts, thus ensuring positive contact between refugees and Germans, who can 
provide the refugees with accurate information because of the coordinated programmes 
established by the city government and the organisations.  
  
From our juxtaposition and analysis of the two cities, we can simplify our four 
variables of successful policy through a type-II MLG structure into the following:  
1. Active civic participation and entrepreneurship is co-dependent with city 
government leadership in creating a sustainable policy implementation structure, 
both for ensuring continuous operational support for policy as well as political 
support; government support for volunteer services should be continuous and 
localised around refugee accommodations to promote interaction between natives 
and refugees;  
2. Direct, transparent, and active collaboration and coordination between civil 




successful policy governance where power relationships between them are 
balanced, especially in policy areas where civil society groups contain greater 
subject area and operational knowledge; city governments must also maintain 
consistent standards for its accommodations, including in the utilisation of 
operators, with strong mechanisms for oversight over the internal operations of 
the accommodations to ensure transparency of standards;  
3. Direct consultations with refugee advocacy groups (both separate NGOs and local 
cultural/religious organisations) is essential in formulating an adequate policy 
response so as to understand cultural nuances and differences that may arise 
between the expectations of the local government and the arrived refugees; and  
4. There must be multiple avenues for dynamic policy adjustment in the face of 
recognisable policy failure or shortcomings, either through city government 
intervention, civil society organisational challenges, or a combination therein.  
These lessons and variables will be carried over into the development of the 
framework in section 7.5. The next section will discuss the other side of the study, 
perceptions of integration and housing’s role in it.  
  
7.4 A Focus on Integration Variables and Housing  
This section will utilise several of the key concepts and theories from the integration 
and housing literature to analyse the responses collected from the interviews conducted in 
Berlin and Leverkusen. The purpose of this analysis is to elicit the pragmatic experiences of 
what helped and hindered refugees from both achieving a ‘feeling’ of integration and what 
role housing played in that experience. Because integration is a subjective experience, 




Those variables will then be considered and utilised in constructing the theoretical 
framework in the next section. We will look at 3 factorial levels of integration perceptions: 
what the individual refugee feels helped them personally either feel integrated, or helped 
them along the path to fuller integration; what the individual felt about their interactions with 
the community around them, i.e. whether their community interactions were restricted to 
fellow Syrians or native Germans; and how housing affected their integration perspectives, if  
at all.  
  
7.4.1 Personal factors  
One commonality shared between almost all the interview participants was the 
difficulty and the awkwardness they felt in trying to speak with Germans they did not already 
know. Some of the anxiety and hesitancy felt by the interview participants came down to the 
broadcasting and increased voter share of the far-right Alternativ für Deutschland (AfD) 
party at the time and its views on culling numbers of asylum seekers and migrants, as well as 
restricting benefits to refugees (BD interview, 2018; HD interview, 2018; LW interview, 
2018). Others felt the anxiety of their precarious situations and their backgrounds, mixed with 
harmful right-wing rhetoric and the imposition of having to adapt to a new culture that was 
not as familiar as that back in Syria weighed on them in such a way that they could not relate 
to Germans (MD interview, 2018).  
  However, all interview participants expressed a desire to interact more with Germans 
and make more German friends. An obvious hindrance to this, however, is language. Given 
that hardly any Syrians came to Germany with knowledge of German, much of their 
communication had to be in English or through a translator as respondents stated many civil 
servants refused to converse about the asylum process in English. The interactions refugees 




society and the systems in which they now had to operate. One refugee who worked 
extensively with other refugees stated “[s]o I can tell you here in Germany from first step to 
now, and this everybody says, it’s a matter of luck. How the employee can help and support 
you, your life will be changed. (QD interview, 2018)”  
  What this suggests, and is integral within Berry’s (2006) acculturation model, is that 
how society presents itself to the individual is as important as the individual’s efforts to settle 
into society. How this is done can vary extensively with disparate results: a government-led 
intervention to ensure amiable contact through mobilising its civic volunteers would differ 
considerably from a laissez-faire, disorganised civil society effort to aid. There are obviously 
many degrees of implementations between those two extremes, one of which can be seen in 
Berlin’s unprepared and understaffed immediate response to the refugees who had to wait 
outside the asylum offices for many nights in a row (QD interview, 2018; Karin Windt 
interview, 2018). This further reinforces Bourhis, et al.’s (1997) main finding, that how a 
government intervenes will determine how a new population can begin its acculturation 
process.  
  Across all interview partners, all agreed that establishing connections with Germans 
was the most important way not only to begin feeling more comfortable in Germany, but to 
find a place to live. Given the housing shortages in many German cities, almost all refugee 
respondents found their housing through friends and volunteers: in Berlin, 83% of 
respondents (10 out of 12) found their living arrangements at the time of interview (or if their 
housing situation changed after the interview) through friends, volunteers, or NGO workers 
rather than through city government allocation; in Leverkusen, 71% of respondents (5 out of 
7) found their housing through friends/volunteers, though they started in government 




refugee respondents never stayed in refugee accommodations because of the help of the civil 
society groups and volunteers.  
  Even in Leverkusen where the local government’s response was not as unprepared as 
Berlin’s, the civil society response formed the strongest base on which refugees could find 
places to live and begin acclimating to German society. However, this response was done in 
conjunction with the Leverkusen government rather than due to its perceived impotence, and 
led to streamlining some refugees as volunteer workers (AQL interview, 2019).   
For those refugees who arrive with family, have family already in Germany, or have 
family in Syria who are trying to reach Germany, an integral part of their integration journey 
is ensuring that the family is able to remain together, or ensuring that they can arrive in 
Germany with a secured status. One respondent experienced a great deal of stress with the 
housing authorities in Berlin because he [an adult] was not able to stay with his younger 
brother [a minor], who was staying in a youth camp before his family was able to arrive (PD 
interview, 2018).  
Other refugees hold a constant anxiety over their families’ situations in Syria, given 
many escaped the country to avoid being forced to fight for Assad’s government and now 
fear their families may face reprisal for that action (MPL interview, 2019). Reunification with 
one’s loved ones brings a sense of relief as well as a sense of home, and the family member 
who has resided in Germany longer can give extensive help for their family members’ 
acclimation (DD interview, 2018).   
This points to an important delineation between housing and home (Parsell, 2012), 
and it is one that must be taken into account when states/cities make integration policies: 
family constitutes an integral aspect of integration for those whose loved ones are not yet 




Along with that, all refugee interview partners stated that a fast transition to 
normalised housing (especially without status renewal burdens) was key in lending them a 
sense of stability and safety from which they could pursue education, work, or simply focus 
on a return to a sense of normalcy. This entails a troubled consideration of differences 
between asylum statuses, where one status will allow for family reunification while another is 
severely restricted, which will be delineated below.  
  
7.4.2 Community access   
For refugee accommodations based in communities, organisations near or within that 
community are able to provide social programmes or events both within and around refugee 
accommodations (Jürgen Dreyer interview, 2019). In Leverkusen, sprachcafes are offered by 
NGOs as a way through which refugees can interact with Germans and learn about German 
society, as well as for Germans to learn about refugees (KPL interview, 2019). This serves a 
dual purpose: helping refugees overcome the fear of interaction and anxiety that comes with 
being immersed in a different culture, and removing any sort of perceived stigma that 
Germans may have about refugees, i.e. by actively promoting contact between the perceived 
‘different groups’, the boundaries of differentiation can gradually lower (Allport, 1954).   
Sprachcafes are also places for refugees to make friends which, as previously stated, 
is possibly the most important method by which to find housing in Germany by making 
contacts. For Leverkusen, because there is a lower barrier for refugees to enter housing, this 
can mean an accelerated private space away from the often crowded and lower-privacy 
refugee accommodations with the right connections (KPL interview, 2019; YSL interview, 
2019).  
Having a centred community meeting place, such as a sprachcafe, also encourages 




arrived refugees who are still uncertain of how, for example, to find housing. Refugees 
already familiar with German can help bridge communication gaps (KPL interview, 2019; 
AQL interview, 2019).  
  An interesting model of community access is that run by the organisations Give 
Something Back to Berlin (GSBTB) and Refugio, which operates within a network of other 
community and refugee-facing organisations. Within the organisations (and the building 
itself) is a ‘sharehaus’ model of housing for refugees, with German residents also living in 
the building side-by-side. Refugees are able to obtain apartments in the building, while 
downstairs is a café and community space where sprachcafes and other community 
interaction events occur regularly. “I would say, for the newcomers, it is a motivation to 
reach for a stable life in Germany. We could just support them, with answering letters, being 
there, encourage each other to not be frustrated with all the paperwork. (Give Something  
Back to Berlin interview, 2018)”  
  Much like the Startblok programme in Amsterdam (see Czischke & Huisman, 2018), 
GSBTB and Refugio formed a community around refugees rather than implanting refugees 
into a community. In Berlin’s case, this kind of community establishment may be a 
consequence of relative organisational detachment from city government policies regarding 
refugee housing. While Give Something Back to Berlin began in 2013, the Refugio concept 
began the Summer of Migration in 2015, as a response to the influx and the lack of organised 
or focused centralised response to homeless refugees (Give Something Back to Berlin 
interview, 2018; Katina Schubert interview, 2018).   
  
7.4.3 Housing as the ‘base’  
Housing emerged as a focal point when refugees arrived in Germany, both in practical 




immediately despite the lack of prepared areas by the government. Questions arose about 
housing allowances and allocations: should refugees be given the right to obtain a private 
accommodation upon arrival, or must they wait in a refugee accommodation? Should there be 
a minimum amount of time spent in an accommodation? Should there be a maximum amount 
of time? Should these accommodations be made temporary with materials only rated to last 
up to 10 or so years, or should they eventually be converted into fully functional residences? 
Most importantly, where should accommodations be built, if they are built? What space is 
there to convert into at least a temporary residence?  
Each state and city in Germany handled these questions differently leading to 
different outcomes for refugees.   
We start, first, with refugee-specific accommodations. In Berlin, these were 
constructed quickly with materials typically only rated to last a limited amount of time, and 
were operated by a number of different organisations under Senate remit. One of the most 
visible refugee residences was the one at Tempelhof airfield, on which modular 
accommodations were constructed. While monitored by the local Bezirksamt, a civil servant 
working in the office expressed frustration with how the Senate and Landesamt handled its 
contracting process and how often operators changed, which also changed oversight 
interaction (Tempelhof Bezirksamt representative interview, 2018).  
  The constant change of housing operators in Berlin caused frustration for refugees 
and care workers given the different standards under which each company would operate. 
Further, the respondents interviewed did not want to spend time in the accommodations 
because they were so crowded, noisy, and had poor climate controls (LD interview, 2018; PD 
interview, 2018; Christiane Beckmann interview, 2018; et al.). Many spent their time going 
to places where they could meet others, either community spaces such as those offered by 




virtually no way to learn or retain German while learning it if one were to stay in the 
accommodations all the time (KD interview, 2018; KPL interview, 2019; YSL interview, 
2019). Another reason is the lack of privacy found in accommodations, as, depending on the 
accommodation, one individual could share a small room with three others, or more, an 
obvious health hazard and a cause of conflicts between those sharing a space (HD interview,  
2018; YSL interview, 2019).   
  Location thus becomes a central aspect in refugee housing, especially in first 
reception and subsequent refugee accommodations. Refugees who are placed in 
accommodations in remote areas will not have access to community resources, such as those 
made available by community-oriented organisations and NGOs.   
  Families that arrive together will also typically first be placed into a refugee 
accommodation, though depending on which accommodation it is, the size of the space may 
vary considerably: “[W]e were four people in like a 20-meter room... It was pretty small. We 
barely, we literally slept next to each other and it was, we were lucky that it was winter, I 
can’t even imagine it in summer. But it was so annoying because, my sister is 28, my father 
is older than old, plus of course and I’m not a child anymore and I would like my privacy, all 
of us would. (ZD interview, 2018)”  
  The city of Berlin recommends for refugees to stay in refugee accommodations 
(heims or modular accommodations) for longer durations of time because of how 
oversaturated the private housing market is (Land Berlin, 2019). However, not all refugees 
were aware that they had the right to search for private apartments in Berlin, sometimes due 
to implicit policies stating that social workers should encourage refugees to remain in the 
accommodations (Hamann & El-Kayed, 2018), a misapprehension experienced by a 
respondent where she was informed that if she tried to rent a private place before obtaining 




 Moving into a private space for a refugee is an uncertain and anxious process, as QD 
described (QD interview, 2018). There is a language and comprehension gap with regard to 
how rental processes work. Some of the interview partners in Leverkusen had guidance from 
volunteers who went along with them to meet landlords and view apartments/rooms in order 
to ensure the refugees get fair treatment, as it is common that refugees may be taken 
advantage of when searching for places to rent. Many respondents, both refugee and NGO 
workers/advocates, said it was common knowledge that there are landlords who charge 
several thousand more euros than should be allowed under the law, with some respondents 
admitting to paying more because they do not want to deal with legal issues and simply 
wanted a place to live (QD interview, 2018; ZD interview, 2018; Karin Windt interview, 
2018).  
  Lack of guidance about how housing policies and the rental market work can act as a 
detriment towards integration, given the inherent untrustworthiness of having to pay 
excessive amounts of their monthly stipend/income towards renting a place that may 
otherwise be affordable, and impresses further anxiety about monetary security. In this case, 
structuring a stable volunteer-guided programme, such as that which occurs within 
Leverkusen, becomes a method by which to cut through any shady dealings that are likely to 
arise when refugees attempt to tackle the housing market without any prior experience or 
knowledge.    Related to this, because of the over-saturation of the German housing market, 
the most common way refugees and non-refugees alike find housing (especially in Berlin) is 
by word of mouth or through friends. Almost all of the respondents living in private 
accommodations found their place through friends or contacts rather than through formal 
‘room available’ ads. This points to the absolute importance of encouraging the growth of 
contact networks (i.e. social bonds and bridges from Ager and Strang, 2008) among refugees 




2015), as those respondents who lived with Germans said they acquired the language faster 
than when they were living either in refugee accommodations or among non-German 
speakers (XD interview, 2018; DD interview, 2018), and those who were in school or 
studying while living in the accommodations had trouble due to the noise, lack of privacy, or 
poor climate control (HD interview, 2018; PD interview, 2018).  
  As one would expect in a crowded city, many refugees end up in homeless shelters. 
Unfortunately there is no solid measurement of how many refugees have to resort to living in 
a shelter, but even refugees who can speak good German and have jobs have to live in 
shelters even while the conditions are poor (BD interview, 2018). Currently, Berlin has 
enacted a new programme to set aside housing for both homeless and refugees, however this 
has come under criticism by refugee advocacy groups as treating refugees as if they were in 
the same qualification as chronically homeless, where afflictions and health issues would be 
the same between the two (Christiane Beckmann interview, 2018).   
  One of the primary difficulties faced by refugees in attempting to attain or maintain a 
private residence is trying to navigate the paperwork and bureaucracy implemented by the 
state. In Berlin, because refugees have to answer to different offices about their living status, 
job status, etc., and often must send their important documents to these individual offices for 
weeks or months at a time while simultaneously needing those documents to search for a 
place to live, they experience a great deal of stress about their housing status, as well as their 
permanent residency (DD interview, 2018; ZD interview, 2018; Andreas Tölke interview, 
2018). Because of the competitive rental market, by the time refugees get clearance to move 
the room may be taken. They may also miss out on other opportunities (class registrations, 
ausbildung programmes, etc.) because they do not have their official documents on hand.   
They often require help from friends or volunteers to understand the technical 




confusing or excessive and the requirements to be arduous: “If for a German people it’s 
complicated, how could we do it, explain it? How could we make it? That was a big problem 
for us, and sometimes I ask, when it’s so complicated for a German person, why the office 
didn’t make a simple solution, simple rules about it that they make it in an easy language so 
people can understand it? (AWL interview, 2019)”  
  While both cities face housing shortages and difficulties constructing new housing, 
maintaining a model of structured support and contact between refugees and civil society 
determines the difference between proactive and delayed private housing, which, as 
previously demonstrated, is a primary indicator that one’s integration process is well 
underway.   
  States of private housing and apartments can vary widely given location and general 
upkeep; however, all respondents who were in private residences rather than refugee 
accommodations expressed both relief and happiness that they were not living in the 
accommodations anymore. While it may be unreasonable to demand that every refugee be 
allotted a private apartment upon arrival, it is important to recognise the necessity for a 
person to have privacy, stability, and a sense of agency over their choices in life after having 
to flee a traumatic situation. Housing, specifically the ability for refugees to attain private 
residences, should be a priority for cities when deciding how to structure their policies 
regarding refugee reception.  
  Table 5 summarises the objectives for both the government and the civil society 
organisations in the realms of governance and integration. The next section will take the 
important aspects and variables surrounding policy implementation and governance 
described in the MLG section and the variables around integration and housing presented in 









  Government  Civil society organisations  
Governance objectives  ● Ensuring a sustainable population 
turnover within refugee 
accommodations with expeditious 
asylum decisions  
● Maintaining a steady rate of new 
housing construction throughout 
city for general populace, including 
subsidised housing for  
low-income groups  
● Ensuring provision of formal 
government integration benefits  
● Ensuring development of further 
refugee accommodations, if 
needed, are situated within  
communities  
● Maintaining active and consistent 
communication and collaboration 
with governance partners  
● Ensuring government meets 
legal standards for wellbeing of 
refugees  
● Providing platforms for 
volunteer initiatives and 
supporting refugees with those 
initiatives  
● Oversee volunteers for 
sensitivity training on any 
issues that may arise  
● Working to help refugees move 
into private accommodations  
● Maintaining communication 
and collaboration with 
governance partners  
● Actively collaborating with 
representative cultural groups  
 ●  Steer direction of policies at 
lower district level (if relevant)  
 from refugee countries of 
origin, if available  




Ensuring refugees spend as little 
time as possible in the mass 
accommodations before moving 
into private accommodations 
Continuous support for 
community integration 
programmes focused on refugee 
accommodations  
Support for medical aid for 
refugees who need it, including 
psychological help  
Promote creation of or dialogue 
with cultural groups to consult 





Helping refugees with 
technicalities of adjusting to 
new society, i.e. facing 
bureaucratic hurdles, 
providing volunteer 
translators, etc.  
Involving civil society and 
promoting contact between 
natives and refugees  
Promote creation of or consult 
directly with cultural groups 
representative of refugee 
populations  
Be able to refer refugees to 
various societal resources  
Table 5- Essential variables and duties for governments and NGOs in the theoretical model 
 
7.5 Building a Framework  
Following from the previous sections and chapters, this section will construct a 
theoretical ‘best practice’ framework around implementation of a Type II MLG refugee 




as both cities serve as unique examples of policy responses to the refugee influx while 
operating within both Type I and Type II MLG structures. We have also looked at the relative 
successes and failures of both cities’ responses and taken into account differing factors that 
can affect how cities respond to refugee movements, such as population density, location, 
housing availability, et al. While it is impossible to account for all types of locational 
idiosyncrasies with a single theoretical model, it is our hope that this model is generalisable 
across the vast majority of municipalities, and can be implemented successfully.   
The following sections will describe the important variables from our study of MLG 
and policy implementation, and then from integration and housing, and how they fit into the 
overall model. Then we will provide a simplified visual representation of the model to 
demonstrate how, in theory, such a structure would operate. Finally, we will discuss the 
potential applicability of the model in the current atmosphere surrounding asylum governance 
in European municipalities.  
  
7.5.1 MLG variables  
While Berlin and Leverkusen are different at a glance, with differing land sizes and 
populations, they share similarities in governance structures: the local government is able to 
formulate policies determining how refugees are housed, what partners are utilised for 
contracting/policy implementation, as well as how these policies are regulated and how 
durable they are. They also share a common problem found in most German cities: a chronic 
housing shortage. However, these two cities have tackled the policies surrounding refugee 
housing in considerably different ways, though both within Type II MLG frames.  
A more stratified system of policy governance and implementation, where operators 
of refugee accommodations are chosen by limited contract, with those contracts up for 




the residents of the accommodations. Furthermore, in some cases oversight and regulation of 
these operators has been lax and led to issues with the refugee occupants, who then have 
trouble reporting those issues to the Berlin Landesamt.   
Thus, consistency of management becomes a key part of establishing policy 
governance. As we have seen from Leverkusen, trust between the NGOs and the city 
government is high because they have implemented a durable, long-term collaborative model 
of governance over refugee accommodations with proven success in both placing refugees in 
private housing and saving the city money on expenses regarding refugee accommodation. 
Part of this has to do with the division of duties between social workers employed in refugee 
accommodations, where there are social workers employed by both the city and the NGOs in 
each accommodation. This active division of labour encourages both transparency and 
accountability.  
What this requires is active and regular collaboration between the city government 
and the relevant NGO partners without resorting to time-limited paid contracting. 
Relationships must be established without regard for profit or cost-savings, as it is more 
important to ensure quality care rather than budget effectiveness. Cost-savings can be 
ensured, first, by encouraging refugees to enter the private housing market (alongside the city 
actively engaging in housing construction); the Leverkusen Model has exemplified that 
aiding refugees to leave accommodations and find their own living space will produce 
costsavings. Second, it can also be ensured by the longer-term benefit private housing has on 
refugee’s integration efforts, such as through language acquisition or through the ability to 
have privacy.  
The establishment of longer, durable relationships between city government and 
NGOs requires regular contact and meetings between them, as well as a mitigation of 




partnership or collaboration. This has begun in Berlin with monthly meetings between the 
government and the NGOs, though we have seen in Leverkusen that meetings are weekly, 
and sometimes more than once a week between the relevant actors, with communication 
consistently flowing between them. In a more tightly knit collaborative model, city 
government must treat the relevant NGOs as governing partners and equals rather than 
contracted clients. Part of this emerges with the shared duties of social workers in 
accommodations, while much of it comes from how civil servants work with NGO members 
and vice versa.  
Constant, regular meetings and active communication between the city government 
and the NGOs is needed to ensure that policies are being implemented efficaciously and to a 
standard that would ensure, for instance, that refugees only spend 6 months on average in a 
refugee accommodation before being moved into their own private residence.   
Refugee accommodations themselves should be situated in communities, or as close 
to communities as possible to allow for active civil society involvement. This is where local 
government operates within a Type I structure rather than a Type II: building permits and 
construction laws may face backlash from some members of the community (or the district 
administration) about constructing a refugee accommodation near to a specific 
neighbourhood or in a particular place. In Berlin, the city government has taken the initiative 
to implement direct edicts that refugee accommodations will be constructed in Bezirke 
without recourse; in Leverkusen, the existing accommodations were constructed within 
neighbourhoods, though a new one is proposed somewhat further outside the city than the 
existing accommodations, facing backlash from members of the civil service and the NGOs.   
Further, it is not enough to regularly construct refugee accommodations, which are 
largely degradable with limited life-spans: as the refugee influx has made patently clear, 




without the surprise addition of refugees. This requires consistent city government 
interjection to guarantee a high percentage of all new housing units built are for low-income 
and vulnerable populations, rather than allowing persistent gentrification or overdevelopment 
of housing by private financial interests. Both Berlin and Leverkusen have enacted new 
building programmes and laws as a reaction to the refugee influx, but this is a policy that 
should not be reactionary; rather, it has to remain consistent both to ensure an adequate and 
durable housing stock for regular population increases and the ensure that rent rates do not 
rise outside of a minimum inflationary amount.   
Finally, city government must be willing to facilitate the creation of representative 
diaspora groups if they do not already exist. These groups, usually composed of migrants 
from those countries, can help facilitate refugee integration by guiding refugees through the 
necessary bureaucratic rapids that inevitably arise with asylum in Germany. Local 
government support for these groups demonstrates implicit integration support for newly 
arrived refugees, as encouraging the creation of diasporic groups centralises a location for, 
first, language-specific translators, and second, cultural familiarity.  
In conclusion, the active facets of MLG being brought into the theoretical framework 
are: durable structures of collaborative governance not determined by time-limited paid 
contracts; active and responsive communication between the NGO partners and the local 
government; sharing duties within refugee accommodations to ensure transparency of work 
and accountability; embedding refugee accommodations within communities to ensure direct 
access to civil society groups and neighbourhood resources; dedicated housing construction 
by city government, as well as assurances on rent control; and support for the creation of 
diasporic groups within the city.  
Secondary facets, such as power relations, are embedded into the collaborative 




dominate the other, as well as maintain transparency so that each side is accountable for any 
actions that may hinder efficient policy implementation. Because the governance partners all 
desire the same general outcome, i.e. efficient delivery of policy, power is ceded to the larger 
whole in exchange for collaboration.   
  
7.5.2 Integration variables  
Those who arrive in a new country as refugees generally want to learn the native 
language (if they do not know it already) and wish to return to a sense of normality, i.e. not 
be treated as a refugee. This usually means returning to work, going to school, etc. as soon as 
they are able to. However, there is obviously a necessity for refugees to become acclimated to 
the new country in which they have asylum, especially one in which they do not speak the 
native language. Thus, efforts promoting contact between citizens and refugees ensures that 
refugees can have a basis on which to begin understanding the nuances of the new country.   
Integration itself is a wholly personal and subjective experience of how the individual 
perceives him or herself within their new society. Do they identify themselves as a refugee 
within a host country, or a resident? Do they feel welcome, or still outside the ‘bubble’ of 
society despite knowing the language, having an education/job, etc.? The efforts to ensure 
that this subjective experience depend on how the government orients itself towards both 
refugees and the organisations dedicated to helping them acclimate to their new country.  
How this can be achieved depends partly on central/city government leadership and 
coordination of volunteer efforts with relevant NGOs. Leverkusen’s government has 
dedicated volunteer coordinators who communicate directly with NGOs to guarantee that 
volunteers are always available to refugees who require their help, whether it is with 
attending a doctor’s appointment or registering one’s child in school. This effort is less 




Berlin government began as icy, but may increase with increased communication and 
interaction within the scope of the now-regular meetings.   
Volunteers and positive interactions with native Germans helped refugees understand 
central government documents, learn German faster, and navigate the ins and outs of the 
housing market in Leverkusen. The primary difference here between Berlin and Leverkusen 
is the limiting factor of assigned status: those who were able to move from the refugee 
accommodations without restriction felt less confined than those who were restricted to a 
minimum amount of time spent in them and could better acclimate themselves to their new 
surroundings.  
This is also where embeddedness in communities demonstrates its importance: with 
greater access to community resources, i.e. local organisations, sprachcafes, sports clubs, 
etc., more interaction can occur with the native population, which is the lynchpin of almost 
all modes and theoretical assertions about integration previously stated (see Allport, 1954; 
Zapata-Barrero, 2014). This also demonstrates the importance of housing within the realm of 
integration: where and how a refugee is housed can largely determine how they perceive their 
integration to progress.   
Diasporic groups speak to a transnationalistic element within integration (see Sert, 
2012) and can facilitate a refugee’s acclimation to Germany. Several interview partners were 
in active contact or a part of a diasporic group in their respective cities, and one of the 
interview partners in Leverkusen contributed to the creation of a Kurdish organisation within 
Leverkusen, whose creation was also facilitated by the Leverkusen government. Diasporic 
groups can then partner with the local government and other NGOs to create events and 
promote interculturalism to bridge any hesitance on behalf of both the native population and 




  Small things, such as the ability to cook within one’s residence, is a positive marker 
of comfort in one’s own place, as refugees interviewed for this project all stated 
dissatisfaction with being unable to cook in refugee accommodations. Other small but 
important aspects include the ability to furnish one’s space with personal belongings and 
items of cultural significance (books, furniture, etc), as well as the simple ability to choose 
where one lives (or have the means to choose where one lives by navigating the housing 
market). This further promotes the idea of encouraging refugees into the private housing 
market, or for cities to construct refugee accommodations into a more liveable space akin to 
an apartment or house; however, the latter is less likely given refugee accommodations are 
often built quickly and, as previously mentioned, to a limited lifespan.   
  In conclusion, the important aspects of integration utilised by this theoretical model 
are: encouragement of positive interaction between civil society and refugees through 
promotion of volunteer efforts; ensuring access to community resources for refugees by 
situating accommodations within communities and neighbourhoods; encouragement for 
refugees to enter the private housing market without restriction for status; facilitating the 
creation of or contact with diasporic groups; and the creation of intercultural offerings to 
ensure contact and cross-cultural understanding.  
  
7.5.3 Envisioning a Theoretical Framework  
  Before we create a physical representation of our theoretical ‘best practice’ 
framework, we should both list out the essential variables for integration and governance that 
the model will utilise, as well as envision an ideal timeline of arrivals and asylum integration 
procedures in order to better understand how this model will fit within the general framework 




governments and their NGO partners in the model, while Figure 11 shows the flowchart of 
the time from arrival to an ideal move into private accommodation.  
  In this flowchart, ideal times for asylum application assessments should be considered 
within as fast a time as possible in order to allow for refugees to settle into the country and 
avoid living in first reception centres for extended periods of time. In the past, wait times for 
asylum decisions in Germany have eclipsed a year or more, with some applicants having to 
wait months for a first interview (Beirens, 2018: 13-15)49. Asylum benefits (stipend, classes, 
etc.) should begin for all upon the at the start of the asylum process rather than once a 
decision as to status is reached, given possible lengthy delays in an asylum decision that can 
severely hinder both integration prospects for refugees and overall mental health (ECRE, 
2016; LD interview, 2018).    
In addition to this, differentiated rights based on tiers of asylum status should not be 
taken into account for refugees to receive a right to better housing conditions or integration 
benefits. While this may seem a polemic statement, one need only to look at differentiations 
in statuses granted to Syrian asylum seekers: as of BAMF’s December 2019 statistics for the 
year, 22,705 asylum seekers were given full refugee status while 15,173 were given 
subsidiary protection (BAMF, 2019a: 3). The differences between asylum status and 
subsidiary protection, while seemingly small, are actually large: asylum entitles one to a 
3year residence permit with the possibility of extension, while subsidiary protection only 
entitles one to a 1-year residence permit, and an application for extension may be denied if 
the factors that caused one to be granted subsidiary protection, i.e. danger of harm or 
unlawful imprisonment, are found to no longer exist or are not sufficient to warrant an 
 
49 As a response to the inflated wait times experienced by many refugees in 2014/2015, Germany opted to 
‘fasttrack’ applicants for statuses if they were from a country that received greater than 50% approval for an 
asylum status. This has mainly pertained to Syrians, who, in the most recent statistics released by the BAMF, 




extension (Wallis, 2019). The continual precarity and slow response times of government 
offices handling refugee official documents leads to stress and lost integration time (see  
7.4.3).  
Asylum status also allows for family reunification, while that right under subsidiary 
protection was effectively abolished in 2018 in Germany and replaced with a monthly limit 
of 1,000 visa applications total granted to family members of those with subsidiary protection 
(see European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2020). As stated by interview partners, 
reunification and bringing one’s family safely to Germany is a primary contributor to 
ensuring a sense of home in the country (KPL interview, 2019; DD interview, 2018; PD 
interview, 2018).  
 






  This allocation of standard rights across asylum statuses should also apply, ideally, to 
those refugees whose cases may have been given an initial rejection but are under appeal.   
At the time of writing, there is no foreseeable end to the Syrian civil war, which raises 
the question of why there would be a difference in assigned asylum status if the country’s 
humanitarian situation is largely unchanged i.e. hazardous to civilians. Subsidiary protection 
is only temporary and granted with a “view to returning [them] to their country of origin” 
(Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, 2016: 1). Removing the arbitrary roadblocks of 
different asylum statuses removes a high degree of stress for refugees, especially when they 
require their various documents (passport, resident ID, insurance card, etc.) to apply for 
different things within Germany, often in timeframes very close to each other, such as 
subsidised housing, extension of status, education, etc. and must wait until they receive their 
documents back from one government body to apply with another (ZD interview, 2018; DD 
interview, 2018).   
  From the first reception centre, refugees should be moved into more stable living 
conditions as soon as possible. This is obviously dependent upon what the city has available 
for use, but ideally there would be a dormitory-style facility available for temporary living 
where refugees can have a better sense of privacy and from where they can establish a 
semblance of normalcy while looking for a private living space. These spaces should have 
access to NGO/government psychosocial aid (such as through a dedicated office within the 
residence) so that refugees can have direct help with queries related to government 
paperwork, registering for classes, etc.  
  Figure 11 is a simplified representation of how our theoretical best practice model 






Figure 11- The Theoretical Framework for Refugee Housing Governance 
  
  
  The local government and the civil society organisations are joint proprietors of 
governance surrounding refugee housing, and policies surrounding refugee housing. This 
entails collaborative governance and active communication between the groups, where 
formal meetings are held at regular intervals but informal communication is expected and 
continuous. The city government, as expected, has prudence over housing provision in the 
sense of allotting building spaces/locations for construction or conversion of refugee 
accommodation, while the civil society partners have input about location. There is joint 
operation of the accommodations, with duties shared rather than split.  
  The city government is also responsible for ensuring that refugee accommodations are 
stationed near essential community resources, i.e. proximity to schools, groceries, public 
transit, etc. Community resources also contains volunteer initiatives, sprachcafes, etc., 
whether it comes from religious organisations or otherwise. In cases where there is devolved 




the devolved administrative district must be as involved with the NGO partners as the city 
government, if not more so. For larger cities with ‘independent’ district offices that oversee 
refugee accommodations within the district borders, it is expected that these offices will 
collaborate with NGO partners/accommodation operators just as the city government would 
if the city were smaller and did not have individual district offices.  
  While the primary structure of this model adheres to Type II MLG, it still fits the 
Type I structure found within the city-district government structure.   
  The aforementioned MLG and integration variables all fit within the scope of the 
model with the equal responsibility given to the city government and the NGO partners to 
ensure an effective implementation of housing policies. Because of the active collaboration, 
transparency between the actors is maximised and can become normalised over time. This 
normalisation creates a consistency of policies and operations over both refugee 
accommodations and policies regarding refugee’s rights over accessing the private housing 
market.   
  While this framework is derived from the lessons learned from studying the policy 
successes and failures of both Leverkusen and Berlin, this model would require 
implementations testing and continued study to determine its efficacy and rigour in ensuring 
consistency in housing and integration policy implementation. The hope is that it is 
generalisable across the spectrum of cities and different modes of government, and that it is 
of use in improving the policy responsiveness of cities where refugees find themselves living.  
 Implementations testing circles us back to perceptions of policy success and failure and the 
relativistic qualities therein. In terms of a city implementing the framework, we can see two 
possibilities for their existing or previous refugee housing policy: either it was relatively 
successful but the city wants to build on what they have to improve their ability to move 




by the government, the populace, the refugees themselves, or a combination therein. The 
former posits an easier transition into the policy governance of the framework than the latter, 
as they have an existing infrastructure on which to build and likely have active relationships 
with the local NGO/refugee-facing organisations.   
  Building off a failed policy, however, becomes more difficult especially in the face of 
perceptions of anomie and ‘blame games’ by all sides for why/how the policy broke down. 
One cannot simply walk into a government office, lay down a framework for a new policy 
mechanism and feel victorious at the positive change to come. Even in the case of 
Leverkusen, where their eponymous Model has existed since 2002, the Leverkusen 
government and the NGOs were antagonistic towards each other leading up to the 
recommendation of a high-ranking civil servant to attempt a pilot programme of the basis for 
the Model. If not for that intervention, it is likely there would not have been a pilot project to 
test whether the Model could achieve positive outcomes for both sides.  
  In the case of building a new policy after reeling from a failed one, assessing or 
pronouncing a cause of failure can lead to further antagonism from one side or the other due 
to the political unwillingness or political ‘poison pill’ of admitting one’s failure in the wake 
of possible electoral change due to the issue failure, especially where one side (be it 
government, NGO, etc.) was perceived as negligent in duty or as a ‘fiscal black hole’, i.e. 
pocketing or frivolously spending money on immaterial things that should have been used for 
policy implementation. Re-establishing a sense of trust and transparency thus becomes a key 
in reconciling relations and building up a new foundation for a policy, which then must cause 
the pre-existing power relationships from the failed policy to ebb. Ensuring no one party 
dominates the other allows for greater policy dynamism, though this may also cause the 
policy to become watered down depending on the demands of either side. How all parties 




continued effective policy implementation will be one of the determinants of how successful 
and durable a policy could be.  
  We also cannot assume from the framework that a city that chooses to implement its 
structure will have a perceptual success in implementing its refugee housing policy. As 
referred to in the section on policy failure (Marsh & McConnell, 2010), it is entirely possible 
for one of many things to go pear-shaped, whether there is political backlash from more 
nationalistic/xenophobic elements of the political parties or perceptions of financial 
embellishment or ‘waste of resources’ through the policy, or something else. This framework 
does not claim to be a panacea for policy shortfalls that cities experience; it is simply the 
result of learning lessons from two instances of different policy reactions to a refugee influx, 
and proposing that these lessons can contribute to our understanding of one way of how 
refugee housing policy can be implemented effectively given a certain governance structure.   
  
7.6 Conclusion  
This chapter attempted to coalesce the various strands of MLG and integration 
literature, as well as the examples of policy success and failure from the empirical cases of 
Leverkusen and Berlin, into a functionally specific Type II theoretical framework covering 
refugee housing policy in cities.   
Within Berlin, which has experienced significant policy change since 2014, important 
developments such as the government’s dicta that refugee accommodations must be built 
within districts without the possibility of veto, as well as the implementation of regular 
meetings between the government and civil society organisations, were imported for the 
framework. Aspects of policy inadequacy, such as inconsistency in housing policies and 
advice given to refugees, and disconnects between the government and civil society, were 




Within Leverkusen, which has utilised a consistent model of partnership since 2002, 
important facets of the policy such as direct collaboration between the government and the 
civil society organisations, as well as shared duties within refugee accommodations were 
imported for the framework. Aspects of policy inadequacy, such as the government’s 
proposed construction of a refugee accommodation away from a neighbourhood, were also 
accounted for.   
Common definitions and analytical perspectives of policy success and failure were 
applied to both cities to derive key structural variables for the theoretical framework. From 
these structural variables we also explained some of the more general concepts that fit within 
the variables and linked them to the styles of governance within a type-II structure to 
demonstrate how these concepts, such as social connections helping obtainment of private 
housing, can be implemented through the framework.  
Collaborative governance through direct partnership with refugee advocacy 
organisations was found to be largely beneficial for both the city government and the city’s 
refugees because these organisations act as connective tissue between the refugees’ and the 
new society’s relatively distinct perspectives. In addition, governments must spearhead a 
policy of continuous housing market adjustment for population growth over time; as 
observed in both Leverkusen and Berlin, the cities’ neglect of housing development resulted 
in a saturated housing market with very little leeway to properly adjust to a growing 
population, let alone the population shock that came from the sudden infusion of refugees to 
each city. This also involves increasing investment in social housing for the cities, something 
that experienced a drastic reduction at the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st centuries.  
By investing in both a sustainable housing development plan and in mutually 




integration processes on day 1, allowing them to pick up the local language faster (if needed) 
and adapt to the new cultural setting in which they live.  
The framework seeks to be applicable to cities across a diverse array of city 





Chapter 8:  For the Benefit of Europe: Reflections on the 
relevance and lessons of the study on both Germany and 
municipalities across Europe  
8.1 Introduction  
  This chapter will reflect on the study, both its normative and pragmatic relevance for 
Germany and the greater European asylum framework, and how the framework developed in 
the previous chapter can be implemented and adjusted across European cities. Taking 
considerations from the previous chapters on Berlin and Leverkusen and the lessons learned 
from policy failure and success, we will discuss how other cities across Europe have 
generally responded to the ongoing situation and whether they abide by or contravene their 
national governments. Future directions for research of these cities and their refugee housing 
infrastructure would be conducive to deeper knowledge and policy variation by governance 
style, and would only serve to facilitate greater interweaving and communication across city 
and state borders in order to exchange ideas and establish more sustainable policies going 
forward; for now, we will only overview systems of refugee housing already studied in 
academia given the comparative nature of this chapter.  
  We will also reflect on the discussion of which level has more sway in integration 




of Germany’s national integration laws (see Chapter 2) and programmes, we have seen cities 
taking the ‘first leaps’ into more inclusive and progressive measures, such as through 
Berlin’s integration plan preceding the national one, the federal state of North Rhine-
Westphalia enacting its Integrationsgesetz several years before the country did and with 
greater measures to ensure facilitated integration through qualifications recognition, and from 
examples of Cologne, Bonn, and Düsseldorf requesting that Germany take in more refugees 
rather than restricting their access to asylum in the country through the externalised borders 
of the EU, among others.   
  First, we will ask whether states or localities lead in integration policy, or if the 
answer lays somewhere in between. The repercussions of this balance (or lack thereof, 
depending on the country) of centralised decision-making with regard to integration policies 
will be explored, looking at examples of local versus state practices. What impact does this 
difference of conceptual policy centres have on refugees? What impact does it have on cities 
when the national government has a greater say in determining how integration is conducted 
at the local level, and vice versa? This area of study is relatively new (see Bauder & 
Gonzalez, 2018; Bendel, et al., 2019; Borkert & Bosswick, 2007; Emilsson, 2015; et al.) 
within the realm of European asylum given the recency of the EU’s development of a 
‘common’ asylum system and the foibles within, and is worth exploring conceptually as 
cities become policy innovators in the field of refugee integration due to the exigency of 
refugee flows from the Middle East and Africa.  
  We will then discuss how cities engage in policy learning through networks 
facilitated by cities themselves, states, and the EU, as well as through transnational NGOs. 
Examples of policy and idea dissemination will be given to demonstrate that, while policy 
ideas may not be ascribed to single areas of what may be regarded as ‘best practice’, they are 




also review to what degree a networked organisation can influence policy development or 
change, and whether NGOs are limited in what and how they can influence governments 
based on how the NGOs are organisationally structured.  
  This chapter will also look at the use of bordering and the externalisation of borders 
throughout the EU, as it relates to aspects of how we conceive both house and home through 
access to the right of reunification and integration within EU states and the normative 
paradox of bordering and asylum for the EU. Bordering has come to signify the 
externalisation of ‘the other’ from accessing societal benefits and integrative aspects, 
presenting the other with more ‘hoops to jump’, as a method of isolating a country’s cultural 
and political systems and structures from any influence perceived as ‘outsider’ (Collyer, et 
al., 2020). Complexities surrounding the Dublin Regulation will be touched upon, as well as 
how housing at the fringes of the EU, i.e. those structures made within isolated and fenced 
camps reflect on our understanding of the promise of asylum and integration within the EU, 
both in the quasi-legal sense and the humanitarian sense.   
  Our discussion of bordering will also touch on the preferential treatment given to 
refugees of some nationalities over others, as well as the ‘pragmatic’ argument in favour of 
refugee allocations, i.e. that countries that are expected to experience demographic ageing 
and degradation should take in refugees to replace its ageing tax base and fill work sector 
gaps that have emerged as economies have shifted towards more technical work than trade 
work. We argue that the desire to utilise refugees as ‘work replacement’ is illogical given that 
numbers of refugee intake will always be too low to account for work sector shortages.   We 
will finish off this chapter with a look to the future and how Germany and Europe should 
adapt to what is expected to be an overall increase in migratory movements to Europe due to 
estimations surrounding global warming and conflicts that may develop from it. The 




readjust their lives by adopting new employment or seeking to return to their previous fields 
of employ; how cities can sustainably adjust to the pressures imposed by global warming 
while ensuring climate refugees and migrants (see Burrows & Kinney, 2016; Puaschunder, 
2020) are able to enjoy equal access to citizens’ social rights is one area our new theoretical 
framework can touch upon.   
  We focus on these values because they set the groundwork for how a city postures 
itself with regard to their refugee housing and integration policies, and whether or not they 




may act towards a national government where outlooks and goals surrounding refugee intake 
and integration clash, and ultimately help us understand the context in which the research 
questions are couched and how the local level affects integration policies.  
  
8.2 States as leaders, or localities?  
  In 2018, the mayors of Bonn, Cologne, and Düsseldorf, neighbouring cities in the  
German state of North-Rhein Westphalia, published an open letter to Chancellor Angela 
Merkel asking the German state to intervene in the Mediterranean to conduct naval rescues of 
asylum-seekers unable to reach Europe and allow them to settle in the three cities (Geisel, et 
al., 2018). It was a highly unusual request for a group of prominent cities to make of the 
federal government given it touches on policy areas (external borders, naval patrol) reserved 
to the remit of the federal government and, in this case, the European Union, but it 
represented how asylum and integration practices and priorities had diverged between the 
federal and local levels.   
  In the years following the summer of migration, major cities have, generally, acted 
with aggressive probity to ensure that refugees allocated to their regions are given access to 
requisite services that would allow them to return to a state of normalcy, while some national 
governments have pulled back on asylum obligations and sought to deter further ‘waves’ of 
migrants from attempting to reach the EU (Careja, 2019; Emilsson, 2015; Joppke, 2017). 
Though more pronounced now due to the recency of the refugee influx from 2014, this 
bordering aspect enacted by states (and uploaded into the European Union through the 
Dublin Regulation as well as civic integration policies50) traces its roots back to the aftermath 
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of the 11 September attacks in the United States, and lingers as a remnant of fear concerning 
terrorism and transnational crime (Joppke, 2007).  
  Because of Germany’s federal and devolved governing structure, the experiences of 
cities during the height of the refugee influx differed by state and city to varying degrees of 
inclusion and political willingness, as well as measured success and failure, as alluded to in 
previous chapters. Generally, cities will utilise national guidelines for creating the basics of 
local policy while adjusting finer details, such as housing, to local requirements. But the 
letter from the three mayors was a subversive act of political speech, as Germany had been a 
strong proponent of the EU-Turkey deal of 2016 that sought Turkey’s aid in limiting the flow 
of refugees to Europe in exchange for money and the promise of restarted EU accession 
discussions (Eralp, 2016), while the European Union has continued to fund migrant returns 
through the Libyan coast guard, which human rights groups have decried the coast guard’s 
treatment of migrants as inhumane and the EU’s support as undermining the values on which 
the EU was established (Amnesty International, 2017).  
  But what influence can cities exert over national governments in policy areas reserved 
for national governments that touch on important aspects of integration? Cities throughout 
Europe, and especially in Germany, have been at the forefront of policy innovation with 
regards to refugee integration and inclusion because they are left to adjust and acclimate to 
the new populations, both acting as providers of everyday resources and as potential 
longterm homes (see Mayer, 2017; Schiffauer, et al., 2017). Many have developed strong 
networks and lines of communications over which they are able to share policy ideas, 
sometimes facilitated by the charitable NGOs that operate in different locales (see  
Flüchtlingsrat NRW, 2015).   
  Zooming out from the local municipal level, the federal states within Germany have 




NorthRhein Westphalia developed its Integrationsgesetz several years before the refugee 
influx, and the law tackled (or attempted to tackle) issues that were still prevalent for 
refugees across the country after the passage of the 2016 national Integrationsgesetz, such as 
recognising native credentials, support for language education, etc. while the national law 
focused more on labour market access (Schmidtke, 2014; Gesetzentwurf der 
Bundesregierung, 2016). Berlin, as a city-state, formulated its integration plan before 
Chancellor Angela Merkel convened the National Integration Plan in 2007.   
  Of course, the strength of cities to influence national policy can only go so far: in 
2016 the German government introduced a 2-year suspension of the right of family 
reunification for refugees who only receive subsidiary protection rather than full refugee 
status, which constitutes a significant number of refugees accepted into Germany51. In 2018, 
rather than allowing full family reunification rights at the end of the 2-year suspension, the 
German government instead scrapped the right entirely and replaced it with a 1,000-visa per 
month quota system, assessing for, as stated by a CSU spokesman, those refugees with 
“illness or injury” (Deutsche Welle, 2018). Visa fulfilments have continually been below the 
maximum threshold allotted by the government (European Council of Refugees and Exiles, 
2020).   
  We have identified previously that having one’s family with them is an important part 
of integration. What this suspension represents for refugees with only subsidiary status and 
the cities/towns that host them is a continual suspension of normal life even while they 
attempt to establish a sense of normalcy. Beyond violating the principles of asylum and 
refugee rights as laid down in the EU’s Common European Asylum System directives, it 
installs a further arbitrary border or hurdle that refugees must surpass. Cities have no 
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ameliorative power in this regard, as they have no jurisprudence to offer a visa or residency 
for someone not already in the country. Alternatively, cities (and organisations within) have 
acted to protect refugees and irregular migrants from deportation by their state governments, 
either by shielding them in churches or by not recording or revealing intimate details when 
asked for the information by state authorities, such as address, workplace, or previous 
residences (Fauser, 2019).  
    
8.2.1 Where cities innovate  
  When we envision a policy moving vertically down through a federal system, 
sometimes we may see it as a parent (federal/central government) giving chores to a child 
(city/municipality), such as mowing the grass in a particular fashion as designed by the 
parent. Depending on their size and different abilities, the child can either mow the grass 
exactly to specifications, mow the grass however they want to with varying degrees of 
completion, or have the entire endeavour result in a catastrophic failure where the 
lawnmower catches fire, along with the lawn and possibly the house. In the first case, the 
parent’s recommendation for how to cut the grass (our metaphorical policy) is reinforced as 
the preferred method, and the parent would likely maintain this method the next time the 
grass needed to be cut (i.e. no policy entrepreneurship); in the second case, the parent’s 
perception of their preferred method of cutting grass may change or be reinforced depending 
on how efficient and functional the child’s method of cutting grass is perceived to be, and if 
the new method proves to be better, the parent may adopt it as the new standard for when the 
other children have to cut the grass, or choose to be hands-off and let the children cut the 
grass however they want so long as it ends with the same result; in the third case, the parent 




  While the analogy for how a policy may move vertically downward from the central 
government to a local government may be simplistic, it highlights the main features of a 
theoretical archetype of Type I multi-level governance functions: policy domains are nested a 
la federal structures, with the central government encompassing the policy domains straight 
down into the municipal area (Emilsson, 2015; Hooghe & Marks, 2003). We see this within 
Germany through the areas within integration policies where the federal government holds a 
remit, such as the mandated integration courses and extension of residency through work or 
apprenticeships (Rietig, 2016). The local government, typically, would follow federal 
guidelines (for instance, only allowing access to integration courses for Syrian refugees and 
those others whose statuses are approved rather than blanket allowance) given the funding for 
a federal programme is provided from the central government. Deviation from that central 
advice would not be the norm.   
  As we have seen within this study, however, some cities have chosen to shirk federal 
guidelines on access to integration benefits in order to better promote inclusivity and societal 
access to those who may face restrictions, i.e. asylum seekers. Leverkusen is a prime 
example, which followed its Model in housing and removed status requirements to allow 
refugees immediate access to integration and language courses52. Hinger (2020) conducted a 
study on Osnabrück, a city in Lower Saxony which eliminated programmes that discriminate 
between general migrants and refugees and instead followed a similar course to Leverkusen 
in 2014-2015: that is, removing status requirements in order to access certain benefits, such 
as private housing and integration courses (Hinger, 2020: 32). The city even requested that 
refugees be transferred from overcrowded Greek camps into the city; however, the city 
government became divided on whether or not to allow Dublin deportations, with the 
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conservative fraction of the city government arguing that they should comply with federal 
and EU regulations (Ibid: 33).  
  Other cities around Europe have excelled in their own right in developing inclusive 
integration policies while their national governments have been more restrictive towards 
admitting refugees (see Careja, 2019). The European Commission Partnership on the 
Inclusion of Migrants and Refugees transcends a member state’s central government and 
partners directly with cities and organised representative groups within as the primary foci of 
integration practices, while actively seeking to include third-country national groups to better 
improve integration policies across EU cities (Lang, 2019: 200). The EUROCITIES network 
has even advocated for refugee recognition to be accepted across the entire EU in the spirit of 
the right to free movement in the bloc, a sort of EU-mandated asylum rather than delineated 
state-by-state (Doomernik & Ardon, 2018: 94).  
  The general trend since the refugee influx, and even before then, has been that of 
cities acting to support and protect refugees and expand integration services, either through 
formalised policy implementation or partnerships with non-profit organisations, while central 
governments have sought to otherwise restrict access to European borders by acting through 
externalised instruments, either the Dublin Regulation, Frontex, or other national policies 
designed to ‘disincentivise’ refugees from coming to Europe (Mayer, 2017; Nuissl, et al., 
2019; Jorgensen, 2012). Priorities between national governments and the local level have 
diverged: national governments seek to ensure dispersal of ‘national and cultural norms’ to 
newcomers and press on quick labour market entrance, while local governments mostly seek 
to ensure inclusion and interculturalism (Scholten, 2018).  
  Germany presents an interesting dynamic in that regard: because of Germany’s 
devolved federal nature and the areas of integration policy that are left largely to municipal 




through conventions such as the annual Integration Summit at the Federal Chancellery, which 




organisations, which helps to address local-national issues and mainstream policy areas that 
the national government can implement nationwide (Scholten, et al., 2017). Some of 
Germany’s cities besides Leverkusen and Berlin have innovated in their own ways to expand 
the ways by which refugee integration is conducted locally (see Schiffauer, et al., 2017) 
while the central government has sought ways to restrict refugee access to both German 
asylum procedures and European borders.  
  What this leaves refugees with are (sometimes) two very conflicting structural facets 
of integration, where the local level can feel more welcoming than the central government. 
Within the scope of the empirical work in this thesis, this was found to be true for all 
refugees and only serves to reinforce the argument that local level engagement with refugees, 
through either the direct provision of aid or inclusion in policy governance, provides 
paramount integration support that, sometimes, the central government may seek to restrict. 
While the local level may disregard requirements and make exceptions for status fulfilment 
with integration requirements, the federal government most likely will not and will continue 
to maintain stringent standards by which to measure refugees based on their given status. 
Hinger (2020) terms this ‘disintegration’, or the supposed limited capacity of the state for 
integration of refugees. As the local level may seek to reach out and enact a ‘two-way’ model 
of integration, the federal government places the onus of integration on the refugee to achieve 
the benchmarks the government sets out for them, tying both broader societal and welfare 
access to these arbitrary benchmarks (Lebuhn, 2013: 43).   
  This constitutes an inherent conflict between different aspects of bordering in both 
the physical and conceptual sense between the central and local governments. While three 
major cities in Germany may ask that the federal government take aggressive action to 
subvert current Frontex operations and rescue refugees stranded in the Mediterranean, the 




EU, and leave a hard border between what can and cannot be done. It might then be inferred 
that cities are able to innovate in the realm of refugee integration policies because they do not 
have a duty for external borders and the political pressure that often rests on issues of border 
control, and that lack of bordering pressure allows for greater solidarity for refugees within 
government (if the city government is so obliged). While our framework requires that cities 
are active in their work and dedication to ensure that refugees obtain housing and integration 
benefits as soon as they arrive, the notion of ‘limited capacity’ may still predominate through 
the federal government’s legal leadership.   
The next section will focus on policy networks that exist across cities and states, 
where both seek to exchange and gain knowledge on policies surrounding refugees and 
integration. This ties into our discussion on bordering and our framework given the differing 
priorities surrounding asylum and integration for different areas: where some cities and states 
may seek to make policies and practices more inclusive, others may seek to exclude refugees 
more in order to ‘deter’ them from remaining.  
  
8.3 Networks across states and between cities: Moving policies 
across and around  
  The modern configuration of the European Union has created more avenues through 
which cities in different member states (and non-EU member states, such as Switzerland and 
Norway) can exchange policy ideas and recommendations for various policy sectors not 
typically controlled exclusively by the central government or the EU (Slaughter & Hale, 
2011). Policy networks also reflect upon our study of multi-level governance and 




recipient city holds a similar ideological outlook, even if these cities exist on opposite sides 
of the same country or in different countries altogether.   
  For this, we can look at both formal and informal policy networks that facilitate 
policy ideas, with the formal methods existing in more obvious forms, such as through 
various EU-established organs, and informal methods, such as through transnational NGOs 
communicating local policies across borders from within. We will look at several examples 
of policy transfer/learning (see Cairney, 2012) and policy mobility from one region to 
another in integration policy and other fields, as policy communities have grown throughout 
the late-20th and continue to grow within the 21st century.  
  
8.3.1 Can a policy in one city be adopted in another and expect the same results?  
  Two cities may face similar policy issues, but in the area of drafting or adopting a 
new policy, context reigns supreme. In the example of attempting to counter a housing 
shortage with a drive to build new low-cost housing, contextual factors such as available land 
within the city’s boundaries, available public transit near possible areas of housing 
development, land development laws, population density, government funding/budget issues, 
environmental issues of new housing development, political expediency, etc. can affect 
possible outcomes. The complex interplays between intra-metropolitan factors sometimes 
precludes the ability of one city to simply graft another city’s policy into its implementation 
outlook and call it a day (Schmitt, 2020).   
  Before many states enacted decentralisation reforms (as Germany did in 2002/06), 
policymaking in certain domains may have been guided (or fully implemented) through 
central governments at the local level. This would be classified, Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) 
argue, as policy transfer instead of policy learning, since cities/states within a federal system 




question could be significant, as in completely reformulating how a city/region conducts 
energy efficiency to how a comparable city does it, or part of administrative minutiae, such 
as removing outmoded software to upgrade tax collection ability (see Cairney, 2012: 246).   
  There is also a constantly shifting middle ground of policy transfer and learning in 
terms of the relationship between the central and the local governments: where the central 
government may not lead, the city may choose to innovate on their own when the specific 
policy area or aspects of it falls within their remit (see Homsy, 2018); and where the central 
government chooses to lead, the city government may decide to ignore policy advice if the 
central government cannot force them to follow (see Kern, 2019, for a discussion on leaders 
and laggards in climate mitigation policies across Europe).   
  We have seen previously in chapter 4.2.4 the example of different policy 
implementation comparing Dresden to Berlin, and by extension, Leverkusen. Where 
Germany maintains general advice and guidelines on treatment of refugees (and, by 
extension, the CEAS also has similar legal guidelines for member states and cities), some 
cities will attempt to maintain spartan policy aid to refugees as a function of its local political 
mechanisms rather than engage in wilful policy learning and overhaul, even where a 
tangential policy (housing development in general rather than specifically refugee housing) is 
concerned53 (see Schönig, et al., 2017).  
  And even within cities or states that have similar governance structures and general 
political outlook regarding issue areas, officials within cities or states may view the same 
policy situation differently. An example comes from the empirical work conducted for this 
thesis: when Berlin officials and key stakeholders interviewed were presented with an 
 
53 During the budget crunch of the 2000s previously referred to in Chapter 1/2, Dresden completely sold off its 
municipal housing company (WOBA) to private organisations in order to erase its debt, leading to harsh 
housing conditions within the city and difficulty in developing new affordable housing when compared to the 




example of how Leverkusen structures its Model, the Berlin officials were quick to bring up 
that Berlin is unique and should not be compared to other cities, or that Berlin’s problems  
  
require a Berlin solution (Berlin senate representative interview, 2018; Sebastian Muschter 
interview, 2018). Interestingly enough, this notion was shared by some officials interviewed 
in Leverkusen, who believed that Berlin is a unique issue-area (Andreas Laukötter interview,  
2019). That is to say, some who work within city governments may only look to other 
‘comparable’ cities, i.e. in the case of Berlin, officials may only want to look to major 
metropoles like London, New York, Paris, etc. for policy inspiration.  
  While it would not be unusual to look to cities of comparable population size for 
policy ideas, one must take into account actual modes of governance employed in each and 
how much independence a city has from its encompassing federal state (if there is one) or the 
central government to consider whether a policy can be grafted into the governance regime of 
another.54 City governments that have different governance structures, such as one city 
utilising a majoritarian rule council while another utilises a party coalition governing council 
would likely have very different outcomes in policy output. Similarly, one city may have 
internal district councils operating subsidiary to the city council, while another may only 
have a central council. In terms of actual implementation, one city may rely more on private 
contracting for implementation of its services while another relies on central distribution of 
services. These differences in functionality and MLG Type II structure (ignoring central 
government for the time being) can determine the finer points of how policy is written and 
implemented, and why a policy in one city may not necessarily work the same in another.  
In the cases of Berlin and Leverkusen, where governance structures operate similarly 
enough in the area of refugee housing policy (see chapters on Berlin and Leverkusen), the 
 
54 See Mulvey (2018) for a discussion on MLG practices around power devolution and social citizenship for 




former’s newest policy surrounding refugee housing and integration (more neighbourhood 
engagement and government interaction with refugee-facing NGOs through its Berlin  
  
Entwickelt Neuen Nachbarschaften (BENN) programme) elicits direct comparisons to the 
policy of the latter (see Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Wohnen, 2018a).   
While this change was not a result of direct policy learning by Berlin lawmakers and 
civil servants from those in Leverkusen, it could be argued that the style and substance of 
Leverkusen’s Model, i.e. direct links between government and NGOs, active coordination 
with civil society, etc. became mainstreamed because of the work done in Leverkusen since 
2002. Before 2015, the architects of the Model had been invited to speak in various other 
cities on their experiences utilising the Model and lowering city costs while ensuring that 
refugees were able to attain their own housing (Leverkusen Flüchtlingsrat employee 
interview, 2019; Caritas Leverkusen employee interview, 2019a & 2019b). Die Linke (The  
Left) party had members advocating directly for policies in the style of the Model (Die Linke, 
2013), and the Model was even recognised as a policy of ‘best practice’ by some in public 
hearings held by the Bundestag in 2014 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2014).   
The current (since 2016) Berlin Senator for Integration, Labour, and Social Services 
(Senatorin für Integration, Arbeit, und Soziales) Elke Breitenbach is from Die Linke, 
suggesting that the tenets of the Leverkusen Model as a model of best practice may have 
influenced how BENN was conceived and implemented, at least partially, though the work 
done in this thesis cannot directly prove it is so. However, what we can state is that no city 
exists in such a ‘unique’ bubble that it cannot learn from those cities that are not directly 
comparable to it in size, stature, or international standing. Aspects of the Leverkusen Model 
were adopted by far larger neighbouring cities Cologne and Essen, while cities in other 




Model (Flüchtlingsrat NRW, 2015). Especially in a complex and dynamic policy area as that 
of refugee housing and integration, learning can and should be done and adapted from even 
smaller cities and towns, especially when governance structures between two different cities 
are recognisably similar.   
The issue area is one that requires a multifaceted response which should not preclude 
policies that are considered qualified successes within a certain locality; so long as one city 
understands why a policy was successful in another and is able to scale a similar policy 
accordingly, positive learning and implementation should be possible (Zimmerman, 2020). 
This type of knowledge can be exchanged within and beyond Germany’s borders through 
organised networks at either the federal or supranational level, such as through the annual  
Integration Summit at the Federal Chancellery, the European Commission Partnership on the 
Inclusion of Migrants and Refugees, the EUROCITIES network, and others, to allow for idea 
exchange between cities with similar policy goals and outlooks (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996). 
Membership in policy networks can often strengthen the prestige and political weight within 
the EU (Mocca, 2019).  
  While we have mainly talked about transfer and learning of policies through formal 
means, i.e. via government summits, party policy recommendations, etc., NGOs and other 
refugee advocacy organisations play a large role in disseminating policy ideas, though there 
is a caveat: the city in question has to have a working relationship to the organisation to 
consider changing or altering existing policies.  
  
8.3.2 From without, speaking within: NGOs and their effect on policy spread  
  Europe contains several cross-border NGOs, notably Caritas, that work in the same 
general policy areas regardless of their location. In cities where services are contracted out or 




number of vital functions for the public, either in partnership with the government or on their 
own (Careja, 2019). NGOs, as a matter of definition, comprise a wide array of organisations, 
both for-profit and non-profit that provide services either under contract/partnership with 
governments or on their own as part of their operational missions; for the purpose of brevity 
our focus will be on social welfare non-profits.  
  Relationships between local/national governments and charity NGOs throughout  
Europe differ from state to state. In some, such as Germany, they operate in both partnership 
and advocacy roles with the various levels of government, as well as supplementary 
providers of welfare where the various levels of German government have remained pulled 
back in the area of social services since the New Public Management reforms throughout the 
1990s and the public services selloffs of the late-1990s and early-2000s (Martin, et al., 2018; 
see Chapter 2). In other states, this supplementary role is more extreme to the point where 
large-scale NGOs have explicitly promised not to take government money to fund their work 
due to how the government is perceived by its citizens (Witkowski, et al., 2019). This more 
at-odds approach to conducting social welfare lends itself to a lack of interest on behalf of the 
organisations in attempting to alter policy and instead focus solely on the humanitarian 
aspects of the organisation itself (see Vandevoort & Verschraegen, 2019).  
  As reflected by the work in this thesis, different city governments with similar policy 
outlooks can interact with these organisations in diverse ways when governing priorities vary  
(Haque, 2011: 334-335). Conflicting/antagonistic relationships between advocacy 
organisations and local governments are, intuitively, the most obvious in terms of 
understanding the effect of NGO policy proposals for local governments, where organisations 
almost always encounter a slammed door to the face when they want to try to affect local 
policy with a recommendation from another city where governing outlooks differ. Where 




recommendations for greater allowances than are delineated in law (Leverkusen civil servant 
interview, 2019). As previously mentioned in the Leverkusen chapter, some cities may also 
resist policy change based on political outlook even when NGO representatives are invited to 
present on why a certain policy model works.  
  But doors are not always closed and attitudes towards policy governance are not 
always obstinate. Some cities will gladly accept means-tested ideas from civil society 
organisations if they have been scaled to how the receiving city operates, or the organisations 
could be invited to plan out how to scale a policy to the new city in tandem with the local 
government (Cappiali, 2018). In other instances, citizens or residents of one city can act 
through a local organisation and reach out to organisations in other cities where governance 
or governance practices are more inclusive, and instigate contacts between the two cities as a 
result in the hopes of policy learning between them (Schiller, 2018).  
  However, there may be a caveat to that action: local governments (depending on their 
political inclusivity and policy outlook) may only listen to one type of organisation over 
another even if they share the same positions and goals. For example, a religiously-affiliated 
organisation or a regional church-based aid initiative that is familiar to the local government 
may have more sway with a local government than an organisation based around a foreign 
national background started by a group of migrants, even if the issue advocacy or policy 
desires are similar (Caponio, 2005). This denotes two important caveats about NGO policy 
advocacy: the first is that familiarity between governments and NGOs, as well as a history of 
positive coordination/interaction, can lead to greater influence to change policy; the second is 
that internal (i.e. political and cultural) bordering aspects maintain a large role in access to 
government for migrants and their representative organisations.  
  The importance of the second point cannot be overstated. As found in the Berlin 




to integrate refugees, local governments may not always consult directly with refugees, 
instead choosing to deliberate with familiar NGOs/citizen groups as a proxy for policy 
formulation (Berlin senate representative interview, 2018). Instead of determining what it is 
the refugees need to facilitate integration by asking them, local governments may end up with 
what organisational heads believe refugees need through a subjective/cultured perspective, 
which can be condescending and lacklustre in terms of facilitating integration (Kevins & van  
Kersbergen, 2019).  
  Our framework attempts to subvert this implicit internal bordering by adopting a 
successful mechanism implemented by Leverkusen, i.e. immediate contact upon arrival with 
local refugee aid groups, including organisations that directly represent the refugee’s national 
or ethnic background. Additionally, the city government facilitates the creation of 
refugeerepresentative outreach groups (Andreas Laukötter interview, 2019). In partnership 
with local/national/international NGOs that operate within a city as part of its governance 
structure, these organisations (depending on their size, funding, structure, etc.) could act as 
policy advisors to NGOs if the new organisations themselves do not have the outreach or 
breadth that the NGOs do. This aspect of the framework rests on the necessity for the city 
government and the NGO partners to be tied together in collaborative governance, as well as 
willingly facilitating and requesting the cultural expertise of newly arrived refugees in order 
to best tailor arrival and integration experiences for those who will come after.   
  This self-reinforcing mechanism would act as a structural buffer that would ease a 
refugee’s transition from their journey into their new life. So long as the government is 
willing to help facilitate the creation of representative groups in order to have an 
organisational voice(s) specifically for refugees, as in the case of Leverkusen, policy 




  Taken altogether, NGO influence on local government policy only extends so far as 
the willingness of the local government to adapt and adjust their policies, and perhaps even 
beliefs, in light of an emergency situation and studies/data that demonstrate the benefits of 
facilitating integration rather than impecuniously implemented policies. Despite how 
policies/practices may spread through cross-border organisations due to a unified structure, 
not all cities in which they operate may be receptive to successful governance practices in 
another city.  
The next section will discuss bordering, as well as how our model reflects on 
bordering practices that can serve to hinder integration, even while bordering practices are 
established by some national governments as a method to ‘facilitate’ integration.  
  
8.4 Bordering aspects- both physical and cultural  
Borders constitute more than the legal boundaries established to delineate where one 
state ends and another begins; they are also conceptual spaces, both externalised and 
internalised from the core of the state that help to keep ‘undesirables’ outside a ‘protected’ 
space, effectively excluding them from and controlling their access to a state’s 
economic/financial benefits or serving to protect a state’s cultural ‘homogeneity’ (see 
Menjívar, 2014; Schönwald, et al., 2018). They can be as one would expect, i.e. a checkpoint 
of crossing between two countries, such as in an airport or at a physical border, or borders 
can exist as visa requirements, such as those that require a visa applicant to have a certain 
amount of money in one’s bank account before one is able to apply for a visa (Fauser, 2019).   
Within the context of our framework and its applicability towards how cities conduct 
refugee housing and integration, we can look at two dimensions of bordering utilised by 
Germany (and Europe) in the realm of refugee movements: internal borders, i.e. the 




member states while they may have already lodged their application for asylum or have had 
their asylum approved, and external borders55.   
Internal borders, in our case, are those mechanisms by which refugee access to 
societal features and support are limited by the status imposed upon them from the state, and 
sometimes by the city/municipality in which they are allocated. These mechanisms, while 
derived from state practices and policies, also depend upon cities to comply with (or agree 
with) the precepts for those policies. For example, Germany originally required schools and 
teachers to check and report to the BAMF the residency and citizenship credentials of 
children (and their parents) applying for school places, implementing a precarious sense of 
belonging to families whose statuses, such as those under subsidiary protection, may be in 
constant question by the German government; in response, a number of cities adopted 
ordinances that required teachers and schools not to report that information to the federal 
government (Lebuhn, 2013: 45). Additionally, North-Rhine Westphalia was the first German 
state to implement a law that made primary and secondary schools exempt from the reporting 
requirement (Ibid).   
The pressure to alter one’s legal frameworks to be more accommodative can come 
from a variety of actors and factors, such as leading politicians from more inclusive-minded 
political parties, from religious groups, from NGOs aimed at providing care and resettlement 
services to refugees, or from a combination therein (Hinger, 2020: 32). The results, as 
demonstrated in this thesis, have not been homogenous across Germany, even in cities that 
make inclusion of refugees into society a priority.  
 
55 Borders, both internal and external, serve four functions: identity (cultural perceptions), solidarity  
(perceptions of belonging, e.g. entitlements from the state), stabilisation (conditions that stabilise welfare state 
systems), and regulatory (that which limits the reach of the state itself, as well as entry to those at the borders) 




However, not all cities and localities opt to implement more inclusive local 
ordinances, and often comply with harsher state restrictions (or go even further with more  
  
draconian local measures) for a variety of reasons (see Fauser, 2019). As mentioned 
previously in this thesis, housing allowances for refugees between cities in Germany vary 
wildly, from the less restrictive (Leverkusen) to the more tacitly restrictive (Berlin) to the 
heavily restrictive (Dresden) (see Hamann & El-Kayed, 2018 for a comparison between  
Berlin and Dresden).   
As stated in chapter 7.5.3, differentiations in asylum statuses allocated by 
governments creates a tiered level of rights that severely restrict one’s access to societal 
resources and rights typically granted under asylum. How these restrictions are implemented, 
however, depends upon the restrictiveness of the locality. This differentiation was hard-coded 
into Germany’s 2016 Integrationsgesetz, where integration services are ‘fast-tracked’ for 
refugees with a good chance of staying, typically defined as those belonging to a nationality 
with greater than a 50% asylum approval rate, regardless of status. The law frames Germany 
as a ‘homogenous’ culture and the refugees as a ‘problem to be solved’ or ‘outsiders’ being 
granted indefinite permission to remain once they are able to fulfil government and societal 
objectives, rather than framing integration as something the national government must do as 
well to help accommodate refugees to society (Hinger, 2020: 24).   
This institutes an arbitrary border around society by classifying refugees akin to 
‘unstable elements’ by understating the government’s duty to maintain a stable society in the 
face of the refugee ‘problem’ (Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, 2016: 23-24). Further, 
the arbitrary nature denoted in asylum statuses, where subsidiary status must be continually 
reviewed and renewed because a refugee cannot directly prove ‘persecution’ even if they are, 
in this case, from areas of Syria made uninhabitable by fighting provides another border that 




Some of these distancing and bordering elements likely arose as direct backlash to the  
November 2015 Paris terrorist attacks, where Syrian passports were found near the 
perpetrators; for many, both in governments and electorates, this was enough to equate 
refugees with a risk of terrorism (Funk & Parkes, 2016).   
The inherent contradictory nature raised by these bordering policies and practices 
creates uneven situations on the ground for refugees and cities alike. Some cities that lean 
away from refugee inclusivity, such as Dresden, will follow and reinforce these bordering 
elements while others, as seen in Leverkusen, do not regard these central restrictions on 
refugees as the primary guidelines by which to conduct their integration programmes. 
Reinforcing these bordering elements physically typically serve to make refugees more 
visible in society, either by isolating refugees within camps away from neighbourhoods or 
societal centres (Vey, 2019), or isolating them in fenced structures (such as in Tempelhof) 
that are within view of neighbourhoods but have controls and restrictions set to keep general 
society out, and rules that restrict the activities refugees are able to do within their residences.   
For people fleeing precarious situations where their identities openly displayed would 
put them at risk, such as from either the Syrian army attempting to draft citizens under threat 
of imprisonment, torture, or death, or by ISIL terrorising their homes, such visibility imposes 
a border on one’s ability to integrate beyond the isolation under which they are placed.  
The theoretical framework developed in chapter 7.5.3 attempts to erase the 
arbitrariness of imposed internal borders, such as those with asylum statuses, by adopting one 
of the core tenets of the Leverkusen Model, i.e. refugees may access benefits that can be 
allocated by the city without reference to their denoted status. This shifts the focus of policy 
from restricting societal access to those refugees with ‘unworthy’ statuses, whether the 
reasoning is fiscal impecunity or cultural protection, to faster integration into work, 




legalistic securitisation of borders, which is typically an extension of a state’s desire to 
control access primarily to the labour market (Lebuhn, 2013: 41), the state/city can make 
refugees ‘part of the neighbourhood’ (Murdie, 2008), i.e. people (whose status as refugees 
may otherwise exclude them from either material goods or cultural idiosyncrasies) who, like 
so-called ‘regular’ migrants, are simply learning to adapt to their new homes.   
Furthermore, the framework seeks to embed refugees into society as quickly as 
possible. This entails, upon arrival, living in a collective accommodation that is built within a 
neighbourhood in a city/locality rather than being distant (if the city/locality does not have a 
direct placement programme into municipally-rented houses/apartments) and having 
government workers and governance partners actively assessing whether there is private 
housing available for refugees, as collective accommodations typically have low quality 
standards and entry into a housing market can be a byzantine process without help (BBSR, 
2017). Waiting times for asylum decisions can be excessively long, thus hindering initial 
efforts at integration (Beirens, 2018)- the theoretical framework seeks to eliminate that lost 
time.  
What this would entail is a restructuring of the EU’s member state refugee camps that 
sit at the extreme borders of the bloc, i.e. those in the Greek and Italian islands that have 
become overcrowded and neglected by both member state and EU authorities, and where 
refugees are forced to wait extended durations to lodge asylum applications (Malafeka, 
2018).   
This delves into a stream of discussions on the normative aspects of implementing 
borders or restrictions when it comes to asylum and the rights that should be inherent with the 
granting of asylum or subsidiary statuses (see UNHCR, 2014), i.e. should one group of 
asylum-seekers receive preferential treatment over another when every group has no safe 




    
8.4.1 The irrational normativity of utilitarian asylum  
Despite the highly philosophical and jargonistic tone of this section’s header, 
its meaning can be condensed to ‘what the state likes to tout as its values only applies 
to asylum practices when it wants them to apply’ or humanitarianism-by-utility. All 
EU member states had to ratify the Lisbon Treaty and thus agree with the ideas within, 
demonstrating that they identify with the normative values of respect for human rights, 
respect for the UN charter, pluralism, tolerance, etc. As has been the case with asylum 
and proactive operations in the Mediterranean versus reframed border policies, these 
values shine in bright contrast to the actions taken by the EU and its member states.   
  This concept is emblematic of how the German central government has 
evolved its policies and practices since the summer of migration. As noted in Chapter 
2, Germany’s population is ageing and leaving shortages in essential work fields with 
an eventual danger posed to the social welfare system. It faced a similar situation in 
the latter half of the 20th century, thus prompting the development of the Gastarbeiter 
programme where subsequent inequalities developed between the native German 
population and the long-term migrant workers who remained in Germany.   
 The infusion of one million and more refugees presents Germany with an opportunity 
in a new population of workers to fill many of the gaps left by its aging population, 
with age demographic layouts almost opposite those of the German population: 
counting those refugees who arrived since 2015, those aged below 24 constitute 
~60% of all refugees registered, while the number of Germans over the age of 40 in 
the same timeframe is 57% (Färber & Köppen, 2020: 103). At the same time, 




infrastructures that can both adapt and grow with the brought expertise and the 
necessary tutelage for the refugees.   
With that in mind, it should seem logical that Germany would and should 
encourage the EU to be more welcoming of refugees and immigration in general as 
nearly all EU member states face aging populations where shares of the over-65 
demographic will rise against all other demographics due to low birth rates and longer 
lifespans (Eurostat, 2020). But, as we have seen, the EU’s and its member states’ 
bordering practices contravene that notion with externalisation of borders through 
partnerships with Libya, with ‘integrated migration management’ (see Hänsel, et al., 
2019) making borders ‘secure’ and ‘securitised’ rather than guaranteeing an integrated 
networked system of asylum where the EU is able to enact a humanitarian mandate 
across the bloc and ensure that asylum-seekers are able to access the guarantees that 
the EU and its member states agreed to under both UN and EU  
treaties.  
  Here is where the irrationality in ‘irrational normativity’ lay- Germany’s 
obvious history involves the displacement and death of millions, which remains on the 
country’s collective conscience. The right to asylum is written into the country’s Basic 
Law. Opening its borders to asylum-seekers in 2015 with an overwhelmingly positive 
and enthusiastic public outreach was, in a way, a method by which to demonstrate how 
far Germany had moved in relation to its painful historical memories. But almost as 
soon as Germany welcomed the refugees, its government set restrictions on family 
reunification and then sought to restrict refugee access to the continent, even though, 
by most measures, the country had the capacity to accommodate more refugees, with 
federal leadership and high organisational competence (Brücker, 2020: 30). 




immigration system and requirements for refugees to reach integration quotas, or face 
deportation.  
The country also set tiered allowances on asylum-seekers by country, giving 
immediate benefits for some while restricting others simply based on national 
background rather than on individual necessity or on the strength of asylum cases. 
Preferential treatment of one nationality/ethnicity over another explicitly violates the 
aforementioned aspects of the Lisbon Treaty, and even within that preferential 
treatment the tiers of status/allowances may be perceived as arbitrary because 
asylumseekers are required to prove they have experienced or are under the threat of 
‘political persecution’ on the basis of political beliefs, race, religion, nationality, or 
being a member of a particular social group (BAMF, 2018). The difficulty in proving 
‘political persecution’ for refugees fleeing generalised violence is well documented, 
making delineations in granted status all the more difficult to justify between 
individuals fleeing the same country (see Chow, 2018; Kirchhoff & Lorenz, 2018; 
Hinger, 2020). Restrictions on allowances elicits restrictions of access to the country 
itself, and a determination by the country’s government to maintain distance between 
those migrants the government may deem to be ‘deserving’ versus ‘undeserving’.  
  What we see with this dichotomy of policies can be summed up through Pierre 
Bourdieu’s assertion of the ‘left hand’ versus the ‘right hand’ of the state, or the social 
welfare and state protections aspect of a national/local government against the 
financialised/nationalist portion that seeks to exclude as many non-citizens as possible 
from the common till (see Swartz, 2018). Within Germany, this clash began, as 
previously discussed in chapter 2, with the financialisation of social welfare programmes 




Caritas) as providers of social welfare services as a ‘secondary state’ within the local level 
context.   
Decoupling the state from many local welfare programmes also invariably 
decoupled the state from many direct integration services for refugees beyond that 
which is identified as mandatory in the Integrationsgesetz and the Basic Law, such as 
the integration and language classes and a living stipend. Ironically, within some cities 
(such as Leverkusen) this led to the utilisation of refugee-facing organisations within 
the scope of Type II MLG arrangements as voices and advocates for refugees and 
other migrants who had difficulties in integration due to lack of a national performance 
standard before Germany’s integration infrastructure faced its first reformulation in 
2016.   
  These organisations, either within the scope of shared governance in a city’s 
asylum framework or outside of it, have advocated for more inclusivity and an 
increase in refugee intake despite the current CDU-CSU national government’s 
approach to tiered restrictions in favour of some refugees over others. This has, in 
some ways, emboldened aspects of solidarity towards refugees because of a 
perception that the national or local government is either too timorous/incompetent 
(which many saw in Berlin, see chapter 6) in providing a guiding path for refugees to 
eventually become part of the citizenry, or the perception that they wish to push 
refugees to the margins of society (Volunteer worker interview, 2019).   The MLG 
partnerships between these organisations and municipal governments may also 
explain why some cities, as referenced above, choose to speak out in favour of an 
active integration agenda rather than increasing bordering: the cities that have 




‘rejuvenated’, in a way, the ‘left hand’ of government, though the right still maintains 
a disconnect.  
This brings to mind the ongoing German programme of ‘Freiwillige Rückkehr’  
(Voluntary Return), operated in tandem with the International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM), where the migrant in question can consult with the German 
government about obtaining support (often a stipend or the German government 
covering one’s costs of return, such as for a flight) to return to their country of origin. 
Posters advertising the programme are present in many areas of Germany and 
translated into various languages, with the example below taken at a train station in 
Berlin in 2018 (Figure 12). The Voluntary Return programme is offered with the 
proviso that if the migrant accepts the offer to return to their home country, their 
application for asylum or their asylum status is rescinded, and if they choose to return 
to Germany, they must repay whatever amount the German government gave to them 
to facilitate their initial return (BAMF, 2020).  





Figure 12- Germany's 'Voluntary Return' advertisement in a Berlin U-Bahn station. The tagline translates as ‘Your country. 
Your future. Now!’ (Own photo, 2018) 
  
  The details of the advertisement and the website containing information on 
countries of return reveal some telling characteristics about what constitutes a country 
whose citizens can receive return benefits: the country flags presented on the 
advertisement are from predominantly African, Middle Eastern, and South Asian 
countries. While searching the website’s database for information on facilitated returns 
to non-EU countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia, New  




programme is not available for Libya (and Syria and Yemen) because the International 
Organisation for Migration has determined that Libya currently has a ‘difficult security 
situation’ (BAMF, 2020a), raising questions about the ethics and legality of the EU’s 
partnership with Libya for returning migrants.  
  The paradox of values between Germany’s opening of its migration laws, such 
as allowing refugees eased access to the labour market and broadening offers of 
integration courses stands in stark contrast to a programme that offers money to send 
migrants (refugees or otherwise) back to their countries of origin. Given the 
operational guidelines of the Voluntary Return programme (with countries that have 
supported returns and those that do not, i.e. Syria, Libya, Yemen, etc.) and that 
Germany’s population is going to experience a large demographic shift, with many 
ageing into retirement years without a strong base of a younger workforce to support 
the pension system, the logic of integrating a large population of refugees as a panacea 
to solve the demographic issue rather than seeking a wholesale easing of migration 
restrictions falls apart given that the number of refugees in Germany is insufficient to 
adequately ameliorate the future strain on the country’s social system (Brücker, et al., 
2020: 34). While the figure of one million+ refugees is conceptually large, it is only a 
miniscule percentage point compared to the country’s 83 million residents.  
  The ‘utilitarian’ aspect of Germany’s asylum actions in 2015 thus seem 
diminutive when compared to the necessities of the country as a whole going forward, 
where protracted and encouraged net migration into Germany is needed for the country 
to continue operating as one of the foremost economic powerhouses in the world. This 
may entail removing signifiers of demarcated migration statuses, such as those 




enticed by limited-time visas offered by the German government to fill gaps in labour 
fields with little possibility of extension after the visa’s expiry (Lebuhn, 2013: 46).  
  This discussion leads us back to the normative aspects of our theoretical 
framework. In it, inclusivity and facilitated integration are offered to everyone 
regardless of their asylum decisions or statuses both to eliminate the ‘lost time’ that 
has plagued refugee applicants across the EU where waiting times for both interviews 
and granted statuses have been protracted and lasting far longer than CEAS guidelines 
would advise (ECRE, 2016), and to ensure that asylum applicants feel ‘welcomed’ by 
both the German government and the local area in which they are placed. As we have 
found throughout this study and have confirmed the findings from studies conducted 
by Ager and Strang (2008), Ersbøll and Gravesen (2010), Adam, et al. (2019), and 
others, social bonds and connections established in a place are part and parcel of 
successful integration, whereas government mandates placed on migrants produce 
more stress than encouragement. Our theoretical framework seeks to build up this 
integral aspect through organised policy actions, which is explicitly contrarian to 
programmes and policies such as Freiwillige Rückkehr which explicitly encourages 
migrants to return home if they feel they are experiencing difficulty, or limited asylum 
rights by assigned status.  
  Furthermore, given Germany’s concern with labour market integration as 
signified through its 2016 Integrationsgesetz56, facilitating immediate contact between the 
native population and newcomers upon arrival, either through a dedicated policy  
  
 
56 The 2016 Integrationsgesetz contains a ‘3+2’ rule, where a recognised asylum-seeker undergoing job training 
in a field is given a 3-year right of residency and then an additional 2-year residence permit if their employer 
wishes to keep them on after completing their job training. It also eased access for asylum-seekers into local job 
markets by suspending ‘preference tests’ (i.e. a preference for native Germans in a job over a migrant with 




action or through volunteer initiatives, can help refugees better understand and 
navigate their options in the labour market (Doomernik & Ardon, 2018). For all the 
concerns about the immediate costs of integration on both the country and localities, 
labour market integration is the most important factor in terms of managing the costs 
of integration and ensuring a positive ‘return’ on the integration ‘investment’ (Färber 
& Köppen, 2020: 109; Manthei, 2020). Therefore, it is in both a city’s and a country’s 
best interests to make integration benefits accessible to all as quickly as possible rather 
than enforcing a prolonged waiting time, including access to stable private housing, or 
at least housing that allows for greater privacy and security rather than continuous 
stays in overcrowded and often poorly maintained refugee accommodation  
facilities.  
  The next section will look to the future and the possibilities covering future refugee 
movements and how countries and cities may react to them, as well as how this area may 
evolve as cities adapt to global causes of refugee movements, such as global warming.  
    
8.5 A future in refugee housing and integration: greater 
inclusion or increased bordering?  
  At the time of writing this chapter, the world is currently in the grips of an unforeseen 
and largely unprepared for pandemic. While the first wave of that pandemic crested within 
the first three months and western nations, including the United States, the EU, Australia, etc. 
were eager to reopen their economies and return life to a notional ‘normal’ while the number 
of active cases dropped to sustainable levels, the inevitable second wave that resulted from 
government measures to revitalise economies has brought about lackadaisical government 




continue teaching in-person, and national governments have resorted to turning the fault of 
this towards its citizens rather than at the policymakers who craft piecemeal policies by 
tangoing around the inevitable necessity of a national lockdown.  
  Unfortunately, refugees tend to become visible distractions for times when political 
pressure is on for national governments. Notably, the United Kingdom government began 
announcing in August 2020, as pandemic testing failures became prevalent and viral case 
numbers skyrocketed, that boats of refugees crossing the English Channel constituted a  
‘threat’ and the government appointed a ‘Clandestine Channel Threat Commander’ to make  
“the Channel route unviable for small boat crossings” (UK Home Office, 2020). Prime 
Minister Boris Johnson also engaged in political sabre-rattling with regard to human rights 
lawyers, blaming them for subverting government policies designed to keep the country 
‘safe’ (Bowcott, 2020). The government also confirmed potential plans to ‘offshore’ 
government asylum facilities, relocating asylum centres to the South Atlantic Ocean, echoing 
policies of a decade past that sought to have asylum processing centres within the countries 
from which refugees were fleeing, or immediate deportation to far-offshore processing 
facilities (Verkaik, 2020).   
  Refugees (and migrants generally) have been used as political set-pieces in 
international politics as recently as in the EU-Turkey refugee deal and its aftermath, where 
Turkish President Erdogan threatened the EU several times to ‘unleash refugees into Europe’ 
when European leaders have expressed dissatisfaction with the Turkish government’s 
treatment of refugees (Deutsche Welle, 2020). The future of how asylum and integration 
policy will evolve (or not) in the era of a warming world and all its repercussions is 
uncertain; as of now, ‘climate refugee’ exists only as a notional phrase in academia and 
media rather than anything official inscribed in international law. Even UNHCR speaks of 




avoids direct recommendations to apply refugee rights to those displaced by global warming 
effects (UNHCR, 2020).   
  What follows in the next sections are speculation based on both the fieldwork 
conducted in this thesis, current policies, and outlooks by other experts in the field. In the 
first section we will look at a possible future for city development around refugee integration, 
and then we will look at a possible future for bordering mechanisms in place at both the city 
and EU levels. However, we will maintain two assumptions within the next sections: no 
stipulations for asylum/refugee statuses as it regards displacement due solely to global 
warming effects will be enacted throughout the EU, and attempted mitigation for global 
climate effects did not change the trajectory of warming below 2 degrees Celsius (see 
HoeghGuldberg, et al., 2018).  
  
8.5.1 Dynamic Cities in the Age of Forced Migration  
  As is trite at this point to write, the EU and its cities (especially those in Germany) 
had to adjust strongly to the influx of refugees since 2014. This process was different for all 
cities: some had more financial and social leg room to stretch out benefits and volunteer aid, 
while those ageing towns and cities that had little to offer refugees beside shelter in aged 
buildings (Bock, 2018; Schiffauer, et al., 2017). Climate-related migration is expected to 




regions and those with land closer to sea level), especially to Europe and the US, as extreme 
drought, storms, floods, famine, etc. become more frequent (Hoegh-Guldberg, et al., 2018)57.  
  
  Climate-related effects are also expected to drastically increase the gap between 
wealthy and poor across the world, with the wealthy better able to relocate in the wake of a 
climate disaster, such as a hurricane or wildfire, but the lion’s share of climate migrants will 
not be wealthy or able to sustain themselves without the aid of a government (Arcanjo, 2018; 
Puaschunder, 2020). Cities will inevitably be the main recipients of these climate migrants as 
they seek to restore stability to their lives.  
  German cities demonstrated the ability to adapt and restructure their governance over 
refugee housing and integration policies with relative aplomb when they accepted and 
worked with the civil society movements that sprang up to help the refugees that arrived, and 
solidarity movements have emerged throughout Europe (European Foundation for  
Democracy, 2018).  
  There are positive trends as it regards city adaptations to sustainable development: 44 
cities across Europe in the EUROCITIES network pledged €14.2 billion to combat inequality 
and social exclusion, as well as seeking deeper partnerships with the EU with a place for 
cities at the EU Social Summit in 2021 (Godson, 2020). EUROCITIES had previously issued 
a call for increased allowances from national governments and the EU to help refugees 
acclimate, including a call for better housing quality, more social housing availability, and 
 
57 The IPCC Special Report discusses the stark differences between warming levels of 1.5C and 2C above 
preindustrial temperatures, with 420 million fewer people experiencing extreme heatwaves at 1.5C rather than at 




better coordination between cities and national governments to ensure consistency in policy 
output (EUROCITIES, 2016).   
  Expedited movement from precarity to stability is a central tenet of our theoretical 
framework, but it must go hand-in-hand with cities that continue to plan for the future, i.e. 
consistent development of new city-wide accommodations that are cost-effective, 
environmentally friendly, and affordable for all rather than ‘luxury’, rent controls to ensure 
housing markets are not plunged into hyperinflation, connections with neighbouring cities to 
ensure that burdens of housing allocation and development are not being shouldered by just 
one metropolis, and an engaged and enthusiastic civil society that welcomes inclusivity.  
 Conservative and restrictive bordering pushback against migration arises in times where 
some groups feel threatened by the arrival of ‘outsiders’ because of what might be perceived 
as ‘limited societal resources’- by ensuring a consistent investment in societal resources and 
engagement of civil society, cities can then limit inevitable pushback against higher levels of 
migration.   
  In addition to this, cities that continue to advocate on behalf of asylum-seekers (such 
as Bonn, Düsseldorf, and Cologne, among others) can help pull national governments 
towards inclusivity. Cities hold a prominent place in national politics, whether they are a 
capital city or a regional metropolis. The ability to demonstrate the benefits of inclusive 
policies can act as a buffer against more restrictive policymakers.   
  This also necessitates a long-term budgetary plan for cities. German cities serve as the 
ultimate example of this, with the vast majority of them having sold off public utilities and 
services when deficits climbed and economic pullbacks shook the country, only to reap the 
repercussions of those decisions in skyrocketing rent levels, housing shortages, and public 
welfare deficits over the subsequent decades. Thankfully, costs for sustainable building 




constructions can be made affordably for both the city and its eventual tenants, and with 
general German city reinvestment in affordable social housing construction and purchase of 
social housing stocks, the cities that have adjusted to the refugee influxes (while possibly 
struggling at the beginning) can ensure better adaptivity going forward so long as investment 
in public services continues.  
  That being said, much of this dynamism depends on the actions of the central 
government in both how the structure of governance is centred in the state and how the 
national government perceives the role of immigration and immigrants more generally.  
    
8.5.2 Blind Eyes and Perpetual Shrugs- a possible future of bordering  
National governments across the world recoiled from extending asylum rights to those 
refugees seeking protection in 2015, and the current experience with the UK may be a sign of 
future ‘offshoring’ border policies when it comes to asylum that may restrict the ability of 
refugees to apply for asylum or protection at the national border. Much as the UK utilises 
France’s Calais border as an external asylum checkpoint, it is not unconscionable to assume 
that wealthier nations will seek to further externalise places where refugees can declare 
asylum, such as an embassy. If a person flees their home country and transits through what a 
receiving country may consider to be a ‘safe third country’ even if that country lacks capacity 
to enact asylum protections, that person would be unable to declare asylum anywhere else.  
These practices will likely increase.  
  It is here where cities can attempt to circumvent the harsh bordering practices enacted 
by national governments. Humanitarian corridors, where a city and humanitarian organisation 
may work in tandem to secure a visa (tourist, work, etc.) for refugees in order to skirt border 
efforts, may arise. These corridors can involve private companies or educational institutions 




sanctuary cities, moving from simple protection to outreach and rescue (see Fauser, 2019).  
 At the same time, depending on how governance is structured in a country, a city may not 
have the relative independence to ‘shield’ refugees and migrants from immigration 
authorities if national priorities are restrictive against immigration. Cities may depend on 
contingent funding that comes with complying with immigration authorities in countries 
where governance is structured around the central government (i.e. the Westminster Model). 
In the future, it is likely that these governments, working through an institution like the EU, 
will further externalise the possibilities of asylum-seekers.   
  Beyond adding externalised checkpoints for asylum throughout Africa and the Middle 
East (see Frowd, 2019 for discussion on the EU’s utilisation of African states as ‘border 
checkpoints’), identity validation systems will likely become far more networked and spread 
as methods of security surveillance. Just as one’s phone can now contain access to a bank 
account, social profile, health information, etc., citizenship verification (such as through a 
digital passport) will likely be the next phase of securitised bordering.   
  This method works both internally and externally as well. Every time someone 
utilises, in this instance, a phone to pay, their identity can be tracked and checked for valid 
citizenship or residency status even if they are doing something as simple as buying 
groceries. How this data gets negotiated between the private companies that own payment 
applications and the government is a topic of future concern; at the moment, we only worry 
that this capability will soon exist, and that border enforcement agencies would have the 
ability to identify and deport someone not by violations of law, but because their digital 
identity verification demarcates their status in society.   
  This digital status could be tied to the ability to obtain housing, integration benefits, a 
railcard, etc. as a national government moves towards a more controlled immigration 




structure of a country, this could be subverted by the local level if the local level is amenable 
to inclusion and greater integration.   
  It is also likely we will see an increase in targeted, localised projects from the EU 
within states that are the source of large migrations that encourage developing protected and 
sustainable structures rather than allowing migrants to file for asylum in the EU. Just as the 
EU currently funds the Libyan ‘coast guard’ to enforce returns in the Mediterranean, one 
would expect (should drought conditions worsen in the highest-temperature areas) the EU to 
begin attempting to create micro ‘eco-cities’ through badly affected states as a method to 
justify security and sustainability within a country that is otherwise experiencing 
drought/famine.   
  ‘Technological solutions’ will likely be championed as a reason for migrants to stay, 
with the EU encouraging companies to invest in sustainable technologies or jobs in countries 
badly affected by global warming. However, in extreme conditions where global warming 
affects the effectiveness of governments and governance (see Puaschunder, 2020), corporate 
exploitation of extreme conditions is likely where a strong centralised government cannot 
ensure the wellbeing of its citizens.   
  As of present writing, Germany held the EU presidency and failed to implement an  
EU-wide migration pact New Pact on Migration and Asylum (see European Commission,  
2020) due to difficulties amid the pandemic; the effort to implement this now rests with the 
Portuguese presidency. Among its stipulations are increased border utilisation for assessing 
asylum claims, though these may not necessarily take place at the EU borders, either external 
or internal; another notable stipulation is increasing support for ‘refugee-sending countries’.  
In more extreme future global conditions, it is possible that the EU may create a 
‘work/asylum stipulation’, where the EU and its member states may agree to view a person’s 




operation for an indeterminate amount of time, thereby demonstrating qualities that most 
member states value, i.e. work experience, qualifications, unique experience, etc. What this 
may entail is a subversive act of deterrence: by forcing someone to work for an indeterminate 
amount of time within a country where there is a ‘securitised area’ before applying for 
asylum, the individual may develop a life/sense of stability within that place even if it exists 
as a temporary solution solely constructed to keep asylum-seekers at bay.  
Both can ‘mitigate’ asylum scepticism towards more inclusive asylum and integration 
policies while allowing for economic productivity towards the EU/member states. Neither is 
appealing as a method of ensuring humanitarian principles or the rights of asylum are 
respected, as the former takes advantage of a person’s productivity while keeping integration 
benefits/possibilities at an arm’s length, and the latter can be perceived as neo-colonialism by 
both intervening within an unstable country and not allowing those fleeing violence to leave 
the country in question.  
Though it is hard to project the future with any degree of certainty outside of weather 
probabilities week by week, the impact of global warming over the course of the next century 
will cause instability and precarious situations across the world. People will need to leave and 
find safe harbour under extreme duress, and unless there is a unified response for equitable 
treatment of those in need of protection, we will likely see further externalisation and 
restriction.   
    
8.6 Conclusion  
  This chapter reflected on the work conducted in this thesis and what it means for both 
Germany and the European Union. Specifically, it sought to juxtapose the theoretical 
framework developed in this thesis to the otherwise restrictive bordering policies enacted 




relatively inclusive policies favoured by cities and the stronger restrictions implemented by 
central governments.   
  While cities became more inclusive since the summer of migration, central 
governments and the EU sought to push back more migrants through bilateral agreements, 
such as that made with Turkey and that made with the Libyan Coast Guard. Additionally, 
while the German government spearheaded the suspension of the Dublin Regulation in 2015, 
it immediately imposed restrictions on new refugees, with tiered allowances doled out by 
nationality and new requirements imposed on them under threat of possible deportation.  
Rights to family reunification were suspended for 2 years and never fully reinstated.  
 However, cities have demonstrated the ability to adapt and learn under the pressure of 
accommodating new refugees, both through policy learning and improvisation. Cities have 
also become outspoken in their support for refugees by advocating for the central government 
to actively engage in rescuing refugees in danger in the Mediterranean. Their voices have 
been emboldened by networks such as EUROCITIES and through the EU, with group 
pledges to create sustainable pathways for city development to promote inclusivity.   
 Their effect on national governments’ and the EU’s policies surrounding externalised borders 
remains to be seen, as border securitisation and the methods enacted by the EU and its 
member states flies in the face of cities that have demanded more social inclusion. Cities may 
develop methods of shielding refugees from scrutiny from immigration authorities, or work 
together to skirt federal guidelines on how asylum procedures are enacted, depending on how 
dependent cities are on their national governments.  
  What happens in the future, however, is likely up to central governments. With the 
current trend of externalised borders and bilateral agreements, it is unlikely that central 
governments and cities will agree on immigration and asylum prospects and allowances, and 




immigration authorities, where possible. Integration will be largely up to local practices and 
the discretion therein.  
  
  
Chapter 9:  ‘And, in the end…’- Conclusions, Future Avenues 
of Research, and Policy Recommendations  
This thesis presented a novel comparative study utilising a unique holistic and 
multidisciplinary approach to how housing policies affect prospects for refugee integration 
into Germany by focusing on two cities: Leverkusen and Berlin, and is, at the time of writing, 
one of the few, if not the only comparative study of asylum housing utilising a governance 
analysis framework. These two cities were chosen due to their similar governance structures 
as well as their similar outlook/political approaches regarding refugee integration, but also for 
the different strategies they employed to house refugees. We analysed these two cities 
through two theoretical lenses: that of multi-level governance and theories of and around 
migrant integration.  
  Multi-level governance as a frame of analysis was chosen due to the necessity to 
understand how housing and integration policies are structured, i.e. if they are top-down 
(Type I MLG) and centred on the city government implementing policy directly, or if they 
are horizontal policies (Type II MLG) where the city government engages in a relationship 
with a private organisation for the implementation of a policy.    
  Integration theories were also chosen as a second frame of analysis because it allowed 
us to understand both how integration functions as a subjective experience on behalf of both 
the individual and the government, and what aspects regarded as important within the main 
theories of integration can be promoted by city government policies, and what is extraneous 
or burdensome for the individual. With integration theories, we did not attempt to syncretise 




among migration scholars- instead, we utilised a general definition according to what 
mattered most to the subjects interviewed for this study.  
  Within the theories of integration presented in this thesis, one stood out in particular: 
that of interculturalism, which itself is derived from the contact hypothesis developed by 
Allport (1954), which states that direct contact between two different groups removes 
barriers of entry to acceptance of the different groups into a larger group. This was 
demonstrated through the interviews conducted with refugees, who continually stated that the 
largest help in feeling welcome in Germany was through the volunteer efforts and those 
native Germans who took the initiative to guide refugees through the country’s bureaucratic 
processes.   Housing was our primary focus as the nexus of both integration theories and 
MLG because housing, conceptually, is something that can be actively altered by policy and 
is considered to be one of the key tenets of successful integration. In the case of this study, all 
types of housing occupied by the interview partners became essential to the understanding of 
how they perceived their integration.   
Reflecting on our first research question, the interview partners occupied variegated 
types of housing at the time of interview, such mass refugee accommodations, container 
accommodations built specifically for refugees (mimicking apartments but constructed with 
short-duration materials), private apartments, and private houses. Within our understanding 
of housing, propinquity to neighbourhoods and communities, agency (i.e. the ability of 
refugees to choose their own space and how agency was gained or lost through policy), and 
accessibility of the housing market were important factors in determining how comfortable 
refugees were in their housing situations and in their respective cities more generally.  
 Within Leverkusen, the primary focus of the city’s refugee housing policy was to move 
refugees from mass accommodation into private housing as quickly as possible while 




Berlin, the goal was similar but the implementation was less direct, with volunteer 
coordination not centrally organised between governance partners as it was in Leverkusen.  
  Reflecting on our second research question, the fieldwork revealed the inherent 
juxtaposition in refugee integration outlooks between Leverkusen and Berlin. Though the 
cities are of different sizes and populations, the general governance structure is similar in 
fundamental processes but different in policy implementation: the Leverkusen Model, being a 
strong form of collaborative Type II MLG between the NGOs Caritas and the Refugee 
Council and the Leverkusen government, was expanded rather than reconfigured in the face 
of a refugee influx, while the Berlin government implemented piecemeal and ad-hoc Type II 
policies around refugee housing until a new government was elected in 2016. The primary 
reasonings behind each city government’s respective policies was cost-savings; the irony is 
that the Berlin government had to keep spending to change/remake its refugee housing and 
neighbourhood policies, while Leverkusen expanded its Model and continued to benefit from 
its inherent cost-savings.  
  Housing was found to not only be integral for refugees as a place where integration 
can begin, but paramount in determining how their integration can proceed and central to 
accessing other facets of integration. It provides them with an opportunity to access German 
society as well as a place to establish a sense of normalcy in a new life, and access to German 
society can help them navigate the complexities of German bureaucracy surrounding 
attaining new housing and living on their own. How cities (and countries) structure their 
policies around housing and refugee accommodations can either help or hinder this effect.  
Finally, reflecting on our third research question, based on these two case studies, we 
constructed an original theoretical framework of refugee housing policy, the first of its kind, 
that also draws upon the strands of MLG and theories of integration discussed earlier. Our 




integration begins on day one, preferences is given to privatised housing, and direct and 
transparent connections with NGOs allow for specialised care and services that the city 
government may not be able to provide within refugee accommodations. Additionally, it 
allows room for neighbourhood-oriented volunteer initiatives that can be tailored to 
microsituations, such as housing or neighbour issues in a district of a city such as through 
Berlin’s BENN.   
  The theoretical framework also posits that engagement of civil society is desirable 
and necessary for the swift functioning of a successful refugee housing and integration 
policy, as it allows for direct contact between nationals and refugees and lowers the 
presumed  
‘cultural barriers’ either side may perceive of the other, abiding by the theories of 
interculturalism and acculturation. Creating a holistic refugee housing and integration policy 
requires open and dedicated engagement by all levels of society, with clear and transparent 
lines of communication between all and discussions with the refugees themselves as to what 
their needs are.    
  In total, this study has allowed us to gain a deeper understanding of an intersectional 
social and political experience that has not been well covered in previous studies, either 
within housing studies or integration studies. We have taken a view of macro factors (law 
changes, refugee allocations, etc) to how they have affected the individuals on whom the 
policies are enacted and clarified that housing, both the physical/mental space and the 
policies around it, strongly affect refugee integration prospects through issues surrounding 
location, community access, government transparency, and housing type, and can determine 
how well refugee integration proceeds.   
Table 6 summarises the policy recommendations for cities derived from the empirical 





  Policy Recommendations  
For first/mass asylum accommodations:  • Refugees should have as little time as 
possible in first- and mass 
accommodation facilities before 
moving into the private housing  
 
 sector, and should be moved to 
accommodations that can ensure 
privacy, good hygiene, and security.  
• NGO and volunteer initiatives should 
work together with the government to 
enable refugees the opportunity to 
interact with natives inside the mass 
accommodations and within the local 
neighbourhood.   
• Government must maintain a presence 
in its mass accommodations to ensure 
transparency (if operated by a third 
party).  
• Government should ensure direct 
support to refugees living in mass 
accommodations through utilisation 
of social/care workers, psychologists, 
medical doctors, etc. These care 
workers should have a direct line to 
government civil service members in 
case of any malfeasance on the part of 
accommodation operators (if not 
operated by the government).  
• New mass accommodations should be 
constructed near/within 
neighbourhoods in order to access 
community goods and societal 
resources. Before construction, 
community consultations should be 
held to ‘introduce’ refugees to new 
communities; this lowers the 
accessibility threshold refugees may 
face from those who are reluctant to 
allow refugees to live nearby.  
• In times of low refugee intake, 
accommodations should be retrofitted 
to be more durable/sustainable to cut 
down on excessive repair and 
maintenance costs associated with 




For entry into the housing market:  ● Cities whose populations are 
projected to continually grow must 
ensure there is a steady availability 
of housing on the private market, 
including an increasing market share 
of social/subsidised housing 
available for at-risk and low-wage 
groups.   
● Cities can and should engage with 
private housing developers to ensure 
that a high percentage (at least 20%) 
of new units being constructed are 
sequestered specifically for at-risk 
groups.  
● Government should actively promote 
entry into the housing market for 
refugees by coordinating civil 
society/volunteer efforts to find 
suitable spaces in the housing 
market. This includes collaborating 
with refugee-facing NGOs and 
community-oriented organisations to  
 
  facilitate the creation of ‘social 
networks’ between refugees and the 
native population.  
 ●  Government should remove/ignore 
delineated asylum classification 
distinctions that would otherwise 
restrict a refugee’s ability to enter 
into the private housing market and 
society at large.   
For neighbourhood-oriented integration policies  ●  Government should promote 
‘locality’ of refugee mass 
accommodations, whereby 
communities that have a mass 
accommodation nearby can interact 
with the refugees housed in it.   
 ●  Government should promote 
community-oriented meeting areas 
(community centres) and 
programmes (such as sports, arts, 
culture, etc.) that serve to encourage 
interaction between refugees and the 




 ●  Government should look to partner 
with local organisations to formulate 
outreach programmes that can help 
to increase language acquisition and 
lower perceptual barriers of societal 
entry.  
For governance over integration policies:  ●  If governance over refugee housing 
and general integration policy 
implementation is centralised 
through the city government with 
the government as the primary actor 
of capacity delivery, the government 
should continually coordinate with 
relevant NGOs for any relief efforts, 
as the NGOs will seek to provide 
and offer aid regardless of whether 
or not the government wants them 
to.  
 ●  If governance over refugee housing 
and general integration policy is 
devolved into Type II MLG 
arrangements where either 
partnering or contracting with third 
organisations is done, then the 
government should not take a hands-
off approach to ensuring standards 
of policy delivery and 
implementation, nor should  
  governments seek to contract out 
essential services while removing 
ensured oversight of how the 
contracted parties implement the 
policy.  
 ●  There must be direct lines of 
communication from mass 
accommodations to civil service and 
vice versa regardless of how 
governance over the policy area is 
conducted. This includes 
communication from residents 
(refugees) to the relevant civil 
service officers to ensure contracted 
party compliance with standards for 
accommodation maintenance and 




 ●  Governance partners should remain 
consistent over time unless there is a 
breach of ethics from the contracted 
organisations.  
 ●  Government should seek to facilitate  
the creation of nationality 
representative cultural groups (if 
they do not already exist), and seek 
to tailor policy guidelines with their 
recommendations.  
 ●  Short-term cost-savings should not 
be prioritised over policy 
entrepreneurship, i.e. developing a 
new mode of either governance or 
policy implementation that can 
increase integration outcomes for 
refugees, since increasing refugees’ 
access to societal resources can 
allow them to ‘pay back’ a city’s 
investment in them faster.   
Table 6- A summary of policy recommendations for cities as derived from the work conducted in this thesis. 
    
One caveat of the theoretical framework is that it depends on consistent sustainable 
housing practices enacted by the city. Both cities had to face and adapt to the increasing 
housing availability and affordability crises that had slowly crept in over the years, raising the 
question of whether the cities would have sought to alleviate the pressure placed on its 
residents if the refugee influx had not occurred. Given estimated population growth 
throughout main cities in Europe, developing sustainable and affordable housing is key to the 
functioning of the framework, both in terms of supporting privatised housing for refugees and 
also to alleviate any social tensions that may arise between regular residents and refugees in a 
situation where housing provision for the public may appear to be scarce.  
  The theoretical framework should undergo means-testing to determine its validity in 
public policy so as to ‘iron out any kinks’ that may not be necessarily generalisable within its 




  The theoretical framework and the normative values within reflect on our broader 
notions of allowances for housing and asylum in general in Germany and Europe, both of 
which have enacted further measures since 2015 to increase bordering practices both 
internally and externally. It also furthers our understanding of the differences between the 
local and the national level, where the local level seeks (generally) greater inclusivity while 
the national level seeks to limit migrant access to the country. The contrast between them 
also brings to the fore the contravention of the values the EU is supposed to represent, as 
enumerated in its various treatises: plurality, human rights, equality, etc. This policy and 
outlook differential between the local and the national/supranational can lead to strain on the 
ground for refugees who seek family reunification, as well as access to integration benefits 
when they arrive in a country.  
  This leads us back to one of the Leverkusen Model’s core tenets, and a policy stance 
adopted by the new Berlin government: housing can be allocated regardless of asylum status 
because integration begins on day one of arrival. Artificial stratification of refugees can only 
serve to further divide them from native societies when the opposite is the stated goal of 
every national government that has accepted asylum-seekers.   
  The core contributions of this thesis extend from that precept: housing is a key 
component that must immerse refugees in their new societies rather than cut them off from it.  
This extends to border camps and remote refugee accommodations operated by the EU. 
Cities that can offer more direct support for housing and access to societal resources to 
refugees upon arrival and utilise the help and goodwill of civilian volunteers through 
coordinated outreach and targeted support will have a strong foundation on which refugees 
can begin to feel integrated within a new country and will lower costs for EU member states 
and cities. Utilising a multi-methods approach to understanding policy impacts from both the 




the true impact of policies, such as whether policies that may be touted as successes by 
government due to cost-savings or facilitating government processes may be a detriment to 
the target population. In this case, we found that refugee/representative population 
connection and input to the local government is paramount in determining how truly effective 
a policy is in its most important determinant, i.e., delivering services to the target population. 
If the targets of a specific social policy are not included in determining how a policy is 
implemented, it may only be a success from the governance side and serve to exclude the 
wellbeing of the target population. This is reflected in the theoretical framework developed in 
this thesis (see chapter 7.5.3).  
Overall, and somewhat intuitively, our core finding is that when refugees are given 
more opportunities to both access societal resources and facilitate entry into their countries of 
asylum, they are better able to ‘integrate’, as it were, allowing for more immediate 
contributions to both their new city of residence and country as a whole.  
  When it comes to refugee housing, pecuniary costs for both the cities and the state are 
typically at the forefront of policymakers’ minds, as we have seen from our two case studies. 
While there is an upfront immediate cost to enacting policy reform with refugee housing, as 
we have seen in Leverkusen, there are cost-savings in both financial and, more importantly, 
human terms. In this case, short-term expenditures pale in comparison to the longer-term 
benefits of ensuring that refugees can integrate into their new society faster and become 
taxpaying and contributing members of society. Restricting their access to facets of 
integration, such as housing, language classes, education, etc. only enacts further costs 
towards the state/local government in necessitated upkeep costs for mass accommodations 
and state monetary support, which can lead to political backlash.  
  How the EU and its member states choose to organise their asylum and integration 




cooperate with national government requirements or mandates. This, in turn, affects how 
electorates perceive refugees and their place in society, and how integration can be conducted 
between a local government and the refugees who arrive there.   
  There are many avenues for future research in this field given the plurality of housing 
and support policies that grew from the refugee influx of 2014/2015, including: studying the 
effect volunteer efforts have on housing integration for refugees; analysing the integration 
pathways of refugees in cities with more restrictive housing policy allowances versus those 
with greater housing allowances utilising the theoretical framework created in this thesis; if 
and how the refugee influx has caused city governments to reinvest in social welfare 
infrastructure, and whether refugees will benefit from that reinvestment; comparing cities 
whose integration policies were centralised versus those that had policies devolved to their 
district offices; uncovering the ‘policy rationality’ behind national government policies on 
asylum and bordering; studying the gap between the EU’s bordering policies and the 
inclusive policies advocated by cities; etc.   
  Refugees will constitute more than solely a political burden going forward, as the 
world’s climate changes and forces difficult situations on already precarious governing 
problems. Those cities and countries that can position themselves as able to adapt due to 
having learned lessons from previous policy failures (either within their own borders or from 
without) will likely benefit, as Leverkusen and Bavaria have, from ensuring that refugees can 
transition into normal lives quickly and begin contributing to society. Utilising the findings in 
this thesis, cities that are able to engage with and partner with local organisations, both 
general non-profit welfare organisations and representative national/ethnic organisations, and 
focus policy formulation on immersing refugees into local populations without condition will 




by rising numbers of asylum-seekers; all that is required for these efforts to succeed is the 
drive to make it so.  
















Appendix: List of Interviews  
Interview Number  Description of Interviewee  Date  
In Berlin   
1  Landesamt official  24 November 2018  
2  Andreas Tölke  17 December 2018  
3  Sebastian Muschter  20 November 2018  
4  Christiane Beckmann  14 November 2018  
5  Karin Windt  2 December 2018  
6  Flüchtlinge Willkommen  20 November 2018  
7  Give Something Back to 
Berlin  
Via email  
8  Julia von Stülpnagel  15 December 2018  




10  Berlin Senate Representative  14 December 2018  
11  Bezirksamt coordinator  3 December 2018  
12  Bezirksamt employee  11 December 2018  
13  ET  27 November 2018  
14  Tempelhof employee  9 December 2018  
15  BD  16 November 2018  
16  DD  17 November 2018  
17  HD  27 November 2018  
18  JD  29 November 2018  
19  KD  1 December 2018  
20  LD  3 December 2018  
21  MD  4 December 2018  
22  ND  4 December 2018  
23  PD  7 December 2018  
24  QD  10 December 2018  
25  XD  17 December 2018  
26  ZD  19 December 2018  
In Leverkusen   
27  Volunteer worker  15 February 2019  
28  Andreas Laukötter  7 March 2019  
29  David Nelson  10 February 2019  
30  Jürgen Dreyer  18 February 2019  
31  Civil servant  9 February 2019  
32  Civil servant A  2 March 2019  
33  Caritas Employee  20 February 2019  
34  Caritas Employee A  20 February 2019  
35  Refugee Council employee  20 February 2019  
36  Social worker  12 February 2019  
37  AQL  1 March 2019  
38  AWL  6 March 2019  
39  BQL  1 March 2019  
40  BDL  27 February 2019  
41  HSL  7 February 2019  
42  KPL  9 February 2019  
43  MPL  9 March 2019  
44  YSL  16 February 2019  
  
  
List of Abbreviations  
Berlin Entwickelt Neuen Nachbarschaften  BENN  
Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge  BAMF  
Christian Democratic Union  CDU  
Christian Social Union  CSU  
Civic integration scale  CIVIX  
Common European Asylum System  CEAS  




European Council on Refugees and Exiles  ECRE  
European Union  EU  
Evangelische Jugend- und Fürsorgewerk  EJF  
German Democratic Republic  GDR  
Give Something Back to Berlin  GSBTB  
International Organisation for Migration  IOM  
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant  ISIL  
Landesamt für Flüchtlingsangelegenheiten  LAF  
Landesamt für Gesundheit und Soziales, State 
Office for Health and Social Affairs  
Lageso  
Modular Accommodations for Refugees  MUF  
Multi-level Governance  MLG  
Non-governmental organisation  NGO  
North-Rhein Westphalia  NRW  
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development  
OECD  
Public-private partnership  PPP  
Search-and-rescue  SAR  
Senatsverwaltung für Integration, Arbeit, und 
Soziales  
Senate  
Social Democratic Party  SPD  
United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees  
UNHCR  
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